Coalition incentives and party bias in Chile

This article revisits the debate over Chile's binomial electoral rules and its consequences and examines how the new electoral system conceived by a democratic congress altered political competition. It utilizes a seat-vote model of multiparty competition to analyze party bias under the binomial rule. This approach differs substantively from prior studies of the Chilean case that focused primarily on the disproportionality of aggregate results. In contrast to earlier analyses, the findings reveal that the allocation of the seats under the binominal resulted in significant party bias benefiting the main parties of the right. This bias, however, was eliminated after the electoral reform. The new rule continues to provide majoritarian benefits to parties receiving larger shares of votes, but this effect is less pronounced than before. It is now easier for small parties to gain seats, which has increased party fragmentation. However, we show that coalition incentives, which were heralded as one of the main advantages of the binomial rule, are also significant under the new rule in use since 2017.     

The 2020 presidential election and beliefs about fraud: Continuity or change?

The 2020 presidential campaign was plagued by charges of voter fraud both before and after the election took place. While past literature finds that electoral losers are most likely to express misgivings about election integrity, little else is known about the characteristics of individuals who exhibit these beliefs or how the beliefs have changed over time. Employing national surveys from 2012, 2016, 2018, and 2020, we examine the levels of pre-election expectations of fraud in the event of an electoral loss over time, as well as the individual-level correlates of beliefs in a range of election-related conspiracy theories prominent in 2020. Our analysis reveals that beliefs in election fraud are common and stable across time, and only occasionally relate to partisanship. Moreover, we find that, even accounting for the influence of partisan motivated reasoning, several psychological orientations––conspiracy thinking, anomie, dark triad personality traits, and denialism––play a unique role in promoting perceptions of voter fraud.     

Capturing vote-seeking incentives and the cultivation of a personal and party vote

Electoral rules establish incentives that encourage candidates to strike a particular balance between cultivating their own personal reputations and cultivating shared party reputations. Higher levels of intraparty competition stress the need for an individual reputation and minimize the usefulness of a shared, party reputation. We develop a new indicator of intraparty competition that addresses shortcomings pointed out in previously used indicators. We also identify new, particularly intuitive indicators of ”personal” and ”party” vote seeking. Using within-system and across-system variation in parliamentary elections in Japan, we find that candidate manifestos contain more frequent uses of first-person pronouns and candidate names and fewer references to political parties when intraparty competition is stiffest.     

Hidden in plain sight? Irregularities on statutory forms and electoral fraud

The most common method of tabulating election results around the world is manually compiling paper forms at the local level. Recent election disputes in developing democracies, particularly in Africa, have centered on irregularities observed on these forms. However, scholars do not yet have a good understanding of the distribution of these irregularities, nor of their relationship to systematic fraud. In this paper, we theorize a catalog of irregularities that goes beyond simple vote tally editing. We use deep neural networks to identify these irregularities on forms from about 30,000 polling stations in Kenya’s 2013 presidential election. We find that although irregularities manifest differently in government and opposition strongholds, they do not correlate with election outcomes, and they are unaffected by the presence of electoral observers. Taken together, our findings suggest scholars of election integrity should pay greater attention to problems of benign human error and overtaxed bureaucrats.     

欧洲统一市场的建立与对国家干预的规制

为了促进欧洲统一市场的建立,《欧共体条约》确定了竞争规则和自由流动规则,对成员国制定的不利于统一市场建立的政府干预措施,如授予公用企业独占权、给予国家援助、制定歧视性贸易措施、对私人破坏竞争的行为不作为等进行规制。在欧共体法院的有力保障下,这些规则在推动欧洲一体化进程中发挥了重要作用,特别是其中的竞争规则,因其具有中立、开放之品格而成为规范经济和政治关系、促进共同体市场建立的核心手段和"发动机"。     

论规制知识产权滥用与相关竞争法的制订——从“本土化”的视角

针对发达国家跨国公司的知识产权滥用,我国尚未制订专门的相关竞争法对之予以规制;尽管已有学者在不同程度上对该法的制订进行过理论分析,但从＂本土化＂的角度予以研究的并不多见。本文初步探讨了与此相关的三个重要问题,即该法与我国知识产权国内法的关系、如何审慎地借鉴国外的相关立法、该法的制度重心应如何予以安排。在此基础上提出＂本土化＂的相关竞争法,应在总体上凸显＂最强化＂的制度特色。     

全球治理与国际竞争法的网络模式

由于新自由主义理论的勃兴和市场机制的内在张力,国际社会步入了国际化市场经济阶段。国际化市场经济要求国际社会建立国际竞争机制解决国际市场失灵。在"洛克式"的国际体系下,借助全球治理理论建立一个多层次的国际竞争治理网络模式是国际社会现实的选择。多层次的国际竞争治理网络模式可以借鉴经济学的联邦财政理论和体制竞争理论确定各个层次的管辖权划分。     

Domestic regulatory reform and transgovernmental networks: Brazil and China in the global competition regime

Developing countries increasingly participate in transgovernmental networks of global regulatory governance, but they do so in different ways. This article aims to provide an explanation for this variation for two of the major emerging powers in the world economy, Brazil and China, in their transition toward more active players in the global competition regime. Distinguishing between bilateral and multilateral transgovernmental networks and examining the domestic factors conditioning the transition of their national competition agencies from rule-takers to rule-promoters or rule-makers through these networks, the article makes theoretical contributions to the linkage between transgovernmentalism and the regulatory state. I argue that differing political needs and the incomplete process of regulatory state formation push domestic agencies to join transgovernmental networks, with a need for greater legitimacy steering the Brazilian regulators to multilateral networks and facilitating their transition from rule-takers to rule-promoters. The Chinese agencies' primary need for expertise rather than legitimacy, by contrast, led them to pursue technical assistance and cooperation via bilateral relationships. The Chinese approach has slowed its transition from rule-taker to rule-promoter where its norms and practices are aligned with the established powers. Such approach will further impede its transition into a global rule-maker in areas of competition law and policy where China's preferences diverge.     

论《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用

随着市场经济竞争的日趋激烈,各种新型不正当竞争行为层出不穷,为了加强对正当竞争主体的保护,应明确《反不正当竞争法》一般条款适用的条件、一般条款适用的限制规定,创造一个公平竞争的市场交易环境。     

反垄断法中垄断的法经济学分析

反垄断既是一个法律问题,又是一个复杂的经济问题。而垄断在反垄断法中是一个基石范畴的问题,垄断的合理界定是研究反垄断法的先决条件。通过对垄断利弊的评价分析,从经济学的角度来看,至少要从有效竞争,规模经济,公共利益等三个方面对垄断进行阐述,最后通过对垄断的阐述来界定反垄断法中垄断的范围。