The Power of Policy Regimes: Explaining Shale Gas Policy Divergence in Bulgaria and Poland

Shale gas policies vary significantly across Europe, notably in Russia‐dependent Central Eastern Europe. Most strikingly, Bulgaria banned shale gas, whereas Poland remains firmly committed to fostering it despite its drawbacks. This article uses a policy regime approach to explain the shale gas puzzle. Drawing on a large set of interviews, the piece investigates regime strength as the causal factor that explains the adoption of specific shale gas laws (Poland) or a fracking ban (Bulgaria). It finds that the Polish shale gas policy regime was strong, based on a powerful political narrative and characterized by an institutional process ensuring the buy‐in of actors from relevant policy levels and subsystems. In Bulgaria the policy regime was weak, failed to co–opt key stakeholders, and was institutionally ill‐designed. The findings show how different degrees of policy regime strength translate into diverging policy trajectories in two countries that otherwise operate in similar environments.     

Borrowing Trouble: Sovereign Credit,Military Regimes,and Conflict

Changes in relative military power in the international system are seen as an impediment to peace. This article will focus on one particular avenue for states to increase their relative military power: sovereign borrowing. States’ ability to borrow inexpensive credit can undermine credible commitments in international relations, but only for those states that habitually use credit for military purposes. I argue that military regimes are more likely to use fiscal resources such as sovereign credit toward military spending, which leads to sudden increases in military power. As a result, adversarial states have incentives to use preventive action against military regimes before these regimes use credit for military purposes. To test this argument, I examine target behavior in militarized disputes as a function of expected borrowing costs credit and regime type. The empirical analysis demonstrates that military regimes, expected to have improved borrowing costs, are more likely to be the target of militarized disputes.     

Hitting the saturation point: unpacking the politics of bureaucratic reforms in hybrid regimes

How do the survival incentives facing incumbents in hybrid regimes affect the engineering of bureaucratic reforms? This article tackles this question by departing from the literature on competitive authoritarianism and with the help of detailed empirical evidence from Georgia’s public administration reforms (2004–2012). It first argues that in order to preserve their hold on power, dominant parties have to tilt the political playing field, while still upholding popular support. I posit that this dual incentive structure leads the incumbents to promote efficiency of public service, but to also curb these policies at a point that would jeopardize their ability to use administrative resources for partisan ends. Consequently, bureaucratic reforms reach a saturation point, beyond which no more reforms can be endured.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.     

The Politics of Preferential Trade Liberalization in Authoritarian Countries

While autocracies constitute a third of all signatories of preferential trade agreements (PTAs), very little research has explained why some autocrats join PTAs while others do not. We argue that this variation reflects the leader’s degree of vulnerability to elite-led coups during leadership change–whether a leader enters power legally or extralegally. New extralegal leaders are more vulnerable than new legal leaders, which encourages extralegal leaders to use PTAs to both build support from exporters and pressure disloyal importers. We test our hypotheses using a dyadic data set of 120 autocracies from 1960 to 2014. Our results show that extralegal leaders sign more and deeper PTAs than legal leaders. Moreover, we find that extralegal leaders with a high risk of coups are more likely to form deep PTAs than extralegal leaders with a low risk of coups. In line with our argument, we also provide evidence that extralegal leaders sign trade agreements that are likely to be enforced. Our article has implications for the political economy of trade and for development studies.     

Interpersonal violence by authoritarian rulers: Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin compared

Why do some authoritarian rulers, such as Saddam Hussein, kill or torture other people personally, whereas others, like Joseph Stalin, delegate such violence to subordinates? Such politically motivated interpersonal violence committed by authoritarian leaders has never before been theorized. Through a comparison of Hussein and Stalin, we explain why some dictators engage in this behavior and others do not. We propose a model based on three components: the individual's prior habituation or non-habituation to violence; regime characteristics that ‘select for’ a personally violent or non-violent ruler; and, once a ruler takes power, the interaction of the first two variables. We also suggest that most communist regimes featured organizational characteristics that discouraged such violence by the leader.     

Fuel,feed and the corporate restructuring of the food regime

The agrofuel boom has brought about some of the most significant transformations in the world food system in recent decades. A rich and diverse body of agrarian political economy research has emerged that elucidates the conflicts and redistributional shifts engendered by these transformations. However, less attention has been given to differences within agri-food capital. This paper contributes to the existing literature on agrofuels, by showing how one cluster of agri-food corporations and farmers within the US has benefited from soaring ethanol production at the expense of another cluster. More specifically, I delineate and chart the pecuniary trajectories of two corporate-led distributional coalitions that have vied over the course taken by the US ethanol sector: the ‘Agro-Trader nexus’ and the ‘Animal Processor nexus’. My main finding is that the US ethanol boom has been a vector of redistribution: increasing the earnings of the Agro-Trader nexus and corn growers while reducing the earnings of the Animal Processor nexus and livestock farmers. This finding points to the limits and contradictions of agrofuels capitalism and the acute tensions that exist at the heart of the corporate food regime.     

The Coexistence of Different Welfare Regimes in the Same Country: A Comparative Analysis of the Brazilian Municipalities Heterogeneity

Abstract

This paper demonstrates that heterogeneous countries such as Brazil have vast differences in welfare arrangements at the sub-national level. A number of social policies (social insurance, education, health and social assistance) were analysed in 5,565 Brazilian municipalities along five dimensions: expenditure, coverage, share of private spending, family structure and poverty. The grade of membership method was used to cluster municipalities and identify the main differences in their welfare regimes. Factor analysis was also used to explore which dimensions are most relevant in characterizing these sub-national regimes. The results show highly heterogeneous institutional forms of social protection across municipalities, which are classified as social assistance, quasi-social assistance, corporative, quasi-corporative, family insurance and intermediary welfare regimes.     

Combating Domestic Abuse in Jordan from the Top-Down: Liberal and/or Democratic Statebuilding?

ABSTRACT

This article explores how liberal statebuilding can produce unexpected results by examining Jordan's campaign against domestic abuse. Jordan's Family Protection Initiative exemplifies the executive's implementation of externally-supported measures promoting women's empowerment. However, ambiguities over its central mission have resulted in the state pressuring victims to reconcile with abusive family members. I argue that the Initiative reflects regime survival strategies, designed to deflect international calls for democratic reform, co-opt the Jordanian women's movement, and circumvent Islamist and tribal opposition. Critics' accusations that the Initiative is ‘foreign’ are largely veiled criticisms of the executive for politically marginalising them and/or usurping their authority in family matters.     

Observing incumbent abuses: improving measures of electoral and competitive authoritarianism with new data

Electoral and competitive authoritarian regimes have become a major focus of comparative research. Yet, finding measures that distinguish these regimes from democracies is challenging, especially for scholars conducting large-N cross-national research, as this conceptual distinction rests on incumbent abuses that are difficult to systematically observe. This article reviews common measures that simply utilize extant regime indicators to draw the line with democracy, demonstrates their poor performance in mirroring a benchmark from case-based measurement, and illustrates the adverse implications for theory building. The article then shows how data on incumbent abuse from the National Elections Across Democracy and Dictatorship (NELDA) and Varieties of Democracy (VDEM) projects can be utilized to construct alternative measures. A NELDA-based measure far outperforms extant alternatives in mirroring the case-based benchmark. The article then discusses why a VDEM-based alternative should be a superior option once data is available and how one might be constructed.