Self-respect and public reason

In A Theory of Justice John Rawls argues that self-respect is ‘perhaps the most important’ primary good, and that its status as such gives crucial support to controversial ideas like the lexical priority of liberty. Given the importance of these ideas for Rawls, it should be no surprise that they have attracted much critical attention. In response to these critics I give a defense of self-respect that grounds its importance in Rawls’s moral conception of the person. I show that this understanding of self-respect goes well beyond giving support to the lexical priority of liberty, also supporting Rawls’s still more controversial view of public reason. On my account, taking self-respect seriously requires the coercive enforcement of public reason. This is a novel argument for public reason, in that it grounds the idea in justice as fairness and mandates its coercive enforcement.     

The Presidential Election of 2008*

Senators Barack Obama and John McCain each has severe problems. McCain must take his distance from the very unpopular President Bush while keeping the support of the core Republican voters, but suffers from lack of rapport with the Fundamentalist Protestants and traditionalist Catholics. In foreign policy, he is more devoted to US global hegemony (in a world which stubbornly refuses it) than the incumbent. Senator Obama knows that this is a dangerous illusion but thinks that it is unwise to say so. He supports Israel in exaggerated terms and repeats the fabrications of the war party about Iran. Obama has the difficulty of being part black and entirely intellectual, and he needs the votes of the working class men and women who are very reserved about him. McCain seeks low taxes and less government expenditure and intervention, but tens of millions of economically hard‐pressed citizens are ready to return to the ethos and practices of the New Deal. Obama promises to revive the regulatory and redistributive role of government to help them, but his reluctance to criticise the arms budget may makes him seem unrealistic. Obama's vision of the United States puts the achievement of the American Revolution in the future whereas McCain thinks of the nation as already perfected. In many respects, we have a classical conflict between left and right.     

Pope Benedict XVI Confronts Religious Relativism

Pope Benedict XVI’s inflammatory speech at Regensburg highlights a subtle difference between Benedict and John Paul II. John Paul called Muslims and Jews “sons of Abraham,” and he organized high-profile interfaith events. Benedict is more skeptical of interreligious dialog and more confrontational toward Islam than was his predecessor. This shift in tone toward Islam stems from changed historical circumstances. Islam has replaced communism as Europe’s biggest ideological challenge. But, there are also subtle theological differences between the two Popes. John Paul was trained by Dominicans, and throughout his papacy, he was a champion of St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Augustine, with his bleaker view of non-Christian cultures, is the dominant influence on Benedict. Benedict believes that theologies of religious pluralism, which lead to metaphysical and religious relativism, have replaced liberation theologies as the most serious threats to Catholic orthodoxy.

Cohen vs. Rawls on justice and equality

G.A. Cohen criticizes Rawls’s account of justice because his difference principle permits inequalities that reflect the relative scarcity of different skills and natural abilities. Instead of viewing the ‘basic structure’ as the primary subject of justice, Cohen argues that individual citizens should cultivate an egalitarian ethos, which would enable a just society to dispense with the use of incentive payments to induce individuals to use their talents in socially ideal ways. This study examines Cohen’s critique, including his rejection of ‘incentives,’ and vindicates Rawls’s approach. Ultimately, Cohen’s argument fails to grapple with the moral pluralism that characterizes modern, democratic societies, whereas Rawls’s theory is constructed to accommodate such pluralism.     

The Ethiopian root of Thomas More’s Utopia

The classical utopian novels of early-modern Europe, such as Utopia, Christianopolis and City of the sun, are widely understood in mainstream academics as products of the writers’ inventive imaginations of better social organisations. Suggestions regarding the possibility that places with the social and administrative features depicted in the novels might actually have existed in medieval times, are often dismissed by Western scholars who argue that the role of non-European civilisations in the early-modern proliferation of utopian novels did not go beyond helping to inspire the writers’ creative mix of narrations. A disregard for the fact that medieval utopian novels could be modified and/or de-identified versions of earlier reports about 12^th- and 13^th-century Ethiopians (‘the Land of Prester John’) has severely distorted the mainstream understanding of utopianism and renaissance by African scholars. This article specifically focuses on More’s Utopia, to assert its Ethiopian root using historical and religious evidence.     

