Institutions and Vote Unity in Parliaments: Evidence from 33 National Chambers

The paper looks at the relationship between institutions and vote unity in national parliaments with the help of a large data set of votes from 33 national parliaments. The tests run are the first to confirm empirically the relationship between vote of confidence procedure and vote unity. The paper also provides a theoretical explanation for why the existence of the confidence procedure influences vote unity despite being used only rarely. The vote of confidence influences votes through the development of control mechanisms as well as the selection of party members who are more ideologically united. This study also challenges the view that electoral rules which make candidates individually accountable to voters necessarily lead to more vote defections. The findings suggest that higher personal accountability decreases vote unity only if party leaders do not control candidate nomination. Parties that rely on government finance for campaigns are also more united.     

Increasing Representative Accountability through Electoral Laws: The Consequences of the 2008 Romanian Electoral Reform

The paper tests the effects of the 2008 Romanian electoral reform on the behaviour of MPs with the help of personal interviews conducted post reform. The reform was meant to make MPs more responsive to the needs of constituents, which in turn should lead to more constituency input in the legislative process, while at the same time yielding proportional results. The paper finds that there are few channels for the transmission of constituents' needs to MPs, and the existing channels are used for petty requests that have little to do with the legislative procedure. This in turn encourages the development of clientelistic ties between representatives and voters, which benefit wealthier candidates. The study also finds that although the new system translates votes into seats closely, small parties may still be disadvantaged because of what Duverger (1954 Duverger, M. (1954). Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state, New York, NY: John Wiley. [Google Scholar]. Political parties: Their organization and activity in the modern state. New York: John Wiley) calls the psychological aspects of the wasted vote problem.     

The quality of referendum debate: The UK's electoral system referendum in the print media

This paper analyses the quality of debate surrounding the UK's 2011 electoral reform referendum as represented in the print media. It first considers how debate quality in the context of a referendum campaign may best be conceptualized. It then uses content analysis of media coverage to investigate three aspects of that debate: its quantity; the balance between Yes and No arguments; and the quality of reason-giving. It finds that the quantity of debate was comparable to other recent electoral reform referendums. Coverage was predominantly, but not overwhelmingly, hostile to change. The different indicators of the quality of reason-giving present a mixed picture. The paper concludes by considering how the analysis could be extended through further comparison with other cases.     

Vote-earning strategies in flexible list systems: Seats at the price of unity

In theory, flexible list systems are a compromise between closed-list and open-list proportional representation. A party's list of candidates can be reordered by voters if the number of votes cast for an individual candidate exceeds some quota. Because these barriers to reordering are rarely overcome, these systems are often characterized as basically closed-list systems. Paradoxically, in many cases, candidates are increasingly earning individual-level preference votes. Using data from Slovakia, we show that incumbents cultivate personal reputations because parties reward preference vote earning candidates with better pre-election list positions in the future. Ironically, the party's vote-earning strategy comes at a price, as incumbents use voting against the party on the chamber floor to generate the reputations that garner preference votes.     

论我国农民参政权——基于2009年《选举法修正案草案》的现实思考

政治参与是衡量政治现代化的重要指标,是民主政治的重要内容。农民是中国最大的群体,却是政治参与的边缘群体。《选举法修正案草案》有望使农民获得真正意义上的平等选举权,更有机会参与国家政治生活;但应该在对其肯定的同时,更多地从我国农民参政所处的现状思考,通过对农民参政影响因素及现状分析,探寻一条适合国情的农民参政权的实现路径。     

Legislative voting in the pork-dominant parliament: evidence from the Philippine House of Representatives

