新时代法理：从冲突走向合作——建立法理型社会的法律社会学思考

以法律社会学的三大研究范式即功能主义、自由多元主义和马克思主义的社会观-国家观-法律观之间的主要差异——合作、竞争和冲突——为立论基础,论证了当代中国由马克思主义的冲突观转向功能主义的合作观的必需。依据这种＂从冲突走向合作＂的新时代法理,结合当代中国国家治理的六个基本法律问题,阐述了如何在关键转型上遵循新法律理性,从基调伦理与宪政改革上建立法理型社会秩序。     

竞争法律体系协调性的内涵及其标志

协调性是竞争法律体系的根本属性,对于衡量竞争立法的科学性和竞争执法的有效性具有重要价值。研究竞争法律体系的协调性,可以有效防止和化解竞争法律冲突。竞争法律体系的协调性是由竞争法律调整目标的协调性、竞争法律原则的协调性、调整对象的协调性、法律责任的协调性以及执法体制的协调性所构成的。从应然角度分析,中国竞争法律体系协调化应当具备形式、内容和价值三个要件。     

不正当竞争规制与商业言论自由

正当竞争边界的模糊性与商业言论边界的不确定性,决定了不正当竞争规制与商业言论自由之间存在模糊难决的空间。不正当竞争边界的模糊性易导致不正当竞争规制过宽,仅依据不正当竞争法处理有关商业言论行为可能会导致基本权利价值受到损害。商业言论边界的不确定性使得欧美至今未能对商业言论进行准确的界定,也未形成统一的商业言论保护的原则和标准,其仅受到有限保护。不正当竞争规制的宽泛性与商业言论自由的有限性会不可避免地导致二者发生冲突。对此,欧美所进行的立法及实践表明,商业言论自由是有限度的,当商业言论涉及不正当竞争规制时,只有商业言论事关重大社会公共利益时才可能受到宪法保护。其立法和实践显示出法院根据不正当竞争法和宪法进行双重审查的特点,而依据宪法的基本权利价值进行考量是平衡二者冲突的关键之所在。这些立法和实践为我国商业言论保护提供了可资借鉴的经验。     

Leaders, voters and activists in the elections in Great Britain 2005 and 2010

Discussion of the relationship between parties and the electorate is often based on the notion of partisan constituencies, that parties adopt policy positions that correspond to the average position of the party supporters. In contrast, the Downsian “spatial model” assumes that parties are purely opportunistic and maneuver to gain as many votes as possible. A third, more empirical model, based on the early work of Stokes, assumes that voter choice is based on the evaluation of each of the party leader’s competence or ability to deliver policy success. Such an evaluation can be provided by individual voter overall assessment in terms of the leaders’ character traits.This paper attempts to relate these three classes of models by examining the elections in Great Britain in 2005 and 2010. Using the British Election Study, we construct spatial models of these elections in Great Britain as well as in the three regions of England, Scotland and Wales. The models incorporate the electoral perceptions of character traits. We compare the equilibrium vote maximizing positions with the partisan positions, estimated by taking the mean of each of the parties voters’ preferred positions. We define an equilibrium to be a stable attractor if the vote share at the equilibrium exceeds the share at the partisan position by a significant proportion (determined by the implicit error of the stochastic model). We infer that none of the equilibria are stable attractors, and suggest that the partisan positions are also preferred by the party activists, the key supporters of each party.     

The price of personalizing politics: Political distrust and economic performance in Latin America, 1996–2006

While research has provided evidence that culture and institutional performance shape individual level trust in political institutions, scholars have neglected to adequately estimate the effect of political institutions and macroeconomic conditions on trust. Using data from the World Value Surveys for eleven Latin American cases, we test if countries with “partyizing” electoral systems - those with rules that encourage voters to hold the party, not individuals, accountable for government performance - experience lower levels of distrust in political parties and the legislature in times of poor economic conditions than those countries with “personalizing” electoral rules. Our analysis shows that the macro political and economic context largely conditions the impact of culture and institutional performance on political trust.     

