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31.
《Critical Horizons》2013,14(1):205-224
AbstractThis paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy's interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on The Restlessness of the Negative. It is argued that Nancy's reading represents a significant break with other post-structuralist readings of Hegel by taking his thought to be non-metaphysical. The paper focuses in particular on the role Nancy gives to the negative in Hegel's thought. Ultimately Nancy's reading is limited as an interpretation of Hegel, since he gives no sustained explanation of the self-correcting function of reason. 相似文献
32.
‘Globalization’ implies, among other things, the radical crisis of the metaphysical and theologico-political conceptions of
sense. The crisis of the device built upon the concepts of the abstract individual, the nation and the State is at the same
time the crisis of the subject as a master and an owner of sense (each time, the sense). But, if human beings are subtracted by the national, historical and metaphysical identities, by the system of the meanings-image, they
are exposed to the possibility itself of sense as what precedes and exceeds every constituted identity or reality. This article
aims at exploring in Jean-Luc Nancy’s thought the strict relationship between the ‘non-appropriable’ nature of sense and the
being-in-common of human beings considered not as abstract individuals, but as multiple-singularities. A community that is the opening itself of sense, is not sacrificed to an originary or future Unity, but it is offered to the event of the present; to the existences
as events and to an ‘immediate mediation’ as surprise. The experience of this offer as surprise is what Nancy calls ‘freedom’.
Graduate student at the University of Venice, Italy; conducting a study of ‘the centres of temporary detention’ for migrants
in Italy. The translations of all extracts are mine unless otherwise provided. These pages are dedicated to the migrants of
the Association Solidariedade Imigrante of Lisbon, Portugal (to each one and to all of them, their friendship is for me such a great gift). I would like to thank
Vania Trento Miotto and Thanos Zartaloudis with all my heart for the precious help in the revision of this article. Obviously,
the responsibility for these pages rests entirely with me. 相似文献
33.
Sovereignty and freedom are interlinked in a manner of both ambivalence and interdependence. Neither can sovereignty confirm
itself without presupposing for itself a pure state of freedom; nor can freedom conceive and realise itself without interweaving with sovereignty. Both concepts collide with each other as sovereignty usually signifies a certain social or cultural power or
order; and freedom regularly is related to a sovereign subjectivity. Therefore, the question is: how far might sovereignty
serve as a source of freedom that, at the same time, has to be limited by this freedom itself. When the sovereign (subject)
defines where the limits of freedom are, he will mostly define the limits of experiencing such freedom for all those who have
to follow his decision on the limit. Further, if the free (sovereign) subject itself defines its own limits, it will supposedly
end up rejecting its interweaving with any other subjectivity beyond its own. The problem remains: both sovereignty and freedom
cannot be realised if they are already limited. 相似文献