竞争法国际协调的法经济学分析

竞争法国际协调从性质上属于国际立法,国家是竞争法国际协调的主要参与者,国家的经济人特性以及缺乏一个超国家的立法机构的背景使得竞争国际立法与国内立法在立法目的、立法动力、立法路径与具体内容设置等方面都表现出很大的不同。竞争法的传统理论并不能当然套用到对竞争法国际协调行为的分析中去。从法经济学角度可以对竞争法国际协调的基本特征作重新解读。     

中国与印尼经贸关系的互补性和竞争性分析

中国与印尼的经贸关系从1950年两国建交以来,发展并不顺利,其间曾一度中断近20年之久,只是到20世纪末和21世纪初才得到快速发展.本文运用国际贸易理论和国际关系理论来重点分析两国之间经贸的竞争性和互补性,通过分析得出结论:从目前看,中国和印尼两国的经贸存在互补性,但互补性不是很大.随着两国经济的发展,新的国际分工的形成,双方经贸的互补性可以扩大.同时,随着中国人世和中国一东盟自由贸易区的建立,两国经贸关系必将得到进一步扩大和发展.     

Legislative Twitter Style: Electoral Vulnerability,Social Media,and Constituency-Building in Large Multimember Electoral Systems

How do legislators use social media to cultivate their constituencies in large multimember electoral districts? Colombia's Senate nationwide district offers a suitable case to examine how lawmakers, through their behaviour on Twitter, geographically target their audiences. We employ microblog user geolocation methods which infer locations using textual content in order to identify where Colombian senators' Twitter ‘home’ is. We find that senators' location targeting on Twitter largely mirrors the geographical distribution of their votes. Deviations from that pattern mostly stem from their vulnerability to intraparty competition and the nature of their parties' organisation.     

Balancing district and party seats: The arithmetic of mixed-member proportional electoral systems

Mixed-member proportional electoral systems (MMP) are widely praised because they combine the direct, personal election of MPs from single-seat constituencies with a proportional seat allocation. However, the size of the proportional tier matters for the question of whether the system's overall proportionality is preserved. Hence, a key challenge for constitution-makers and scholars is finding the right balance between district and proportional seats, so as to maximise district representation and guarantee proportional representation.This paper develops the first theoretical model that helps to locate this sweet spot for district and party seats. The novel solution builds on Taagepera's “logical models” about party sizes. The model is tested on 58 national parliamentary elections under MMP rules.     

国际形势回顾展望北大核心

高端智库的调研与谋划职能,要求其树立正确学术观,涵养敏锐的学术点,并能激活信息死穴,打通"信梗"瓶颈,从形势变动之形,推知事物发展之势;实现出精品、出思想、出人才的目的。先贤有曰:"锐始者必图其终,成功者先计于始。"岁末年初的国际形势务虚讨论,即是把脉天下之善始。     

安全全球化的经济逻辑：以全球安全困境为例

当今世界，全球化出现了由经济全球化转向安全全球化的趋势，并存在进一步向“全球安全困境”坍缩的迹象。一些国家的政策开始由倾向于通过经济全球化带动增长，转向更多考虑国家安全因素并宁可为此牺牲经济效率，表现出更不相信开放、更不相信市场、战略竞争加码、供应链及支付网络安全化、军事投入及部署增加等特征。拯救全球化的根本之道在于通过突破性创新驱动的技术进步，将趋于疲弱的世界经济扭转至相对高速的增长轨道，让各国由“存量博弈”回归“增量博弈”。边疆或边缘地区具有打破常规、爆发出制度及科技等方面突破性创新的有利条件，但也存在特有的脆弱性。对一国而言，除应针对边疆地区出台大兴创新之风的鼓励政策外，还应当加强对其所承受的硬权力及软权力影响情况的监测和研判，在用好国际国内两个市场、两种资源的同时，须臾不可放松在软权力上的引致性投资，增强边疆地区的向心力，为其富有活力的突破性创新潜力的发挥创造安定团结的社会环境。     

技术权威与数字时代的国际技术竞争

在国际技术竞争中，技术权威既非构建于利益交换关系之上，又不依靠强制胁迫的方式来维系，而是通过锁定技术发展轨道与治理规则路径赢得其他国家的自愿追随，由此形成非对称服从关系。技术权威可划分为知识型、监管型、辐射型与借力型四种类型，不同技术权威类型之间可通过技术跃迁与市场规模拓展来实现转换。在移动通信技术领域，拥有不同技术权威类型的国家分别通过实体路径、市场路径、制度路径与联盟路径参与国际技术竞争，借助技术领域中的锁定效应巩固其在国际技术竞争中的优势地位，直至出现颠覆性技术的突破。     

Does the early bird always get the worm? First round advantages and second round victories in Latin America

Runoff systems allow for a reversion of the first-round result: the most voted candidate in the first round may end up losing the election in the second. But do voters take advantage of this opportunity? Or does winning the first round increase the probability of winning the second? We investigate this question with data from presidential elections since 1945, as well as subnational elections in Latin America. Using a regression discontinuity design, we find that being the most voted candidate in the first round has a substantial positive effect on the probability of winning the second round in mayoral races – especially in Brazil –, but in presidential and gubernatorial elections the effect is negative, though not statistically significant at conventional levels. The positive effect in municipal races is much stronger when the top-two placed candidates are ideologically close – and thus harder to distinguish for voters – but weakens considerably and becomes insignificant when the election is polarized. We attribute these differences to the disparate informational environment prevailing in local vs. higher-level races.