In this paper I investigate how legislators behave in extremely pork-oriented, or pork-dominant, systems where virtually no party-line voting takes place and politicians strive to deliver individual/local benefits instead of national public policies. I argue that, in the pork-dominant context, most legislators vote with the president, who controls access to the pork pipeline, irrespective of their party affiliations. Thus, the president’s party legislators should have little incentive to vote against the president, regardless of voter demands for pork or policy; however, sometimes opposition-party legislators elected particularly from more-developed districts (where voters often desire policy over pork) should have strong incentives to vote against the president. These arguments are supported with quantitative studies of the post-authoritarian Philippine House of Representatives. It is found that, in the highly homogeneous legislature dominated by pork-seeking politicians, (1) most bills are passed with unanimous or near-unanimous consent, (2) governing-party legislators almost always vote with the majority of the members of the parliament, regardless of voters’ socio-economic conditions, and (3) opposition-party legislators, especially in more-developed areas, tend to vote against the parliamentary majority. These findings indicate that voters’ high socio-economic status promotes programmatic accountability, leading their representatives to undermine voting unity within the extremely cohesive pork-dominant legislature.     

Distinguishing territorial structure from electoral adventurism: The distinct sources of static and dynamic nationalization

Estimates of static nationalization do not always reflect stark qualitative differences between parties. We use a research design oriented around a comparison of sharply different parties—the unstable Democratic Left in Ecuador and the stable Broad Front in Uruguay—to develop the distinctiveness of static and dynamic nationalization. Snapshot measures that only consider a single election suggest that both parties are poorly statically nationalized; but we show that the former case is highly statically nationalized, and that the observed territorial differences arise because it is poorly dynamically nationalized. We adopt the linear mixed modeling approach to reduce the bias in extant estimators. The approach is also informative about the sources of variance in a party's territorial support: relatively stable district attributes account for static nationalization, while features unique to the electoral cycle account for dynamic nationalization. Substantively, our study alters conclusions about parties operating in highly unstable electoral contexts.     

Is there an intrinsic duty to vote? Comparative evidence from East and West Germans

The duty to vote is a strong predictor of turnout, but little is known of its source, leaving much ambiguity around the nature of the motivation. This article shows that a powerful pathway lies in the ethical commitment many individuals feel to their nations. When the state is seen as an extension of one's national community, this national obligation is politicized toward state affairs, including the duty to vote. Conversely, when this linkage is weak or absent, an intrinsic duty to vote is weakened. By revising a key assumption in the traditional calculus of voting, I derive a statistical model to identify a nation-based, intrinsic duty to vote. The model is tested in Germany, where different experiences with unification in the East versus West yield contrasting predictions on an intrinsic duty to vote. The findings suggest new strategies for get-out-the-vote efforts to target the nationalistic source of the duty to vote.     

What They Do Does Matter: Incumbent Resource Allocations and the Individual House Vote

It is reasonable to presume that House incumbents through their behaviors and resource allocations (e.g., trips home, staff, etc.) are responsible for their electoral success. The empirical case for the resource allocation hypothesis, however, rests primarily upon the support of a few experimental design studies. The remainder of the evidence from 25 years of tests of this hypothesis, at the district and individual-levels, is littered with null findings. Scholars suggest two methodological obstructions hinder alternative hypothesis findings: simultaneity bias (in district and individual-level studies), and restricted variance on the allocation measures (in individual-level studies). In this investigation I apply methodological remedies for these hindrances-nonrecursive analyses on a pooled (1960–1976) NES elections data set. I uncover the strongest evidence yet that incumbents benefit electorally from their resource allocations (here: bills sponsored and cosponsored, staff, and district offices). In addition to this main result, I also discuss the influence generational replacement has on resource allocations and the vote.

The Impact of Municipality Mergers on Political Participation

The citizen assembly of the Swiss canton Glarus in 2006 decided to radically reduce the historical number of communes from 25 to three. Studies show that the financial and economic consequences are surprisingly small. This paper analyzes the effects on citizens' vote participation as an indicator of their political involvement. Using the difference-in-difference and the synthetic control methods, we empirically show that vote participation dropped significantly, also compared to neighboring cantons and the rest of Switzerland.