Electoral losers revisited – How citizens react to defeat at the ballot box

The paper seeks to reconcile insights from winner-loser gap research with mainstream understanding of election legitimacy. The paper acknowledges that winning and losing elections creates differential incentives for citizens to remain supportive of their political system, but it argues that losers nevertheless have enough reasons to remain supportive in absolute terms. Drawing on democratic theory, the paper develops a rationale for why citizens are willing to accept electoral defeat voluntarily, and suggest a new way to conceptualize citizen reactions to election outcomes. It presents findings from a sample of election studies in established democracies to show that winners typically become more supportive whereas losers at minimum retain their level of support from before the election. It concludes that elections, when reasonably well executed, as they most often are in established democracies, build system support rather than undermine it.     

府际关系与政府创新扩散：一个文献综述

本文对有关府际关系及其对政府创新扩散的影响的相关文献进行了初步综述,并探讨了这些文献对中国的启示。本文从垂直和水平两个方向分析了府际关系,并进一步将垂直关系分为自上而下和自下而上两个方面,将水平关系划分成竞争和学习两个维度,进而从上述四个方面对已有研究文献进行综述,发现了目前研究的主要特征及问题,并指出了未来研究方向。最后,文章探讨了中国政治体制的特点及其同这些文献的关系,并对中国政府创新扩散的实践与研究前景进行了总结。     

台湾政党体系发展趋势探析

2009年台湾的县市长选举、2010年初的两次“立委”补选以及年底的“五都”选举表明,民进党的政治实力已经从2008年的低谷回升.鉴于国民党和民进党各有源于不同阶层、不同地域的基本支持者,台湾民众在身份认同、统“独”议题、两岸关系、涉外关系方面存在较明显的“蓝、绿”分野,有理由预料均衡两党体系和政党轮替,将成为岛内的政...     

外贸豁免制度的贸易保护功能研究

随着各国贸易保护战略的推进,反垄断法作为政府进行经济调控的工具,与贸易保护政策间的互动关系日益紧密。对外贸易反垄断豁免正是各国为满足贸易需求而普遍适用的竞争政策,它对于促进一国对外贸易发展、提高国际竞争力、保护国内产业利益具有特别的功能和效果,但其适用也受到限制。根据发达国家的有关立法和实践,我国《反垄断法》下的外贸豁免制度尚需完善,惟有如此方能确保其必要的贸易保护功能得以有效发挥。     

Three statutory regimes at impasse： ＂Reverse payments＂ in ＂pay-for-delay＂ settlement agreements between brand-name and generic drug companies

Antitrust authorities in both the United States and Europe have expressed deep concern over settlements of antitrust cases in the pharmaceutical sector, settlements involving ＂reverse payments＂ from plaintiffs to defendants, large sums paid by branded pharmaceutical companies to generic competitors in exchange for promises to stay offthe market. Such ＂pay-for-delay＂ settlements have proliferated in the United States since Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have found them unproblematic despite the Federal Trade Commission＇s persistently strong position that they violate the antitrust laws. These cases arise at the intersection of three statutory regimes seeking to promote innovation, three clusters of doctrine and policy that have interacted only to reach impasse： the Patent Act, the 1984 amendment to the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, and finally the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Antitrust is a late comer to the fierce competition over patented drugs, competition that permeates the approval process in the Food ＆ Drug Administration [FDA], competition that is restrained by these pay-for-delay settlement agreements. To set the stage, we begin with the Patent Act and its relationship to the FDA approval process. The story of pay-for-delay settlements then proceeds to the settlement agreements and their antitrust implications. We conclude that the best solution in these antitrust cases would be adoption of the FTC＇s approach of presumptive illegality. Together with an amendment proposed to fix the food and drug act, the presumptive illegality of pay-for-delay settlements under the antitrust laws would make the market for pharmaceuticals more price competitive, open weak patents to serious challenge, and as a result save consumers billions of dollars annually without taking from branded drug companies legitimately earned incentives to engage in research and development.