United against a common foe? The nature and origins of Euroscepticism among left-wing and right-wing citizens

In Western European democracies opposition to the European Union is commonly found at the ideological extremes. Yet, the Euroscepticism of radical left-wing and radical right-wing parties has been shown to have distinct roots and manifestations. The article investigates whether these differences are mirrored at the citizen level. Using data from the European Election Study (2009/2014) and the European Social Survey (2008/2012) in 15 West European countries, it is found that left-wing and right-wing citizens not only differ in the object of their Euroscepticism, but also in their motivations for being sceptical of the EU. Left-wing Eurosceptics are dissatisfied with the current functioning of the EU, but do not oppose further European integration per se, while right-wing Eurosceptics categorically reject European integration. Euroscepticism among left-wing citizens is motivated by economic and cultural concerns, whereas for right-wing citizens Euroscepticism is solely anchored in cultural attitudes. These results refine the common ‘horseshoe’ understanding of ideology and Euroscepticism.     

Managing conflicting ‘Truth Claims’ – ambiguity in the diplomat's toolkit in East-Asian Island conflict

The article is a study of managing interstate relations via ambiguity and secrecy. At the focal point of the article is the different constitutive logic of domestic politics and diplomacy in conceiving and managing social reality; with the former implying the notion of community and the latter separateness – the difference that allows for diplomatic conduct to rely on tacit agreements and ambiguity for managing contradictory ‘truth claims’, as China and Japan did in the case of the Ryukyu and later the Senkaku Islands. Such successful management is conditional on the parties' ability to control domestic narratives avoiding contradictions in their ‘truth claims’ becoming too blatant. Yet, modern technologies increasingly undermine states' capacities for this. The leaking on YouTube of the collision of a Chinese trawler with the ship of the Japanese Coast Guard in 2010 offers a perfect example. The incident aggravated the conflict and triggered intense debates on secrecy in Japan. The article concludes by arguing that once ambiguity and tacit agreements break down, leaders should turn to their public – recognize that noisy nationalist are frequently but a minority – and attempt to renegotiate ‘truth claims’ domestically to create the basis for a compromise.     

网络涉警舆情危机的成因及对策

由涉警事件引起的网络涉警舆情危机影响着警察形象和警察权威的建立。我国正处于社会转型期,社会矛盾多发,警察执法环境并不乐观。警察自身又存在职能不清、违规执法及内部失检等问题,因而成为网络舆情的引爆点。网络的发展和公众的参与又加深了网络舆情的传播和壮大,一旦出现涉警舆情,极易演化成为危机状态,影响警察权威的树立和巩固,波及整个社会秩序的稳定。警察应对网络涉警舆情也应从自身、媒体、公众等方面着手,重塑警察权威。     

论自媒体时代涉警网络舆情治理

自媒体时代,加强涉警网络舆情治理,对于维护社会治安、构建和谐警民关系有着重要的现实意义。公安机关应当积极研究和把握涉警网络舆情的特点,反思在对其治理方面存在的问题,积极寻找对策。同时还要通过恰当的措施、健全的机制、完善的法律法规来有效的预防、化解涉警舆情危机,助力网络维稳。     

从“瓮安事件”看网络时代的舆论引导

贵州瓮安事件中的谣言影响暴露出当前对社会舆论的引导明显不适应网络时代的要求。谣言在网络时代仍具有很强的杀伤力,并出现了很多新的特点。在处置各种复杂矛盾和突发事件中,引导舆论、抵制谣言必须与处置工作同步进行。把握舆论主动权必须推行信息公开,具体要突出主动性、全局性、及时性和权威性四个方面。     

Elite interests and political participation in Botswana, 1966–2014

ABSTRACT

Botswana’s tiny economy is overwhelmingly government-driven and political participation, particularly on the side of the ruling party, is critical for one’s economic survival and prosperity. This has led to enduring intrigue and conflict among the country’s political power elite. Opposition party activists traditionally have embraced leftist policies and claimed to be representing the country’s poor and downtrodden while castigating the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (in power since 1966) of being pro-rich and politically connected business. Ironically, some members of the opposition elite also engage in business ventures with their ruling party counterparts. The scramble for economic opportunities has fuelled debilitating factionalism within both the ruling and opposition parties over the years. In some instances tribalism was mobilised in intra- and inter-party elections for positions of influence even though voters are more interested in service delivery than traditional ethnic issues. Our paper considers the question: ‘Whose interests do Botswana’s politicians represent?’     

The rise and fall of “Novorossiya”: examining support for a separatist geopolitical imaginary in southeast Ukraine

In the spring of 2014, some anti-Maidan protestors in southeast Ukraine, in alliance with activists from Russia, agitated for the creation of a large separatist entity on Ukrainian territory. These efforts sought to revive a historic region called Novorossiya (“New Russia”) on the northern shores of the Black Sea that was created by Russian imperial colonizers. In public remarks, Vladimir Putin cited Novorossiya as a historic and contemporary home of a two-part interest group, ethnic Russian and Russian-speaking Ukrainians, supposedly under threat in Ukraine. Anti-Maidan agitation in Ukraine gave way to outright secession in April 2014, as armed rebel groups established the Donetsk People’s Republic and Luhans’k People’s Republic on parts of the eponymous Ukrainian oblasts. Rebel leaders aspired to create a renewed Novorossiya that incorporated all of eastern and southern Ukraine from Kharkiv to Odesa oblasts. To examine the level of support for this secessionist imaginary in the targeted oblasts, our large scientific poll in December 2014 revealed the Novorossiya project had minority support, between 20 and 25% of the population. About half of the sample believed that the concept of Novorossiya was a “historical myth” and that its resuscitation and promotion was the result of “Russian political technologies.” Analysis of the responses by socio-demographic categories indicated that for ethnic Russians, residents of the oblasts of Kharkiv and Odesa, for older and poorer residents, and especially for those who retain a nostalgic positive opinion about the Soviet Union, the motivations and aims of the Novorossiya project had significant support.     

Conceptual Foundations of Citizen Competence

This article considers some of the challenges that attend efforts to assess citizen performance. We begin by demonstrating the often- unarticulated complexity of evaluating performance in any domain. To do this, we identify four distinct conceptual elements that comprise an evaluation—identification of task, selection of criterion, choice of empirical indicator, and explication of standard—and illustrate with an example that is relatively free of ambiguity: performance in basketball. Using this framework, we then review research in three general areas of study: mass belief systems and issue consistency, political knowledge, and the use of political heuristics. We find that no study articulates all four elements (or adequate substitutes associated with an alternative framework). As a result, problems arise. Most significantly, any particular study is likely to use criteria that are unsatisfactory in important respects or to employ empirical indicators that do not validly measure the criteria. Across studies, conclusions often vary as a function of unarticulated differences in assumptions, definitions, and measures. We conclude by drawing a few lessons for future research, while also recognizing the impressive progress that the study of public opinion and citizen competence has made over the last 40 years.     

The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen Competence

Social scientists have documented framing effects in a wide range of contexts, including surveys, experiments, and actual political campaigns. Many view work on framing effects as evidence of citizen incompetence—that is, evidence that citizens base their preferences on arbitrary information and/or are subject to extensive elite manipulation. Yet, we continue to lack a consensus on what a framing effect is as well as an understanding of how and when framing effects occur. In this article, I examine (1) the different ways that scholars have employed the concepts of framing and framing effects, (2) how framing effects may violate some basic criteria of citizen competence, and (3) what we know about how and when framing effects work. I conclude that while the evidence to date suggests some isolated cases of incompetence, the more general message is that citizens use frames in a competent and well-reasoned manner.