Trading with the enemy? The futility of US commercial countermeasures against the Chinese challenge

This paper examines whether the US is in a position to adopt restrictive commercial measures against China in order to complement military balancing. It focuses on the necessary condition for serious economic measures against an adversary: the state needs to be sure that it can effectively diminish the adversary's economic performance more than its own. This essay suggests that Washington cannot ascertain that this necessary condition is met in its relations with China. Thus, it might be better for the US to avoid restricting trade with China in any meaningful way, even though bilateral security rivalry intensifies.     

Elections as instruments for punishing bad representatives and selecting good ones

Many theories of democracy point out that voters make their choices based on two goals: the retrospective assessment of incumbents and the prospective choice between incumbents and challengers. Do voters react to malfeasance on the part of their elected representatives? If they abandon corrupt incumbents, are they able to select more virtuous replacements? In this paper, we assess the effects of corruption on voter loyalty and, conversely, of voter defection on subsequent malfeasance. We examine these relationships with data drawn from 169 elections across 72 countries. Our results show that malfeasance does indeed provoke voter defection, but that electoral volatility is not followed by lower levels of perceived corruption. We conclude by discussing the appropriate interpretation of our results, the future research they suggest, and their meaning for related, emerging literatures.     

Issue competition in Western Europe: an introduction

Abstract

The special issue introduced in this article presents the results of the Issue Competition Comparative Project (ICCP). The project uses issue yield theory to provide a general, comprehensive perspective on issue competition (party competition through issue strategy) that goes beyond the extant focus on specific parties or specific issues. Relying on voter surveys and Twitter data collected in the context of recent elections in six West European countries, we address several key research questions concerning issue competition: (a) whether the strategies of different parties are loyal to classic 20th-century ideological alignments or rather actively challenging them; (b) whether different parties opt for conflict-mobilization or problem-solving issue strategic approaches; (c) whether party adherence to the issue opportunities identified by issue yield theory are rewarded by better electoral performance.     

Orchestrating silence,winning the votes: Explaining variation in media freedom during elections

Restrictions on media freedom play a prominent role in the survival of incumbents in hybrid regimes. But while scholars agree that governments limit media freedom to punish opponents and mobilize supporters, less is known about the electoral incentives that explain the timing and location of restrictions. Using original microdata on government attempts to prevent the dissemination of information from Venezuela (2002–2015), I show that electoral competition at the local and national levels shape patterns of government-led restrictions on media freedom. At the local level, I find that differences in the opposition's strength incentivize governments to use restrictions to demobilize opponents where they are strongest, target marginal districts during local elections, and maintain dominance in their strongholds. At the national level, I show that as threats to the government party's primacy increase, so does the effect of local electoral competition on the hazard of restrictions.     

The Effects of Employee Hours-of-Service Regulations on the U.S. Airline Industry

Maximum employee work-hour restrictions are implemented to reduce accidents. However, because they decrease the stock of work hours available to employers in the short run, they may also have detrimental effects. A quasi-experiment suggests that pilot hours-of-service reforms, which decreased the number of flights and hours a pilot may work, reduced consumer choice and increased fares in the airline industry. We find that regional and low-cost carriers reduced scheduled flight frequency, while less constrained legacy carriers (and potentially their wholly owned subsidiaries) were unaffected. Further, we find evidence that market concentration increased on many routes, implying that fare increases may be due to a decrease in competition. These findings suggest a situation where a policy implemented to correct one market failure, airlines not internalizing the full social costs of accidents by allowing dangerously fatigued pilots to fly, exacerbated another market failure by decreasing competition.     

私有标准及其反垄断法规制

私人治理背景下,标准呈现出私有化发展趋势。标准私有化的基本含义是企业、企业联合以及行业协会等非政府组织成为标准的制定者,标准私有化发展的结果是大量私有标准的产生。作为市场自我规制工具的私有标准在提高经济效率、促进产品多样化以及保护公共利益方面具有积极效应。但是,私有标准可能会通过滥用市场支配地位、垄断协议等途径产生限制竞争的影响。私有标准的反垄断法规制应坚持合理原则,具有国际化视野。私有标准的反垄断法规制还需秉持发展的态度,顾及产业部门的差异性。     

SS: Germany’s federal election in september 2009 – Elections in times of duress – Introduction

This paper introduces the special symposium. It provides (1) an overview of the broad campaign themes; (2) introduces several questions pertinent to German electoral politics; (3) highlights the broader theoretical implications of this symposium for the research literature.     

Disproportionality and voter turnout in new and old democracies

A long-standing puzzle in electoral research is why the disproportionality of electoral systems has a negative effect on voter participation in established democracies, but not in new democracies. We propose a learning theory of electoral system’s effects, and test it in a cross-national analysis and by using Spain as a case study. Electoral disproportionality is unrelated to voter participation in early elections after democratization, but the relationship is increasingly visible as democracies grow older. The case study uncovers two mechanisms: small parties optimize their mobilization strategy only after the first democratic elections, and the difference in the turnout rates of small party supporters and large party supporters grows over time. Time is needed before the consequences of electoral systems are fully revealed. Importantly, the findings suggest that studies carried out just after an electoral system is created or reformed may provide downward biased estimates of their long-term consequences.     

Not always second order: Subnational elections,national-level vote intentions,and volatility spillovers in a multi-level electoral system

The widespread second-order view on subnational elections leaves little room for the idea that subnational election campaigns matter for national-level electoral preferences. I challenge this perspective and explore the context-conditional role of subnational election campaigns for national-level vote intentions in multi-level systems. Campaigns direct citizens’ attention to the political and economic “fundamentals” that determine their electoral preferences. Subnational election campaigns and the major campaign issues receive nation-wide media coverage. This induces all citizens in a country to evaluate parties at the national level even if they themselves are not eligible to vote in the upcoming subnational election. Thereby, subnational election campaigns may lead to a reduction in the uncertainty of voters’ national-level electoral preferences throughout the country, which is reflected by a decrease in the volatility of national-level vote intentions. I explore weekly vote intention data from Germany (1992–2007) within a conditional volatility model. Subnational elections reduce uncertainty in nation-wide federal-level vote intentions for major parties. However, patterns of incumbency and coalitional shifts moderate this volatility-reducing effect.     

Personal vote‐seeking in flexible list systems: How electoral incentives shape Belgian MPs' bill initiation behaviour

It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra‐party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems – where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates – create another type of variation in personal vote‐seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party‐in‐a‐district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party‐in‐a‐district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra‐party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote‐seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote‐seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra‐party competition on personal vote‐seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.