The Effects of Blaming Others for Legislative Inaction on Individual and Collective Evaluations

Legislators commonly blame others for gridlock. We posit that legislators may engage in this type of rhetoric to minimize the individual reputational risks associated with legislative inaction or to boost the relative standing of their party. In a series of six survey experiments, we find that blaming others for inaction undermines voters’ evaluations of individual legislators who engage in this rhetorical strategy. This effect is particularly pronounced among out-partisans and independents. However, blaming rhetoric can also enhance the standing of the blamer’s party relative to the opposing party across all groups (including out-partisans), in large part by undermining the reputations of these other actors. Ultimately, we show that when an individual legislator engages in blaming rhetoric, the immediate net electoral effects are null. This suggests that coordinated efforts by a party to blame opponents may improve the party’s relative standing, while imposing few costs on those engaged in blaming.     

Corruption,Party Leaders,and Candidate Selection: Evidence from Italy

Research indicates that voters are not particularly effective at removing corrupt politicians from office, in part because voters make decisions on the basis of many competing factors. Party leaders are much more single-minded than voters and will choose to deselect implicated legislators if it means maintaining a positive party reputation and improving the odds of winning a legislative majority. We examine renominations to Italy’s legislature in two periods marked by corruption. We compare these renomination patterns with those from the prior legislature, when corruption lacked political salience. Our analysis shows that incumbent renominations are negatively associated with the number of press mentions that link the incumbent to corruption—but only when corruption is salient to the public. Our study highlights the importance of party leaders in forcing malfeasant legislators out of office—and reducing corruption—and redirects attention from voters to political elites as a critical channel in enforcing democratic accountability.     

What are we gonna be when we grow up? SYRIZA's institutionalisation and its new “governing party” role

The aim of this paper is to analyse the organizational model of one of the most successful European radical left parties, the Greek Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA). Our goal is to analyse SYRIZA's organizational transition from the electoral arena to the government (2015). Our main finding is that SYRIZA started as a socially-oriented organization led by an oligarchic dominant coalition and converted itself into a political party, characterized by a prevailing role of the party in public office/party government. Both the institutional environment and the party organization's first configuration have had an impact on this change.     

肝胆相照 同心同行

90年来,中国共产党团结各民主党派和无党派人士,使多党合作事业不断创新,焕发生机与活力.70年前,民盟的创建者和早期领导人同共产党和衷共济,为新中国的诞生作出了重大贡献.改革开放以来,民盟充分发挥界别优势,集中全盟智慧,将参政议政活动推向一个较高的层次.     

网络舆情语境下提升民主党派基层组织参政议政能力的路径思考

当前,网络舆情在给我国民主党派基层组织参政议政带来机遇的同时,其突发性、偏差性、繁杂性等特性对民主党派基层组织的应急能力、政治智慧、实战水平等方面提出了严骏挑战,这就要求各民主党派基层组织应当勇于抓住网络舆情对参政议政带来的良好机遇,努力适应当前网络舆情发展的新形势,积极借助网络平台,时刻关注舆情讯息,充分汲取网络民意,深入开展网络调查与监督,着力提升参政议政能力。     

Keeping the rascals in: Anti‐political‐establishment parties and their cost of governing in established democracies

Coalition governments in established democracies incur, on average, an electoral ‘cost of governing’. This cost varies across coalition partners, and is higher for anti‐political‐establishment parties. This is because, if such a party participates in a coalition, it loses the purity of its message by being seen to cooperate with the political establishment. In order to demonstrate that anti‐political‐establishment parties suffer an additional cost of governing, this article builds on the work by Van der Brug et al. and refines the standard cost of governing theory by ‘bringing the party back in’. The results of the analyses, based on 594 observations concerning 51 parties in seven Western European countries, cast doubt on the conventional concept of a cost of governing that pertains to all parties equally. The findings call for a major revision of the standard cost of governing literature, while adding a significant contribution to the debate on strategies against parties that may constitute a danger to democracy.     

From voter ID to party ID: How political parties affect perceptions of election fraud in the U.S.

This paper uses a survey experiment to assess what individuals understand about election fraud and under what circumstances they see it as a problem. I argue that political parties are central to answering both these questions. Results from the 2011 CCES survey suggest respondents are able to differentiate between the relative incentives of Democrats and Republicans where fraud tactics are concerned, but whether voters see these tactics as problematic is heavily influenced by partisan bias. The results show little support for the notion that partisan ideology drives fraud assessments, and suggest support for the idea that individual concerns for fraud are shaped a desire for their preferred candidate to win. These results offer insights that might be applied more broadly to questions of perceptions of electoral integrity and procedural fairness in democracies.     

The Philippines’ Arbitration Pleading Bodes Ill for SouthChina Sea Disputes

正THE Philippines submitted on March 30 a memorial to the arbitral tribunal at The Hague,urging it to invalidate China’s"nine-dash line"in the South China Sea.The Philippines first initiated arbitral proceedings against China over the     

The mechanical and psychological effects of legal thresholds

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties and decompose it into a mechanical and a psychological effect. We study the case of Morocco, whose local elections afford a rare opportunity to uncover the causal effect of the legal threshold, using a differences-in-differences approach. Our results show a large effect of the legal threshold on the number of parties. We find a large psychological effect in absolute terms: a 3% increase in the legal threshold leaves almost one effective party out of the council for purely strategic reasons. We conjecture that this large effect is due to the lack of institutionalization and programmaticness of most Moroccan parties.