Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.     

Popular support for legislatures in Asia

Legislatures have long served as the fundamental organ of democratic rule. They bring together disparate views and competing preferences in one venue as an effort to introduce a equitable means of compromise to produce policies that affect those whom legislatures represent. They also check the authoritarian tendencies of other government actors, notably the executive, and create the conditions for institutionalised, rather than violent, debate. The legislatures of democratic Asia are no different. In this paper, I evaluate popular support for assemblies across the democracies of Asia, in terms of their legitimacy and use as a check on power. Traditional measures of support, including age, education, and liberal values, indicate growing support for legislatures. However, the significant effects of economic evaluations and the limited attachment to political parties suggest that the legislatures of Asia are still far from consolidating their role as assemblies that support democratic regimes in the region.     

大众媒介对职工影响的现状与问题

大众媒介对职工群体日常生活和思想具有重要的影响,特别是随着互联网的日益普及,网络新媒体成为职工舆情表达的重要平台.但当前大众媒介对职工的影响存在三大失衡:职工对新闻媒介的满意度与媒介对职工的影响力不相称、工人新闻的数量与庞大的工人队伍不平衡、工人对新闻的需求与新闻媒介的现状还有距离.为此,应加大对职工群体的报道,充分利...     

国家如何塑造乡村精英?——关于乡村精英变迁中的国家角色述评

围绕"村民自治制度实行以来,国家如何塑造乡村精英"这一核心问题,本文对相关研究领域的文献进行了梳理。本文将国家对乡村精英的塑造区分为两个层次:一是作为"整体的国家"以宏观政策方式塑造乡村精英。其中,意识形态话语的变迁使乡村精英由"政治型精英"转变为"经济型精英",基层制度设计的变迁使乡村精英由"单一政治型精英"转变为"多元化精英",资源性政策的变迁则使得"新代理人"登上村庄政治舞台。二是基层政府作为与乡村精英直接互动的行动者塑造乡村精英。其中,压力型科层制使基层政府根据中心工作的性质来塑造乡村精英,使乡村精英经历了税费时期的"灰黑化"、税费改革后前几年的"老好人化",以及资源下放时期的"新代理人化";乡村关系则使得基层政府根据与乡村社会的博弈来塑造乡村精英:强乡弱村的乡村关系使乡村精英由"兼业化"走向"职业化",强村弱乡的乡村关系使得乡村精英主要由"有声望的村民"来担任。     

Why are the highly educated more sympathetic towards welfare recipients?

Stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients play a crucial role in building public support for welfare retrenchment. Existing literature finds that the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This is surprising given the economic advantage associated with educational attainment. Furthermore, educational attainment has increased even as sympathy for welfare recipients has declined. I address these puzzles using three decades of British survey data and find that it is the socially liberal attitudes rather than the economic advantage associated with higher education that explains why this group is sympathetic towards welfare recipients. These findings reveal an educational cleavage in stereotypes about welfare recipients, which is based on non-economic concerns, and has implications for support for welfare retrenchment and policies such as increased conditionality. This cleavage is weaker in more highly educated regions, implying that there are diminishing returns from increasing educational attainment in terms of sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients.