全球治理与国际竞争法的网络模式

由于新自由主义理论的勃兴和市场机制的内在张力,国际社会步入了国际化市场经济阶段。国际化市场经济要求国际社会建立国际竞争机制解决国际市场失灵。在"洛克式"的国际体系下,借助全球治理理论建立一个多层次的国际竞争治理网络模式是国际社会现实的选择。多层次的国际竞争治理网络模式可以借鉴经济学的联邦财政理论和体制竞争理论确定各个层次的管辖权划分。     

论《反不正当竞争法》一般条款的适用

随着市场经济竞争的日趋激烈,各种新型不正当竞争行为层出不穷,为了加强对正当竞争主体的保护,应明确《反不正当竞争法》一般条款适用的条件、一般条款适用的限制规定,创造一个公平竞争的市场交易环境。     

反垄断法中垄断的法经济学分析

反垄断既是一个法律问题,又是一个复杂的经济问题。而垄断在反垄断法中是一个基石范畴的问题,垄断的合理界定是研究反垄断法的先决条件。通过对垄断利弊的评价分析,从经济学的角度来看,至少要从有效竞争,规模经济,公共利益等三个方面对垄断进行阐述,最后通过对垄断的阐述来界定反垄断法中垄断的范围。     

论反垄断法适用除外制度的理论基础

适用除外制度之所以成为反垄断法的一项重要制度,有其深刻的经济基础和法律基础。从经济基础上讲,垄断与竞争均是利弊兼具,垄断并不必然消灭竞争,甚至会使竞争加剧。适用除外制度的确立,有利于发挥垄断的积极作用, 克服竞争的某些消极作用。从法律基础上讲,反垄断法要解决虽然属于垄断、但又不予禁止的技术问题,只有通过适用除外制度加以解决;另一方面,适用除外制度还是反垄断法与其他法律进行协调的一项必不可少的措施。     

网络经济的竞争法规制探析

网络经济的有序发展需要竞争法的规制。网络经济效应必然带来网络经济行为的垄断性,形成有效的垄断市场结构,使消费者预期管理模式成为主要竞争模式,容易带来竞争策略的不正当性以及竞争地理范围的超国家性。这就对现有竞争法律规范提出了重大挑战,因此,要把合理、自由、全球性作为基本原则,通过修订相关法律概念术语、立足现有法律类型化网络不正当竞争行为、制定网络经济自治组织法与促进法、明确规定网络经济垄断标准等途径完善立法,依靠政府积极参与来促进网络经济竞争政策的完善,以期对网络经济的竞争行为进行有力规制。     

Issue ownership attack: how a political party can counteract a rival’s issue ownership

Abstract

A central part of representative democracy is that voters evaluate political parties based on how competently they handle issues, so-called ‘issue ownership’. Since issue ownership is a central ingredient in the vote choice, rival parties often try to influence how voters evaluate a competing party. This is an issue ownership attack. However, despite intense scholarly interest in issue ownership, the understanding of how parties shape issue ownership is very limited. Therefore a new theoretical model is tested here to understand issue ownership attack. Using several survey experiments, the analysis shows that a mainstream party can counteract another mainstream party’s issue ownership by reframing the issue and by blaming the party for its performance, but not by changing its own position on the issue. Hence, the study not only advances the understanding of issue ownership stability and change but also brings important insights on how parties influence voters.     

From Reset to Restart: The US-Russia Cyclical Relationship in the Post-Cold War Era

ABSTRACT

After a quarter of a century of oscillating relations between Washington and Moscow, Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy named Russia as one of the main challengers to the US-led order. Power transition theory is used to explain the alternating cooperative and competitive phases during each of the first three post-Cold War US presidencies: first, initial attempts at cooperation are driven by US willingness to integrate its former rival into the liberal order; then, regression into competition follows as Washington’s influence rises in territories that Moscow considers sensitive for its national security.     

Issue yield,campaign communication,and electoral performance: a six-country comparative analysis

Abstract

This article develops and tests a model that explains election outcomes on the basis of party strategy. It employs a new comparative dataset linking representative mass surveys from six European countries with Twitter analysis of campaign activity. The expectation is that parties whose issue agendas exploit electoral opportunities while avoiding risks will be rewarded at the polls. These risks and opportunities are modelled using issue yield, a general framework summarising public support, electoral alignments, and party credibility. Empirically, the article traces a three-step process: (1) the configuration of electoral risks and opportunities (which is captured through public opinion surveys) guides party communication (measured with Twitter data), and to the degree that (2) parties design their campaigns strategically (identified through issue yield), this in turn (3) improves their electoral performance (measured using official statistics). The analysis explains some of the most salient election outcomes of recent years.     

Full and Open Competition in Public Procurement: Values and Ethics in Contracting Opportunity

ABSTRACT

Governments have sought to respond to increasing pressures to accomplish aims with efficiency and at low cost. A perception of the potential for corruption and waste of public resources has been met with calls for transparency and accountability. Competition is believed to lead to impartial, optimal outcomes, but attention paid to competition in the literature suggests that the benefits are not universally clear. This paper considers ‘full and open competition’ as a policy promise, ethical obligation, and a matter of justice, drawing upon work of John Rawls and others, in the United States case. The research question is: What do Federal procurement data tell us about the nature of full and open competition in practice? This study draws upon contract data available from the U.S. Federal government, for fiscal years from 2015 to 2018. Through an ordinal regression, it is suggested that variation in the extent of competition results in part from size of project, size of the business (or potential business) receiving the project, and the industry classification, particularly in cases centering on commercial acquisitions. While ‘full and open competition’ is frequently employed, the difference between the normative value of the concept in statute, and practical outcomes in implementation, is clear. This difference has consequences for both vendors and the government.     

Comparisons among electoral systems: Distinguishing between localism and candidate-centered politics

Carey and Shugart (1995) offer a four component composite index of “incentives to cultivate a personal vote.” We argue that this index, while tapping important aspects of electoral system choice, is best regarded as encompassing two distinct dimensions: degree of party-centeredness of the electoral system, on the one hand, and incentives for “parochial” behavior on the part of legislators, on the other. Also, while we have no problem with the three indicators used by Carey and Shugart to measure party-centeredness; to measure parochial incentives we prefer to use a new measure, E (Grofman, 1999a) of the size of a legislator's electoral constituency, rather than using district magnitude, m, as a proxy for a the size of a legislator's geographic constituency, as Carey and Shugart do. In the conclusion to the paper we argue that the degree of similarity between any two electoral systems will depend upon the research question at issue, and that the expected degree of proportionality of election results is only one of the many political consequences of electoral laws to which we ought to be paying attention.