Banzhaf voting power, random elections, and the Electoral College winner’s advantage

In a recent article, Riggs et al. (2009) aim to measure the ‘Electoral College winner's advantage’—in particular, the extent to which the winner’s electoral vote margin of victory is magnified as a result of (i) the ‘two electoral vote add-on’ given to each state and (ii) the ‘winner-take-all’ mode of casting state electoral votes. Their results are based on two sets of one million simulated two-candidate elections. This note has two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that RHR’s simulation estimates can be calculated precisely using the theory of voting power measurement. The second is to correct several flaws in RHR’s analysis, the most substantial of which pertains to the effect of the two electoral vote add-on, which actually has a negative effect on the winner’s advantage.     

Uncovering the micro-foundations of turnout and electoral systems

This paper tackles the micro-foundations of voting and addresses why proportional representation systems (PR) are associated with higher turnout than majoritarian systems (SMD). I argue that individual evaluations of the differential benefit in the calculus of voting are affected by spatial party competition framed by electoral institutions. Unlike PR, SMD constrains the number of parties and creates large centripetal forces for party competition, which reduces the perceived benefits of voting. A citizen’s voting propensity is related to the distance between her preferred policy position and those of her most- and least-favored parties. I use multilevel modeling to analyze individual voting decisions structured by aggregate variables across 64 elections. The empirical findings confirm the argument and the mechanism holds both in established and non-established democracies.     

Voters’ perceptions of government performance and attributions of responsibility: Electoral control in Poland

We test the claim that elections function as a mechanism of accountability in the case of Poland, a new democracy with a fluid party system. We ask whether individuals’ vote intentions are based on assessments of governing parties’ performance. Taking into consideration attributions of responsibility for such performance, accountability exists if assessments of poor performance decrease the probability of voting for a ruling party. We use two criteria of performance: perceived change in unemployment rate and level of corruption between two consecutive elections. Using data from the Polish POLPAN panel survey, our results confirm the existence of a heterogeneous sanctioning model.     

Do voters affect or elect policies? A new perspective, with evidence from the U.S. Senate

Using quasi-experimental evidence from close elections, Lee et al. (2004) - henceforth LMB - argue competition for voters in U.S. House elections does not affect policy positions, as incumbent Senate candidates do not vote more extremely if elected than non-incumbents. Despite stronger electoral competition and greater legislative independence, similar results, shown here, hold for the Senate. Yet, the hypothesis that voters do not affect policies conflicts with how Senators moderate their positions prior to their next election. LMB-style estimates appear to be biased downwards as junior members of Congress prefer to vote more extremely than senior members, independently of their electoral strength. Corrected estimates are more favorable to the hypothesis that candidates moderate their policy choices in response to electoral competition.     

Who moves? Elite and mass-level depolarization in Britain, 1987–2001

Over the past two decades the British Labour and Conservative parties have depolarized on economic and social welfare policy, at both the elite and mass levels. We ask the question: Does mass-level depolarization in Britain extend throughout the electorate, or is it confined primarily to the stratum of affluent, educated, and politically engaged citizens? We report longitudinal analyses of British Election Study respondents' policy beliefs and partisan loyalties over the period 1987–2001, and find that depolarization extends across all subgroups in the electorate, as do perceptions of elite depolarization. These effects are (moderately) more pronounced among the electoral subgroups of highly educated, affluent, and politically informed citizens. The findings have important implications for elite representation of voters' policy preferences, and for differences in representation patterns between Britain and the United States.     

Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination

An electorate can effectively coordinate on the viable parties in its district, or a relatively large proportion of its voters may “waste” their votes on parties that fail to obtain office. Avoiding wasted votes can be more or less difficult depending on several characteristics of the electoral context. Unfortunately, many of the features of electoral contexts hypothesized to cause vote wastage have been tested piecemeal on only a handful of (non-random) cases and/or with data inappropriately aggregated to the national, rather than the district, level. Based on results from 2007 districts in 183 lower chamber elections across 21 countries, we find evidence that new electoral rules, the entry of new parties, past electoral volatility, and high district magnitudes are all likely to make coordination a challenge, with entry by new parties having the largest, most consistent effect.     

How electoral systems affect MPs’ positions

The question how different electoral systems affect the representation of voters in parliaments has been a thorny issue for a considerable time. While some research suggests that first-past-the-posts systems should lead to a closer correspondence between the preferences of the electoral district’s median voter and of its representative, other work concludes that in proportional representation (PR) systems, especially with open lists, candidates have an incentive to cultivate a strong personal vote.     

Turnout in Germany in the course of time: Life cycle and cohort effects on electoral turnout from 1953 to 2049

The steadily rising share of older voters could lead to them gaining an ever increasing level of political representation compared to younger voters not only because of the imbalance of numbers between the young and the old, but also because turnout rates among the old have always been above-average. The latter argument only applies if the so-called life cycle effect is assumed to be dominant. However, diverse socialisation backgrounds, captured by the cohort effect, also have to be taken into account. It is also unclear what the interplay of these two effects of time implies for future aggregate turnout. Focusing on the German case, we base our analyses on the Repräsentative Wahlstatistik (Representative Electoral Statistic, RES) and population forecasts to estimate consequences of the demographic shifts for all federal elections from 1953 until today, as well as for future elections. First, we calculate life cycle, cohort and period effects on turnout for previous elections by using cohort analysis; second, we apply these net effects to the future age distribution under certain assumptions concerning life cycle and cohort effects. Our results show that the recent decline in turnout is in particular due to negative period effects and (in West Germany) to a minor extent also due to consequences of cohort replacement, whereas changes in the age structure have had a positive effect on turnout since 1990 in both parts of Germany. Additionally, our forecasts suggest that turnout rates will decline and that the over-representation of the old will continue until around 2030 and diminish afterwards in a 'greying' population.     

Forgetting to make votes count: The role of previous democratic experience

This paper argues that wasted votes in founding elections decrease when countries have a previous democratic experience before the current democratic period. This historical-institutionalist argument is tested with national election results in 22 founding elections in third-wave European, Asian, Latin American and African democracies. The results demonstrate that having a democratic past clearly increases coordination and then reduces the percentage of wasted votes in the founding election, controlling for the electoral system.     

证券做市交易与市场操纵的界分

2017年12月4日,中国证监会针对做市商的市场操纵行为作出了首单行政处罚,但该决定实际仍未明确如何在逻辑上和事实上厘清证券做市交易与市场操纵行为的关系。虽然做市商的流动性供给和定价功能,会导致做市商对证券价格的内心价值判断与其做市行为客观所表达的观点产生不一致,但该种不一致乃是为履行积极义务所致,因此也就不存在操纵的故意,在逻辑上也就不属于市场操纵。是否存在操纵的故意,同时也就构成了在事实上区分证券做市交易和市场操纵的关键。而该项事实认定在新三板市场上应当考虑到低流动性的市场环境、持续双向报价的积极义务、中央交易对手的特别安排、调节库存的客观需要等特殊因素,设置异于通常事实认定标准的特别要求。虽然该种做法存在发生假阴性错误的风险,但从协调假阳性错误及假阴性错误的逻辑和方法来看仍是妥当的选择。