Idleness,Usefulness and Self-Constitution

Abstract

The core argument of the paper is that the modern philosophical notion of self-constitution is directed against the prospect of human beings dissolving into idleness. Arguments for self-constitution are marked by non-philosophical presuppositions about the value of usefulness. Those arguments also assume a particular conception of superior experience as conscious integration of a person’s actions within an identifiable set of chosen commitments. Exploring particular arguments by Hegel, Kant, Korsgaard and Frankfurt the paper claims that those arguments are problematic in the various ways in which they suppose usefulness and explicitly or implicitly take extra-philosophical views of idleness.     

基于合法律性的合法性——从韦伯到哈贝马斯

韦伯具有强烈的民族主义情结,这种情结使他尤为强调学术的文化政治担当,亦使其具有学者和群众性政治家双重身份。作为学者,他对现代社会基于合法律性的合法性(法理型统治)模式进行了详尽分析;作为群众性政治家,他又明确提出了领袖民主(卡理斯玛型统治)合法化模式。这两种理论模式均具有政治现实主义和实证论倾向。哈贝马斯总体上拒绝了韦伯合法化模式的描述性路径,并极力批判了其领袖民主模式;但他亦将其合法化论说建基于韦伯式基于合法律性的合法性模式之上,并做出了可以容纳道德性内容的理论重构。     

Paradigms in South African cinema research: Modernity,the New Africa Movement and beyond

Abstract

The history of theoretical approaches about South African cinema is discussed from the turn of the twentieth century period of the New Africa Movement, through various other theoretical moments, up to the early 1990s. These include conservative cultural theory, liberal humanism, workerist, Althusserian and Gramscian Marxisms. The discussion examines theoretical interventions either promoting or opposing modernity in the work of Thelma Gutsche, Hans Rompel, John Grierson and various Afrikaner cultural organisations during the first half of the twentieth century. Post-1970s cinema theory is critically examined in relation to discursive contestation occurring within both academia and the industry.     

STR-typer 10G/F试剂在单亲鉴定中的应用

目的观察和分析STR-typer 10G/F试剂盒在单亲鉴定中的作用。方法随机抽样湖北地区汉族个体206人静脉血样,Chelex-100法提取基因组DNA。采用STR-typer 10G/F试剂盒进行复合扩增,分型并计数基因型并计算基因频率、基因座杂合度(H)、标准三联体非父排除率(PE3)和二联体非父排除率(PE2)。结果 9个STR基因座等位基因数9～14个,基因型分布观察值与Hardy-Weinberg平衡理论值的差异均无显著性(P>0.05),杂合度在0.75以上,平均非父排除率0.57～0.75;STR-typer 10G/F试剂盒累积非父排除率(PE3)0.999 973,合并使用Identifiler Plus系统,累积非父排除率可达0.999 999 967 6。结论 STR-typer 10G/F系统多态性程度基本接近Identifiler Plus系统,在单亲鉴定时,可作为Identifiler试剂盒的有效补充。     

Towards a neo-Polanyian approach to money: integrating the concept of debt

Abstract

This paper aims to reconsider Polanyi's approach to money. His best-known writing on money uses is deeply original and presents strong insights that dissociate money from the concept of the market. Polanyi also developed an interesting non-dichotomous understanding of money in his The great transformation. However, taken together, these two contributions lead to some unresolved questions: his critique of the orthodox approach to money is ambivalent; his argument to separate payment from account is weak; and, most important, he ultimately makes an incomplete break with the classical real/monetary dichotomy. This paper proposes a distinction between money as a set of instruments and practices and money as a concept, through the integration of John Commons's concept of debt into Polanyi's framework. This reformulation allows us to resolve Polanyi's unresolved questions while preserving his major contributions, and leads to a more complex understanding of money.