浅析大学物理中多媒体教学的利与弊

探讨了在大学物理教学中运用多媒体技术的优势与存在问题,并对此提出一些解决措施。     

研究经济理论和破解经济难题必须从生产方式入手

当前,经济理论界负有两大社会责任：一方面,从理论上说明我国现阶段社会形态的历史定位和全部社会经济关系的性质,为改革提供更加科学的理论依据;另一方面,从理论上揭示我国面临的诸如贫富悬殊、民生难题、经济失衡、蕴含危机等问题的经济根源,为解决问题提供正确的思路。但是,研究经济理论和破解经济难题必须有科学的思维方式,必须从生产方式入手。＂生产方式＂是政治经济学的核心范畴和首要研究对象。为此,经济学界必须改变忽视和贬低生产方式范畴的传统偏见。     

“先行后知”训练法在警务技战术案例教学中的应用

体验式培训"先行后知"训练法有利于教师掌握教学进度,了解学生水平,提高教学的针对性;有利于课堂教学主体作用的发挥,提高学生学习的参与度;有利于学生模拟实战拓展思维,提高教学案例的鲜活性;有利于师生探究试错做到教学相长,提高技战术实战应用能力。技战术案例教学做好"先行后知"训练的组织和应用,要不断探索,并进行深入研究。     

民间文学艺术作品保护的路径探索

在我国现行立法中，对于民间文学艺术作品采取的是著作权法体系下的特殊条例保护方式，但基于各种原因，无论是在学界还是在司法实践中，这种保护方式都没有充分发挥效用。通过对民间文学艺术作品自身性质的分析，指出其与著作权法通常所保护作品的不同之处，并在此基础上，探索现有著作权保护机制之外的其他路径，以期达到既能够继承和保留各民族文学艺术遗产，保护传统文化的传承，又能促进整个社会文化繁荣发展的目的。     

党校试讲聘请校外专家参与评议的思考

党校试讲聘请校外专家参与评议对搞好党校试讲工作、提升党校教学质量具有重要作用。聘请校外专家参与试讲评议,在实际操作中需解决好如下问题:一是端正认识态度,提供根本保证;二是处理好内外关系,发挥各方作用;三是规范实际操作,确保有效实施。     

案例教学是党校教学改革的成功之路--关于中共瓦房店市委党校案例教学的调查

案例教学法是运用案例进行教学并着眼于被教育者能力开发的一种新型教育培训方法体系.积极研究、探讨并坚定不移地实施案例教学法,极大地促进了党校教学理论与实践的结合,促进了教员与学员综合素质的提高,使党校教学焕发出新的生机和活力,走出了一条党校教学改革的成功之路.     

超越本质主义回归生活之流--维特根斯坦后期思想对现代美学的意义

后期维特根斯坦借助语言分析 ,打破了传统美学本质主义的思维方式。他以审美活动为美学研究的起点 ,使其回归于生生不息的生活之流 ,从而揭示了其特性所在 ,并在此基础上讨论了困扰传统美学的审美魅力、审美普遍性问题 ,为美学研究提供了新的思路。     

应用文写作教学“去文学化“探讨

应用文写作教学中,专业教育所养成的教师的文学思维定势,是导致教学目的和教学内容发生偏移的重要原因.应该从两类文体(实用类、审美类)写作的不同思维方式、不同表达方法以及培养不同的"话语责任人"等方面加以区分,以社会职业工作需要为导向,以写作技术为重心,构建符合应用文自身特质的教学内容体系.     

对建立公安民警网络教育训练体系的探讨

有鉴于当前公安民警教育训练缺乏统一规划和针对性、时效性以及严重脱离现实实践的现状,应适应网络教育技术发展的新形势,以公安信息网为依托,建立新型的公安民警网络教育训练体系,有效解决目前教育训练中存在的问题,为建立以“数字化警察”为目标的信息共享和综合利用创造条件。     

A CONSUMER-WELFARE APPROACH TO NETWORK NEUTRALITY REGULATION OF THE INTERNET

"Network neutrality" is the shorthand for a proposed regimeof economic regulation for the Internet. Because of the trendto deliver traditional telecommunications services, as wellas new forms of content and applications, by Internet protocol(IP), a regime of network neutrality regulation would displaceor subordinate a substantial portion of existing telecommunicationsregulation. If the United States adopts network neutrality regulation,other industrialized nations probably will soon follow. As aresult of their investment to create next-generation broadbandnetworks, network operators have the ability to innovate insidethe network by offering both senders and receivers of informationgreater bandwidth and prioritization of delivery. Network neutralityregulation would, among other things, prevent providers of broadbandInternet access service (such as digital subscriber line (DSL)or cable modem service) from offering a guaranteed, expediteddelivery speed in return for the payment of a fee. The practicaleffect of banning such differential pricing (called "accesstiering" by its critics) would be to prevent the pricing ofaccess to content or applications providers according to priorityof delivery. To the extent that an advertiser of a good or servicewould be willing to contract with a network operator for advertisingspace on the network operator's affiliated content, anotherpractical effect of network neutrality regulation would be toerect a barrier to vertical integration of network operatorsinto advertising-based business models that could supplementor replace revenues earned from their existing usage-based businessmodels. Moreover, by making end-users pay for the full costof broadband access, network neutrality regulation would denybroadband access to the large number of consumers who wouldnot be able to afford, or who would not have a willingness topay for, what would otherwise be less expensive access. Forexample, Google is planning to offer broadband access to end-usersfor free in San Francisco by charging other content providersfor advertising. This product offering is evidently predicatedon the belief that many end-users demand discounted or freebroadband access that is paid for by parties other than themselves.Proponents of network neutrality regulation argue that suchrestrictions on the pricing policies of network operators arenecessary to preserve innovation on the edges of the network,as opposed to innovation within the network. However, recognizingthat network congestion and real-time applications demand somedifferential pricing according to bandwidth or priority, proponentsof network neutrality regulation would allow broadband Internetaccess providers to charge higher prices to end-users (but notcontent or applications providers) who consume more bandwidthor who seek priority delivery of certain traffic. Thus, thedebate over network neutrality is essentially a debate overhow best to finance the construction and maintenance of a broadbandnetwork in a two-sided market in which senders and receivershave additive demand for the delivery of a given piece of information—andhence additive willingness to pay. Well-established tools ofRamsey pricing from regulatory economics can shed light on whethernetwork congestion and recovery of sunk investment in infrastructureare best addressed by charging providers of content and applications,broadband users, or both for expedited delivery. Apart fromthis pricing problem, an analytically simpler component of proposednetwork neutrality regulation would prohibit a network operatorfrom denying its users access to certain websites and Internetapplications, such as voice over Internet protocol (VoIP). Althoughsome instances of blocking of VoIP have been reported, suchconduct is not a serious risk to competition. To address thisconcern, I analyze whether market forces (that is, competitionamong access providers) and existing regulatory structures aresufficient to protect broadband users. I conclude that economicwelfare would be maximized by allowing access providers to differentiateservices vis-à-vis providers of content and applicationsin value-enhancing ways and by relying on existing legal regimesto protect consumers against the exercise of market power, shouldit exist.