Leniency Program: A New Tool in Competition Policy to Deter Cartel Activity in Procurement Auctions

This paper discusses the impact of a leniency program on incentives within cartels. The objective of this program is to encourage a cartel member to confess and implicate his co-conspirators with hard evidence about their collusive agreement. We develop a simple model of cartel behavior under a first-price sealed-bid procurement auction and we show how an effective leniency program can prevent the internal coordination of cartel members.     

关于企业边界的理论评述与思考

企业边界理论存在的不足主要有:交易成本经济学缺乏环境变化的动态分析;新古典理论对不少现象缺乏解释力;竞争优势理论缺少深度分析;迈克尔的分析框架不能解释中国的现实问题。鉴于企业边界问题复杂而动态,因此企业边界的理论研究有待进一步深化。     

对江门市直党政机关竞争上岗几种评价结果的比较研究

用积差相关和纯相关法,对江门市直机关机构改革竞争上岗的五项指标进行分析,结果表明,群众在平时与演讲答辩时对竞争者评价标准趋于一致;领导在组织考察后对竞争者的评价,与群众在演讲答辩后对竞争者的评价关系不密切;领导在组织考察后对竞争者的评价,与演讲答辩后考官的评价不密切;领导在组织考察后对竞争者的评价与群众平时对竞争者的评价关系不密切;群众平时对竞争者的评价,与演讲答辩后考官的评价之间关系不密切;演讲答辩后群众对竞争者的评价,与考官对竞争者的评价之间关系不密切。     

The Making of the French Civil Code: An Economic Interpretation

The code Napoleon has been one of the first (on such a scale), the most important and the most pervasive processes of codification that ever took place. The purpose of our paper is to provide an economic analysis of the making of this codification. We compare customary codification and contractual codification: while the former amounts to the crystallisation of socially accepted practices, the latter consists in a creation of rules through a writing process. These theoretical differences are less clear-cut when history mixes practices and reasoned arguments. We then show that the making of the code Napoleon reflects it since it borrows from the social contract and the spontaneous order traditions.     

论新世纪我国经济伦理学发展的新领域

随着经济全球化和我国市场经济的发展和完善。必将赢来一个经济伦理学繁盛的新时代。在未来经济伦理学的发展中，产权伦理学，竞争伦理学，分配伦理学和生态经济伦理学将成为孕育重大突破和引领经济伦理学发展潮流的新学科，对社会经济生活的影响也将日趋明显。     

域名权和商标权的权利冲突及解决途径

随着网络在商业领域运用的逐渐普遍和深入,以及在巨大经济利益的驱动下,出现了大量的将他人商标注册为域名的行为,此类行为在恶意抢注的情形下构成侵权或不正当竞争行为,时此类权利冲突纠纷应区别驰名商标和普通商标适用中华人民共和国《商标法》、《反不正当竞争法》分别给予法律救济,同时为避免类似权利冲突的产生应完善我国相关的法律制度。     

对经济秩序的不同理解

经济秩序的重要性在当今已不言而喻。欧肯的“竞争经济秩序”、哈耶克的“自发经济秩序”和布坎南的“宪法经济秩序”各有其不同的理论特色。他们的经济秩序思想有一定的差异 ,但绝非完全矛盾 ,都值得人们学习和借鉴     

APEC与多边贸易体制

区域集团是世界贸易组织最惠国待遇的一个最大例外。区域集团由于其本身固有的排他性 ,势必会对多边贸易体制产生一定的冲击。但APEC却通过自己独特的合作机制将这种消极影响减少到最低限度 ,开创了区域合作的创新之路。本文在对当前主要区域经济组织进行比较研究的基础上 ,着重分析了APEC在制度创新及其与世界贸易体制的关系。接着分析了APEC在新形势下面临的挑战及我国的对策。在我国加入世界贸易组织之际 ,强调区域集团的作用具有深远的理论意义和现实意义 ,这将使我国经济在“区域集团”和“多边贸易体制”两个轮子上快速、健康、稳定地发展。     

Gender equality and the electoral system in the regional council of Sardinia

This article provides an account of the process followed by the legislative assembly of the autonomous region of Sardinia, the regional council, to change its electoral law. More specifically, this article will focus on equal access to the elective office at the regional council that the electoral law should have guaranteed. The introduction of measures of gender equality is part of the broader process of change in the electoral law of Sardinia. It is also part of the wider review process of Sardinian autonomy that finds its roots in the amendment of title V of the Italian Constitution of 2001. Following these reforms, constitutional law 3/2013 states that ‘In order to achieve the balance between men and women in representation’, the new electoral law should ‘promote a new equal opportunity in the access to the office of regional councillor’ (article 16). The introduction of double preference for male and female candidates would have guaranteed equality, instead of reserving a share of seats to the underrepresented sex. It would have involved a new approach to the problem of underrepresentation of women. At the 20 June 2013 meeting, however, double preference was rejected in a secret ballot. Yet only four years later, on 21 November 2017, the electoral law was changed to guarantee equal access for women.     

Religious market structure and democratic performance: Clientelism

Is there a connection between government intervention in religious competition and partisan clientelism in democratic systems? Drawing on the economics of religion, we argue that alongside commonly examined population-level religious processes (religious diversity), state-level religious processes (government regulation of competition in the religious market) affect institutional performance in electoral democracies. Linking comparative indicators of religion-state relations with measures of partisan clientelism, statistical analysis suggests that uncompetitive religious markets, such as those where a dominant religion is sponsored by the state, create incentives, infrastructures and opportunities that favour clientelism. The study emphasises the importance of light-touch regulation of religion not merely as a normative principle narrowly related to religious freedom, but also as a potential remedy that can enhance the quality of political institutions.