Political corruption,economy, and citizens' evaluation of democracy in South Korea

South Korean politics has been haunted by numerous corruption scandals as well as the prosecution of politicians and their cronies for their corruption. Yet despite the prevalence and salience of political corruption, many citizens of South Korea tend to overlook the problem by continuing to support corrupt politicians and administrations. This study defines under what circumstances political corruption shapes citizens' judgment of government and the political system as a whole in South Korea. The results indicate that national economic conditions as a perceptual screen mediate the effect of political corruption on the evaluation of democratic governance.     

Back in Contention? The Conservatives' Electoral Prospects

This article assesses whether the Conservatives are likely to be serious contenders for power at the next British general election. First it assesses how well the party will have to do to 'win' the election. Second, it considers whether the record of the polls since 2005 suggests the party is capable of securing the necessary support. Third, the article assesses whether the ideological mood of the electorate has moved closer to the Conservatives since 2005. Finally it considers whether the image of the party has improved.
The Conservatives are likely to have to outpoll Labour by a considerable margin to become the largest party but their record in opinion polls suggests they could achieve this. The ideological mood of the electorate has moved closer to the party, while David Cameron is a relatively popular leader. But the party has still not fully restored its reputation for economic competence.     

Sophisticated Behavior under Majoritarian and Non-Majoritarian Voting Procedures

This study addresses the issue of sincere and sophisticated voting under majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures. By conducting experimental voting games, we compared a common majoritarian procedure, Plurality Voting (PV) with a non-majoritarian procedure, Sequential Voting by Veto (SVV). We focused on two different aspects of the subject: the likelihood of sophisticated voting under each one of the voting procedures and the conditions that foster sincere and sophisticated voting under these procedures. The results highlighted the significant differences between majoritarian and non-majoritarian voting procedures as a key factor in determining the tendency of voters to use sincere or sophisticated voting. Clearly, the sincere model was dominant in SVV games while sophisticated voting dominated the PV games. The extent of sophisticated voting ran counter to the group size, a tendency that was stronger under SVV than under PV. By demonstrating the advantages of the minority principle, when voters are small in number, we hope to encourage the development of a solution that will enable the use of SVV in general elections.     

新经济下的双层股权结构:理论证成、实践经验与中国有效治理路径

新世纪以来选择双层股权结构成为新经济公司的一种新趋势。坚持一股一票的传统公司治理理论主要从公司民主、最优表决权结构和代理成本三个方面反对双层股权结构,认为双层股权结构将降低上市公司价值。股东的共同目标是股东利益最大化而非公司民主;最优表决权治理结构是因公司而异多元化的,一股一票虽普遍然非最优;表决权监督机制非唯一治理成本的约束机制,双层股权结构比一股一票更有助于公司关注长期利益和科技创新。从经验研究来看,双层股权结构与上市公司价值并不存在确定的负相关关系,甚至存在正相关关系。契合新经济公司的双层股权结构有助于在“轻资产、重人力资本”的新经济公司中根据合同而非物质资本进行控制权分配,有助于激励创始股东/管理者进行专属人力资本投资,有助于满足新经济公司的特殊治理结构需要。我国科创板已经引入双层股权结构,为实现中国的有效治理,除目前科创板集中于事前治理外,还应强化事中治理和完善事后治理,最终对双层股权结构进行有效治理实现兴“利”除“弊”。     

组织框架下表决权拘束协议的体系规制

凡是以股东表决权行使为标的的债权协议均为表决权拘束协议,其在实践应用中具有不同的形态与功能。对表决权拘束协议进行规制,不仅需要将其从不同合同类型中识别出来,更要厘清不同形态背后差异化的规制目的与法律对策。合同法、公司法、证券法共同构建了规制体系,三者各有侧重:合同法提供了概念与规则基础;公司法进行了组织价值与规则的填充;证券法通过其合并规则应对义务的规避,解决形式与实质的不一致问题。三者不可偏废:合同层面的纠纷解决不能脱离组织的特殊性而抽象地适用合同法规范;证券特别规制的妥当适用,也无法脱离其合同法与公司法的规范与概念基础。     

资本多数决的限制与小股东权益保护

资本多数决原则在公司议事中的正当运用,能有力地保障公司经营决策的高效运行,但实践中,不泛对该原则的滥用,由此导致损害小股东利益的现象频发,挫伤了小股东的投资热情。为依法保护小股东的利益,应逐步完善相关立法,赋予股东与其所持股份相一致的表决权,明确大股东在行使表决权时所应承担的义务,以实现权利与义务的制衡;赋予小股东特定情形下的股份收买请求权;限制大股东的表决权;加强对股东会决议的监督;同时,赋予小股东在特定情形下提起派生诉讼的权利。     

Is compulsory voting habit-forming? Regression discontinuity evidence from Brazil

Voting in one election increases one's propensity to vote in the future. It remains unclear, however, whether this pattern holds when voting is compulsory – as is the case in a quarter of all democracies. Is compulsory voting habit-forming? I address this question using a regression discontinuity design and administrative turnout data from Brazil, where voting is voluntary at age 16 and compulsory at age 18. I find no evidence that compulsory voting instils voting habits. Instead, the evidence points to a first-time compulsory voting boost, which gradually dissipates as voters grow older. I show that targeted mobilisation of first-time compulsory voters is a plausible mechanism behind the turnout boost. Alternative explanations find less support in the data. The results clarify the scope conditions of prior research on voting habits, and have important implications for the debate over the second-order effects of compulsory voting.     

“Do perceptions of EMU alter clarity of responsibility? A comparison of German and Greek electorates”

The goal of this paper is to understand whether perceptions of supranationalisation of economic policy mitigate economic voting in the Eurozone. We focus on two countries with divergent performances in the Eurozone: Germany and Greece, and make use of a novel dataset, which contains all necessary items to test this hypothesis. Our comprehensive vote model shows that in both countries economic voting occurs. However, once we interact perceptions of EU responsibility with perceptions of economic performance, we obtain diverging results: in Germany, the weight of economic perceptions on vote increases when citizens assign a higher responsibility to the EU for the country's economic situation. This is the opposite of what the “blurring of responsibility” posits. On the contrary, Greek electors are in line with expectations of our main hypothesis. Moreover, in this country we also found support for the idea that only citizens with a high level of political sophistication are able to incorporate the distribution of responsibilities for the economic policy in their vote calculus. Our results suggest that the blurring of responsibility effect on the vote may not be systematic across the Eurozone.