China's new regulatory regime tailored for the sharing economy: The case of Uber under Chinese local government regulation in comparison to the EU,US, and the UK

Although Uber's arrival in China has resulted in disruptive competition for incumbent taxi companies, it offers an attractive alternative in China's supply-demand-imbalanced urban passenger transport system. China's regulatory regime for Uber has evolved in three stages: from the regulatory vacuum prior to 2015 to its official legalization in 2015–2016, and the enactment of numerous local regulations in 2016, with specific and more demanding requirements for Uber. This policy is a part of the Chinese approach to the gradual liberalization of the urban passenger transport market. Policymakers should consider ‘fair competition’ as the guiding principle to balance the interests of sharing firms and incumbent service providers, as well as between different sharing firms. The core value of this principle lies in the benefits it provides for consumers and the way it engenders a pro-competitive market environment. The labor protection arrangements for sharing firms’ laborers should be more flexible and diversified. In order to recognize whether an Uber-Driver is an employee or independent contractor, a new standard taking into account a range of factors should be established through collective negotiations between the participants of the sharing economy, and dialogues between members of the judiciary, academics, and the policymakers. Further, consumer protection law and personal data protection provisions should apply when sharing firms misuse their distinctive algorithmic management model to compete unfairly to the detriment of consumers and other users. Ex ante regulatory measures designed to protect the personal data of users should be introduced for deployment in the context of the sharing economy. When enforcing these rules, a balance should be struck ensuring free data flow that is essential to sharing firms’ innovation and competition, and the need to ensure the level of data security required to underpin a well-functioning sharing society.     

限量放权后"模仿式"地方立法困局的破解之道

修订之后的《立法法》对设区的市实施的限量放权是我国立法体制的重大变化,也是十八届三中、四中全会以来力求走出中央与地方关系怪圈的最新探索.限量放权的重大改革举措,虽然为地方治理经验的法治化吹来一股清新之风,但也使迅猛推进的"模仿式"立法转而陷入尴尬的窘境之中.切实共享立法体制改革的制度红利,实现地方事务治理的法治化与规范化,必须准确把握地方立法限量放权的初衷与要点,从注重问题导向与民意担当的高度,着眼于"为谁立法"立什么法"怎样立法"等关键问题,均衡各方利益博弈,做好配套制度变革,真正使地方立法平稳过渡与有效承接,及早摆脱"模仿式"地方立法的时代困局.     

浅议警务督察机构的职责

警务督察是指公安机关的督察机构及其督察人员,依照法律、法规、规章以及法定程序和原则,对公安机关及其人民警察依法履行职责、行使职权和遵守纪律的情况,进行监督检查的行政执法行为。按照《公安机关督察条例》,从理论上可将警务督察机构的职责分为十项。本文就警务督察机构的十项职责的内涵及履行职责的方法进行了探讨。     

工会会员发展工作亟待突破的领域--关于公有制企业、事业单位进城务工人员加入工会情况的调查

在公有制企事业单位从业的进城务工人员加入工会组织问题,由于受经济关系、利益关系、劳动关系、会籍关系等因素的影响,一直未能很好地解决.必须突破工运理论、劳动经济理论及用工制度的束缚,创新工会组织形式,最广泛、最大限度地把他们组织到工会组织中来,使之成为提高工会组建率和职工入会率新的增长点,从整体上推进全国工会组建和会员发展工作.     

Leaders, voters and activists in the elections in Great Britain 2005 and 2010

Discussion of the relationship between parties and the electorate is often based on the notion of partisan constituencies, that parties adopt policy positions that correspond to the average position of the party supporters. In contrast, the Downsian “spatial model” assumes that parties are purely opportunistic and maneuver to gain as many votes as possible. A third, more empirical model, based on the early work of Stokes, assumes that voter choice is based on the evaluation of each of the party leader’s competence or ability to deliver policy success. Such an evaluation can be provided by individual voter overall assessment in terms of the leaders’ character traits.This paper attempts to relate these three classes of models by examining the elections in Great Britain in 2005 and 2010. Using the British Election Study, we construct spatial models of these elections in Great Britain as well as in the three regions of England, Scotland and Wales. The models incorporate the electoral perceptions of character traits. We compare the equilibrium vote maximizing positions with the partisan positions, estimated by taking the mean of each of the parties voters’ preferred positions. We define an equilibrium to be a stable attractor if the vote share at the equilibrium exceeds the share at the partisan position by a significant proportion (determined by the implicit error of the stochastic model). We infer that none of the equilibria are stable attractors, and suggest that the partisan positions are also preferred by the party activists, the key supporters of each party.     

政府创新的类型与特征——基于“中国地方政府创新奖”获奖项目的多案例研究

尽管关于中国地方政府创新积累了大量案例研究,但关于政府创新的属性、特征与类型的认识和理解仍然有待于进一步深化。利用"中国地方政府创新奖"五届共计100多个入围项目的内容分析,对中国地方政府创新的类型、特征与分布进行了经验研究。分析显示,管理创新、服务创新与合作创新是中国地方政府创新的主要类型,而技术创新与治理创新的重要性在逐步提升。东部地区的地方政府获得创新美誉的比例多于西部地区,其次是中部地区。党政机构仍然是中国地方政府创新的主力军,越来越多的社会团体和非营利组织也在加入创新的队伍。相比其他行政层级,地市和区县政府的创新精神更强。     

过去10年的中国地方政府改革——基于中国地方政府创新奖的评价

依据中国地方政府创新奖创办以来五届申请项目的资料,辅以问卷调查,对过去10年来中国地方政府创新的若干问题进行了讨论。这些问题包括中国地方政府创新的现实性、创新的分布、创新的类型、创新的动力和可持续性以及创新的影响力。研究发现,必须从中国社会政治发展的总体背景出发来审视丰富多彩的地方政府创新。这些创新多是从问题出发的,是对现有体制的充实和发展。但是,创新分布于不同的层级和部门,所以其对整体制度的影响也会由于层级、部门之间的矛盾而受到削弱。     

现实选择与理性诉求:地方政府自身利益的实践逻辑

在现实生活中,地方政府自身利益是客观存在的。地方政府通过追求任期内政绩工程来实现官员的个人利益,通过机构扩张和预算最大化来实现机构利益,通过获取辖区财政资源来实现辖区共容利益。这种利益的实现是地方政府基于外在监督和内在收益而做出的现实选择。在外在监督缺失的情况下,地方政府对自身利益的追求导致政府行为的异化和扭曲,需要采取有效措施予以治理。     

联邦国家的中央与地方立法分权模式研究

联邦制的启示在于,要实现中央和地方关系的法治化,有必要从宪法上合理配置中央和地方的立法权。虽然联邦国家的中央和地方分权历经变迁,但还是有章可循,而联邦国家的立法分权模式为中国的中央与地方关系法治化提供了可资借鉴的经验。