Electoral and structural losers and support for a national referendum in the U.S.

The U.S. is one of only a few democracies in the world never to hold a national referendum. Recent national surveys reveal that a majority of respondents approve of a national referendum both cross-nationally and in America is relatively stable. Building on previous work (Bowler and Donovan, 2007), we find public opinion on a reform proposal is fluid and responsive to electoral politics, rather than stable as reported in earlier work. In this paper, we argue that contemporary support for a national referendum in the U.S. is contingent on whether a citizen is a short- or long-term “winner” or a “loser” when it comes to electoral politics. We expect that public support for a national referendum in the U.S., where legislation referred by Congress would be subject to a popular vote, may vary at the individual level because of short-term electoral fortunes as well as long-term structural conditions. Strategic voting as well as losing in candidate races and policy issues may be important, but so might be partisanship, with non-partisans the most likely to benefit from citizen law-making at the national level. Support for a national referendum might also be contingent upon state context, that is, upon use of direct democracy in the state where a person lives, as well as the population of a state. The results based on a natural experiment and 2008 panel survey data provide an important window into understanding public opinion on institutional change more broadly.     

Electoral reform and the mirror image of inter-party and intra-party competition: The adoption of party lists in Colombia

The Colombian case offers a rare opportunity to observe effects of electoral reform where districting remains constant. Only the formula changed, from extremely ‘personalized’ (seats allocated solely on candidate votes) to ‘listized’: seats are allocated to party lists, which may be either open or closed. Electoral reform has effects on both the inter-party dimension (the number of parties competing) and the intra-party dimension (the extent of competition within parties). Consistent with theoretical expectations, the inter-party dimension features an increased number of parties in the low-magnitude districts and a decrease in the high-magnitude districts. On the intra-party dimension, the impact “mirrors” the inter-party: less competition in smaller districts, yet more in larger districts.     

Social media and political communication in the 2014 elections to the European Parliament

Social media play an increasingly important part in the communication strategies of political campaigns by reflecting information about the policy preferences and opinions of political actors and their public followers. In addition, the content of the messages provides rich information about the political issues and the framing of those issues during elections, such as whether contested issues concern Europe or rather extend pre-existing national debates. In this study, we survey the European landscape of social media using tweets originating from and referring to political actors during the 2014 European Parliament election campaign. We describe the language and national distribution of the messages, the relative volume of different types of communications, and the factors that determine the adoption and use of social media by the candidates. We also analyze the dynamics of the volume and content of the communications over the duration of the campaign with reference to both the EU integration dimension of the debate and the prominence of the most visible list-leading candidates. Our findings indicate that the lead candidates and their televised debate had a prominent influence on the volume and content of communications, and that the content and emotional tone of communications more reflects preferences along the EU dimension of political contestation rather than classic national issues relating to left-right differences.     

企业创新技术竞争保护方式的比较与选择

企业创新技术的竞争,实质上是如何运用法律手段或专有手段,保护企业创新技术不被竞争对手所掌握,使其处于市场竞争的优势地位.为了保证企业技术创新者的权益不受到侵犯,就必须理顺创新技术竞争秩序.理顺创新技术秩序,关键在于企业如何选择保护方式,这样才能真正地保护新技术,使之立于竞争的不败之地.     

不完全竞争中的价格信息

完全竞争市场中的人被假定拥有充分的信息和处理信息的能力 ,因此 ,价格被假定只需包含供求均衡与否的信息 ,市场出清只需价格与供求的相互作用就可以实现。现实的市场是不完全竞争的 ,信息变化的偶然性、主体知识的有限性、机会主义与道德风险导致了不完全信息 ,导致了价格信息的非真实性 ,使得价格和供求的相互作用不再能使市场出清。卖主的控价行为等 ,不能消除信息不完全 ,但可减少不完全竞争中的效率损失 ,有助于配合价格机制建设高效率的不完全竞争市场模型     

The Electoral Success of Beauties and Beasts

Les prises de positions, les programmes politiques ou encore les résultats précédents des candidats et des partis n'expliquent que partiellement leur succès électoral. D'autres mécanismes, plus simples, jouent aussi un rôle. Dans cet article, nous explorons l'influence de l'attractivité physique sur le nombre de votes de préférence reçus par 744 candidats à l’élection au Conseil national en Suisse en 2007. Le système électoral suisse de scrutin proportionnel avec liste ouverte offre une excellente opportunité d’étudier de tels effets, car les électeurs ne choisissent pas simplement entre partis ou entre candidats, mais également entre candidats au sein du même parti. Nous démontrons un effet robuste de l'attractivité physique sur le nombre de votes de préférence reçus par un candidat. L'effet est aussi important pour les femmes que pour les hommes. Cette influence de l'attractivité est essentiellement liée au fait que les candidats attractifs ont une plus grande probabilité d’être remarqués.     

Voter reaction to legislator dissent across political systems

Research shows that legislators who dissent from the political line of their party are rewarded among constituents. This raises concerns about future party cohesiveness and, in turn, parties’ ability to govern and voters' ability to hold parties accountable. However, nearly all studies are conducted in single-member district systems, such as the United States and United Kingdom, which are generally considered most-likely settings for observing such effects. In this note, we conduct a country comparative study of voter reaction to legislator dissent across single-member and multi-member district systems (US, UK and Denmark). Building off existing theories, we argue that voters in multi-member districts also reward legislator dissent but that the reward is significantly weaker. We support this argument with observational and experimental data. Our results suggest that concerns regarding party governance and accountability associated with legislator party dissent extend to—but are less pertinent in—the more widespread multi-member district systems.     

Stability and Change in Party Preference

This article analyses stability and volatility of party preferences using data from the Swiss Household‐Panel (SHP), which, for the first time, allow studying transitions and stability of voters over several years in Switzerland. Analyses cover the years 1999–2007 and systematically distinguish changes between party blocks and changes within party blocks. The first part looks at different patterns of change, which show relatively high volatility. The second part tests several theories on causes of such changes applying a multinomial random‐effects model. Results show that party preferences stabilise with their duration and with age and that the electoral cycle, political sophistication, socio‐structural predispositions, the household‐context as well as party size and the number of parties each explain part of electoral volatility. Different results for within‐ and between party‐block changes underlie the importance of that differentiation.     

Partisan self-interest and electoral reform: The new Italian electoral law of 2005

In December 2005, Italy's mixed-member electoral system was replaced with a system of bonus-adjusted proportional representation. The reform conformed with rational-choice models in that it was imposed by the ruling coalition, which sought to bolster its own power interests. But the case illustrates the impossibility of reducing such power-based motivation to a single goal, such as seat maximization. Power is shaped by many factors, and electoral systems influence many of these. This article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the various power-oriented considerations that may operate in electoral reform. It then analyses the role these played in Italy. It argues, in particular, for the need to take account of coalition dynamics when studying such processes.     

比例原则在公平竞争审查例外制度运行中的适用

公平竞争审查例外制度的具体实施离不开相应的法律原则作为指引,其中最为关键也最为重要的当属比例原则。在比例原则的基本内容架构方面,有必要在传统“三阶理论”之中导入新的子原则——“目的正当性原则”,借以确立起“四阶理论”。在公平竞争审查例外制度运行过程中,引入比例原则事实上不仅具有必要性,而且也具有相应的合理性。比例原则在...