Regionalizing Multilateralism: Estimating the Power of Potential Regional Voting Blocs in the IMF

This paper explores the voting power of hypothetical regional voting blocs in the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund. We first discuss the prospect of regionally defined groups becoming more significant in the Fund’s decision-making process. After briefly outlining the IMF’s formal decision procedures, including its weighted voting system, use of special majorities, and the function of voting groups in the Fund’s Executive Board we define three indices of a priori voting power — the Banzhaf, Johnston, and Shapley-Shubik indices — which are then applied to existing voting groups. Following this we simulate several regionally defined a priori coalitions and their potential to influence outcomes in passing resolutions in the Fund using a simple majority. The coalitions we specify are based on the assumption that members of the IMF will form into voting blocs based on regionally-defined preferences. The procedures employed use existing voting weights to project the relative strengths of alternative regional blocs that could emerge within the IMF. Our results indicate that the United States would have the greatest voting power in almost all scenarios. A voting bloc comprised of European countries, however, would be able to dominate the United States unless the U.S. formed an Asia-Pacific bloc. Japan, the PRC, and other Asian countries appear to be unable to form voting blocs that would provide them with more voting power than the United States.     

我国合议庭评议表决制度功能缺失之省思

合议庭评议表决制度具有充分发挥集体智慧、形成评议结论的功能。为发挥这些功能,采行合议制的国家一般都确立了全体参与,秘密评议;地位平等,独立表决;多数决定,异议保留等原则。我国合议庭评议表决制度在体现这些原则的具体规则的确立与实施方面有所欠缺,导致功能缺失,应当从其自身制度与相关工作制度的并行调整两方面着手进行改革,才会具有实效性。     

Yea or Nay: Do Legislators Benefit by Voting Against Their Party?

This article asks whether legislators are able to reap electoral benefits from opposing their party on one or more high‐profile issues. Using data from a national survey in which citizens are asked their own positions on seven high‐profile issues voted on by the U.S. Senate, as well as how they believe their state's two senators have voted on these issues, I find that senators generally do not benefit from voting against their party. Specifically, when a senator deviates from her party, the vast majority of out‐partisans nonetheless persist in believing that the senator voted with her party anyhow; and while the small minority of out‐partisans who are aware of her deviation are indeed more likely to approve of and vote for such a senator, there are simply too few of these correctly informed citizens for it to make a meaningful difference for the senator's overall support.     

Political corruption,economy, and citizens' evaluation of democracy in South Korea

South Korean politics has been haunted by numerous corruption scandals as well as the prosecution of politicians and their cronies for their corruption. Yet despite the prevalence and salience of political corruption, many citizens of South Korea tend to overlook the problem by continuing to support corrupt politicians and administrations. This study defines under what circumstances political corruption shapes citizens' judgment of government and the political system as a whole in South Korea. The results indicate that national economic conditions as a perceptual screen mediate the effect of political corruption on the evaluation of democratic governance.     

When the election rains out and how bad weather excludes marginal voters from turning out

Ostensibly random and trivial experiences of everyday life, e.g., local weather, can have significant political consequences. First, we present a comprehensive meta-analysis of 34 studies of electoral turnout and rainfall – the vast majority demonstrating a negative association. Secondly, we present a new analysis of a voter panel with validated turnout for a complete electorate merged with fine-grained meteorological observations to show that Election Day rainfall reduces turnout by 0.95 percentage points per centimeter, while more sunshine increases turnout. Marginal voters (young voters) are up to six times more susceptible to bad weather and respond more positively to pleasant weather. Thus, bad weather exacerbates unequal democratic participation by pushing low-propensity voters to abstain. Efforts to include marginal voters therefore ought to be intensified during poor weather, and elections could even be moved to seasons with more pleasant weather to improve participatory equality.     

公司累积投票制度的理论与实践

累积投票制度作为股东选择公司管理者的一种表决权制度,最早起源于美国伊利诺伊州《宪法》的规定。累积投票制度保护了中小投资者的投资热情,符合资本社会化的原则。公司股东选任董事或者监事时,实行累积投票制度对保护中小股东的利益,特别是对完善我国公司治理结构具有独特的价值。     

The political context and Duverger's theory: Evidence at the district level

A central tenet of electoral systems' research is that more parties should get votes in districts with large magnitudes than in districts with smaller magnitudes. This proposition is largely untested at the district level, even though that is the level at which relevant pressures are expected to work. At the aggregate level, research has found that there are systematic deviations from Duverger's law related to incentives from ethnolinguistic fragmentation, institutions, and strategic voting. This analysis confirms that many of these results hold at the district level, which is the most appropriate level for testing Duverger's law. District level party-system fragmentation patterns in 44 countries support Duverger's basic hypotheses. The effect of electoral institutions is contingent, however, upon the presence of social cleavages that generate pressures for additional parties, the establishment of patterns of party-system competition that help voters evaluate contenders' viability, and the absence of competing incentives generated by districts of varying magnitudes. These effects are robust to different specifications of social heterogeneity. However, we find no evidence that institutional features like federalism or presidentialism reduce the strategic effects of district level factors.     

Austerity and niche parties: The electoral consequences of fiscal reforms

Austerity policies — policies of sharp reductions of a government's budget deficint involving spending cuts and tax increases — are claimed to boost support for radical political parties. We argue, counter to popular claims, that austerity measures actually reduce support for radical and niche parties. Austerity policies force traditional left-right politics to the forefront of political debate with the traditional mainstream parties having a stronger ownership over those issues. We systematically explore the impact of austerity measures on the electoral fortunes of niche parties in 16 developed countries over a 35-year period, while controlling for a number of socio-economic variables. We find that austerity policies that rely on tax increases affect radical parties on the left and the right in different ways than fiscal adjustments based on spending cuts.     

Issue cross-pressures and time of voting decision

Undecided voters are often regarded by political parties and candidates as the group that determines the outcome of an election. This paper discusses the concept and measurement of issue cross-pressures and explores to what extent they influence the time of voting decision in different political systems. Using survey data from national election studies in the Netherlands (1994–2012), Germany (1994–2013) and the United Kingdom (1992–2010), this study finds that issue cross-pressures do influence the time of voting decision regardless of voters' personal consideration set size, demographic background and political attribute. The effect of issue cross-pressures in the Netherlands is most pronounced. In the United Kingdom it is more moderate, while it is least prevalent in Germany. This partially demonstrates that party systems may constrain the role of issue cross-pressures.     

First-time boost beats experience: The effect of past eligibility on turnout

Recent findings from the US indicate a clear positive causal effect of past eligibility on voting in subsequent elections. Based on individual-level register data from four elections held in Denmark and Finland, we find that past eligibility either decreases voting propensity or has a zero effect among young voters. The hype associated with the first elections thus appears to cancel out the habit among young adults in countries where the institutional barriers against voting are weak. Moreover, differences across the types of elections can be noted. The negative effect of past eligibility is strongest in elections characterized by low saliency, implying that high-salient elections mobilize all voters equally and therefore narrow the gap between first and second-time eligible voters.