竞争政策规制与多边规则

当世界贸易大量增长,跨国投资快速增加,多国性企业逐渐在国际经济活动中扮演重要角色之后,贸易法和竞争法传统上互不跨越之界限早已不复存在。在国际社会已对贸易立法进行了多边规制之时,结合贸易、竞争政策和国内放松管制之间的互补关系,对竞争政策规制与多边规则进行探析具有一定的现实意义。     

日本-东盟自由贸易区建设对中国非传统收益的影响

新地区主义的非传统收益(Non-traditional gain)理论为研究区域经济合作问题提供了新的思路和方法。日本—东盟自由贸易区建设一方面对我国非传统收益会产生一系列影响,同时,也增加了中日联系的纽带。面对日本—东盟自由贸易区建设对我国非传统收益产生的不利影响,我们应当积极加以应对,以达到趋利避害的目的。     

全球化背景下的地方政府竞争——提高政府核心竞争力的战略选择

市场经济的发展,使处于平等地位的政府主体为获取更多的资源、政治影响力和控制权而处在相互争取和竞争的状态。而目前处在全球化背景下政府竞争的发展态势,正从单纯的国内竞争向国际国内全方位竞争演变,从有形的资金、人才和资源的竞争向无形的制度、服务和管理水平的竞争演变,从不规范竞争向规范竞争演变。为避免政府的过度竞争及其消极影响,各级政府必须进一步明确角色特征,调整行为取向,切实维护公民权利,创造竞争机会;营造公平竞争环境,维护竞争规则;调整经济发展战略,制定适宜的社会政策,调节竞争结果;进一步在政府自身建设中,引入竞争机制,提高政府效能和政府竞争力。     

对我国《反不正当竞争法》调整对象和调整方法的反思——以马克思竞争理论为研究路径

我国《反不正当竞争法》以竞争管理关系为调整对象,以行政处罚为主要调整方法,抹杀了该法的经济法属性,成为一部“经济行政法”。必须以马克思竞争理论和经济法理念为指导,深刻揭示竞争关系才是《反不正当竞争法》的调整对象,“反不正当竞争诉讼”应成为主要的调整方法,以便更好的促进市场竞争的发展。     

论篡夺公司机会的禁止

禁止篡夺公司机会是英美公司法的一个重要理论 ,我国公司法在此方面尚有缺失。确立我国的禁止篡夺公司机会规则 ,应比较、分析、吸收美国两大最具代表性的理论的有关观点     

市场经济与法治伦理的契合:商法伦理机制论纲

法治和伦理是共同承托和推动市场经济发展的两个互相依存、彼此渗透的巨轮.作为调整市场经济关系中商人及其商事活动法律规范总和的商法.不但具有强烈的技术性特点,而且同时也体现出浓厚的伦理性特质.频繁发生的商业欺诈行为和愈演愈烈的商业失信行为,促使我们不得不对既往的商事立法模式进行认真的反思,由此可以得出的结论是:过分偏重技术性规范并非是完善我国商法制度的唯一途径.我国未来商法制度的构建,不但要考虑通过强化法律规范设计的合理性从而提高商法制度的竞争力,而且还必须充分关注商法制度所赖以建构和运行的伦理基础.只有将商法的技术性规范和商法伦理机制有机结合起来,才能真正奠定市场经济健康有序发展的良好基石.     

入世后的人才竞争战略与人本管理

人才竞争是入世带来的首要挑战。入世后国际人才竞争将更加激烈,并且具有高起点、高层次、多方位的特点。跨国集团立足我国国内进行人才竞争,将对我国造成更大的压力。我国长期面临人才缺乏、人才流失等问题,应按照扬长避短的原则设计我国的人才竞争战略,突出人本管理理念,具体表现为对个性价值的充分尊重,从“卡堵”策略到“磁石”策略的转变,充分利用现有人才资源。     

To What Extent are Cost Savings Passed on to Consumers? An Oligopoly Approach

Competition policy often asks whether a “fair share” of the benefits from cost savings obtained through mergers or agreements is passed on to the consumers. We assess the factorsthat determine cost pass-on in some partial-equilibrium oligopoly models, and show that, although the strength of the pass-on varies from one situation to another, there are some rules of thumb that give a first approximation of the pass-on rate. We also show that, contrary to common belief and to what is written about the subject in the European Commission's guidelines on the application of Article 81(3), in most circumstances cost pass-on does not depend on the price elasticity of demand nor on the market share of the cost saver, and that with competition the pass-on of firm-specific cost savings is weaker than without. JEL Classification: C72 (non-cooperative games), D43 (oligopoly), L40 (antitrust policy)     

论对比广告的利弊及其法律规范

对比广告指直接或间接指明某广告产品的其它竞争者,对产品进行对比而无需征得其事先许可的广告,它有助于国家繁荣经济。但也存在三个问题贬低其他竞争者;用指出虚构的“一般”产品品牌的方式误导消费者;夸大广告中产品的一个或一些特点的重要性。通过合理完善的法律规定,可以控制对比广告潜在的弊端。     

How do voters perceive ideological congruence? The effects of winning and losing under different electoral rules

The degree of ideological congruence between citizens and their elected representatives is an important feature of democratic systems of government. A long tradition of literature has examined the ideological linkages between citizens and governments, often drawing attention to the differences (or lack thereof) in congruence across different types of electoral systems. Previous research has largely relied on aggregate-level measures of ideological congruence, such as the ideological distance between the position of the median voter and the government. We turn our attention here to how congruence relationships are perceived by individual voters, and how the perceptions of congruence may vary across electoral system types. This individual-level measure of ideological congruence is important in that individual-level, rather than aggregate-level, congruence has been shown to influence other outcomes such as citizen satisfaction with democratic performance. We expect electoral “winners” – those who voted for a party that entered government – to perceive greater ideological congruence between themselves and the government compared to electoral “losers”. We expect this effect to be stronger in majoritarian systems where political competition takes place primarily between two parties, than in proportional systems where electoral losers are more likely to receive a proportional share of representation. We test these expectations by estimating random-effects regressions of perceived individual-level congruence using data from 54 elections held in 23 democracies included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). The results provide consistent support for our expectations. Electoral winners in all types of electoral systems perceive greater ideological congruence between themselves and the government, and this effect is stronger in majoritarian systems.