从认同视角看卡扎菲的非洲外交政策

卡扎菲时期的利比亚持有多重身份认同。其中,阿拉伯认同、伊斯兰认同以及非洲认同在不同时期对利比亚外交政策发挥着不同程度的影响。从认同视角看,卡扎菲时期利比亚对非洲外交政策大致可以分成两个阶段：在卡扎菲执政的前20多年时间里,利比亚对非政策主要受到阿拉伯和伊斯兰认同的影响;从20世纪80年代末开始到卡扎菲政权垮台,利比亚对非政策的重点转移到了撒哈拉以南非洲,主要受到非洲认同的影响。卡扎菲政权垮台的结局说明,对于非洲各国来讲,国家认同是首要的核心认同,而非洲认同是相对次要的认同。     

Active in Not Being Active (AINBA): how East Asian powers accept R2P

This article explores and compares the positions of two major powers in East Asia—China and Japan—towards the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) norm. R2P calls for collective international responsibility in the event that states are unwilling or unable to protect their people. Evaluating the mainstream argument in the literature that China and Japan have recently been welcoming the R2P norm, we ask the following questions: To what extent have China and Japan aligned themselves with R2P? How do international and national factors play out to influence their R2P stance? To summarize our findings up front: unlike what much of the current literature says, China and Japan's acceptance and practice of the R2P norm are largely pro forma. We argue that they both appear active in participating in the debates but only in order to remain inactive. In other words, they are active participants in the debates and discussions on R2P, but their aim is not to further its usage but to contain its effects. Their current stance on R2P is characterized by what we will call ‘Active in Not Being Active’ (AINBA). The article discusses the key sources and rationale for their AINBA policy with regard to R2P.     

Historical aspirations and the domestic politics of Russia's pursuit of international status

What determined Russia's national interests and grand strategy in the first decade after the Cold War? This article uses aspirational constructivism, which combines social psychology with constructivism, to answer this question. Central to aspirational constructivism are the roles that the past self and in-groups, and their perceived effectiveness play in the selection of a national identity and the definition of national interests. This article explains why Russian political elites settled on a statist national identity that focused on retaining Russia's historical status as a Western great power and hegemon in the former Soviet Union and in engaging the country in bounded status competition with the United States.     

Status and emotions in Russian foreign policy

The importance of status concerns on Russia's foreign policy agenda has been increasingly observed. This preoccupation with status is particularly visible in Russia's relations with the West. Although strong claims about status in Russian foreign policy are frequently made in public and private by researchers, journalists, politicians, diplomats and other commentators, such claims often lack any closer theoretical or empirical justification. The aim of this introductory article is, therefore, to outline the basic components that form the research agenda on status. Status, if properly examined, helps us understand not only Russian foreign policy, put also present-day international politics and its transformation in a broader sense.In a first part, we identify the theoretical voids concerning the study of international status. In a second part we outline the drivers and logic of status concerns, considering in particular identity theories, psychological approaches and existing research regarding emotions. The presented research agenda on status, derived from International Relations and related theories, provides a well-structured tool-box for investigating the link between status, identity and emotions in Russian foreign policy vis-à-vis the West. In a third part we present the key questions rose by the contributors to this Special Issue and summarize their main findings.