论保护有效竞争的基本方法

就保护有效竞争的方法而言,各国反垄断法在立法体例上早就有行为主义和结构主义之分。其中行为主义反垄断法律制度以重点规范市场行为为基本特征,而结构主义反垄断法律制度以重点规范市场结构(市场集中程度)为基本特征。但从当今各国的反垄断实践来看,他们的选择突出表现为行为主义和结构主义的结合。     

努力建设高素质的职工队伍

扬州市总工会等单位在全市职工中开展“十万职工大练兵、十大行业大比武”技能竞赛活动。在活动中, 创新组织领导和管理、市场运作和激励机制, 认真抓好活动中的各个工作环节, 使这次活动健康、有序、有效地得以开展。从而全面提高了广大职工的技术业务水平, 探索了工会工作围绕中心服务大局, 建设高素质职工队伍的新途径。     

政府采购法基本原则探析

对《政府采购法》所确定的公开透明、公平竞争、公正、诚实信用原则作了概括阐述并逐一分析,阐明这些基本原则设计的控权倾向和公私法性质结合的特色,并且具体分析了每一基本原则的含义、作用、相关实践的欠缺,进而分别给出运用各个原则的相关建议,强调必须充分发挥这些基本原则的各种作用,以达到规范权力和促进诚信的当前要务。     

反垄断法的一般条款解读——中国反垄断法第4条释义

一般条款是法律明文规定的基本法律原则。我国《反垄断法》第4条是整个反垄断法的一般条款,指出以健全统一、开放、竞争、有序的市场体系为目标,必须制定与我国社会主义市场经济相适应的竞争规则,同时要完善宏观调控,妥善地处理好竞争政策与宏观调控各政策之间的关系。作为反垄断法的一般条款,它是反垄断立法和执法、司法的最高价值取向和根本指针。     

浅析我国反不正当竞争法一般条款的完善

目前我国的《反不正当竞争法》并没有明确规定一般条款,从而使得在司法实践中难以适用。因此,我国《反不正当竞争法》需要借鉴德国《反不正当竞争法》的成功立法和法律实践,规定明确的一般条款,以应对因时而发展的各类列举情况之外的实质不正当竞争行为。     

金融危机下小规模经营者的经济法关怀

在金融危机的冲击下,个体工商户及中小企业这些小规模经营者的生存更加艰难。如何对待曾经为中国经济发展做出过重要贡献而且还将为中国经济发展继续做贡献的个体工商户及中小企业,是任由自由竞争、优胜劣汰、适者生存竞争法则自由发挥,还是通过必要的制度安排使个体工商户体及中小企业得到更多的人文关怀,是构建社会主义市场经济制度必须考虑的问题。     

我国反垄断执法机制的不足与完善

随着我国《反垄断法》正式实施,我国的反垄断法律体系建设加速。而建立一个权威、独立的执法机构是发挥反垄断法功效的关键。因此,反垄断执法机构的科学设置及其职责的合理确定是中国反垄断法制建设中的重要一环。目前,《反垄断法》为我国设计了三家联合执法的机制,权威性和独立性尤为不足。加之目前我国反垄断执法体制缺乏具体的分级设计,没有配套的实施细则,人员素质与结构不合理等等。诸多问题势必影响我国反垄断法的实施。因此,探讨中国反垄断执法机构的问题与不足,对于完善中国反垄断执法机构确有必要。     

Technocratic attitudes and voting behaviour ten years after the Eurozone crisis: Evidence from the 2019 EP elections

The onset of the Great Recession raised the profile of technocracy, or government by experts, as a contrasting model to democracy. Yet, there is little research on how attitudes towards technocracy may impact European citizens' political behaviour. Moreover, the consistency of technocracy supporters' political attitudes, especially towards the EU, is questionable. This paper uses new survey panel data collected before and after the European parliament elections in May 2019 in six countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain). We investigate how citizens’ technocratic attitudes affect their voting behaviour in the European elections. We find evidence that citizens with technocratic attitudes are less likely to support mainstream parties, and tend to either abstain or, if they vote, to give their vote to anti-system parties, especially from the populist right. In addition, by distinguishing technocracy supporters according to their partisanship, we conclude that technocracy is a thin ideology that can be combined with different patterns of political support: while many technocracy supporters have no party identification or support non-mainstream parties and show dissatisfaction with democracy and the EU, another subgroup of technocracy supporters identifies with a mainstream political party and show above average political support and support for the EU.     

Public support for electoral reform: The role of electoral system experience

What affects public support for electoral reform? How does experience with different electoral systems affect people's willingness to support electoral reform? Given the salience of changes to election rules even when they are passed via the legislature and the increasing use of referenda as alternative mechanisms for change, these questions are critical to understanding when electoral reform will occur. I argue that experience (specifically, with an electoral system similar to that under consideration) affects public opinion by reducing uncertainty about the likely effects of reform and thus affects support for reform (although the direction of the effect depends on partisan bias). Moreover, I argue that experience is most important in the absence of strong party cues. I leverage subnational electoral system variation in the United Kingdom and find that experience does affect support for reform — negative experiences decrease support for reform. The results have implications for the possibility of electoral reform in the UK and beyond.     

What accounts for Duverger's law? The behavioral mechanisms underpinning two-party convergence in India

Duverger's Law states the single-member district plurality rules should produce two-party competition. In district-level election races where this expectation holds, what political behaviors—ranging from elites' strategic formation of political parties to voters' strategic abandonment of losing candidates—account for these outcomes? Using data from state elections in India, this article demonstrates that no single mechanism accounts for most electoral outcomes consistent with Duverger's Law. However, mechanisms related to the behavior elites, far more than voters, produce convergence on two-party competition. This article uncovers relatively little evidence of outcomes driven by strategic voting, instead finding that much of the convergence on two parties is attributable to various forms of strategic entry in which parties selectively field candidates in certain races. In particular, elite collusion—when multiple parties coordinate on where to field candidates—is especially important. Data from other countries confirm that these findings are not unique to India.