中国的东南亚研究:成就、视角与问题——以三家高校学术期刊的比较研究为基础

本文选取《东南亚研究》、《南洋问题研究》和《亚太评论》三份学术期刊,根据东南亚问题研究论文的载文量、内容(国别与主题)和作者三个指标,对这三份刊物2000—2005年的载文进行了统计、对比与分析,并由此管窥中国东南亚研究的成就、视角与问题。     

战后日本在亚太地区的战略选择

战后日本选择在亚太地区推行重振战略、大国战略和拓展战略,逐步减轻战后体制束缚,恢复亚太强国地位,进而掠夺发展空间。三步战略目标明确、实施有序,相互衔接、融为一体,帮助日本洗脱战争罪责,骗取国际信任,攫取发展资源。这其中饱含了日本政府的政治谋略,具有很强的隐蔽性和迷惑性。由于日本亚太战略始终偏离正确轨道,并且为转嫁政府执政危机服务,所以很难取得最终胜利。当前中日关系紧张微妙。不能对日本保守政府抱有太多幻想,以防落入圈套,可以尝试联合国际力量,强化战后制裁体制,防止日本重蹈覆辙。     

中国海岛的保护开发与管理

中国海域辽阔,海岛众多。海岛在资源、权益、国防等多个方面都有着极其重要的地位。另一方面,在中国经济高速发展的今天,海岛渔民的的生活与沿海有很大的差距。关注民生,海岛需要发展;关注国家安全与长远利益,海岛需要保护;要做好保护与开发,需要立法。该文总结海岛保护与利用的现状、成就,分析问题,提出设想,就海岛的利用、保护与管理立法向全国人大提出建议案,推动海岛立法。     

太平洋战争期间日本对东南亚的财政金融统制

1941年日本在发动太平洋战争的同时,开始对东南亚地区实行财政金融统制,采取政府出台相关政策、军队和金融机构具体实施的方针,滥发军票和南方开发金库券,对占领区征收苛捐杂税,排挤当地商业银行,严重破坏了当地原有的财政金融秩序,给东南亚各国人民造成巨大损失。     

Australia and the Developing World under the Abbott Coalition Government

The Abbott Coalition government, elected to office in Australia in September 2013, has not had a major focus on the developing world. Nevertheless, in terms of substance this government has been engaged with a number of issues that relate to, or have implications for, the developing world. At a general level these issues concern development cooperation, refugees and asylum seekers, and climate change. At a regional level Australia has had particular concerns relating to Indonesia and the Pacific island countries; there has also been some focus on India and Indian Ocean regionalism. Beyond Australia’s immediate region there has been engagement in some issues relating to Southwest Asia and the Middle East, and Africa. The government’s approach to issues concerning the developing world reflects its pragmatism based on a perception of Australian interests and an identification with the countries of the developed world as led by the United States.     

At the Edges and on the Margins: Hearing the Voices of Young People in South Pacific Island Countries

Abstract

‘Youth’ are frequently referred to under the mantra of inclusivity in any aid-funded project, development initiative or government–donor initiative in the Pacific region. Indeed, ‘youth’ ranks alongside ‘women/gender’ as a catch term for communicating diversity compliance. But how are ‘youth’ framed and who speaks for this group of people who are not yet adults or are only just adults in law, and yet are beyond the voiceless or barely articulate stage of childhood? This question may be particularly pertinent in cultures such as those found in the Pacific, where the right to speak out is traditionally not afforded to those on the edge of adulthood, and where ‘youth’ for the purposes of inclusive dialogue frequently means people over the age of 20. Although they may seem isolated, the Pacific islands are linked to global, regional and national movements to give young people more voice, to recognise the valuable contributions they can make and to ensure that they are participants in determining their own futures.     

The theme of indivisibility in the post-war struggle against prejudice in the United States

Whitfield's essay seeks to identify and explain a tendency that emerged in the United States in the 1940s and extended through the 1950s. It was then that a notion became commonplace, especially among liberals, that the victims of prejudice were interchangeable and that bigotry was undifferentiated. Before the 1940s, the problem of prejudice was not widely believed to be urgent; but the war against the Third Reich heightened awareness of the price of an irrational hostility to minorities. American liberals in particular came to the understanding that bigotry was indivisible; and, for its objects, the cards of identity could easily be shuffled. Whether the victims were Jews or Negroes or homosexuals, the hatred that they elicited appeared to be formed without making any distinctions among them. Evidence can be found in the culture of those two decades, in novels, plays and films. The unitary view of the character of prejudice had some support in social science, including in the authoritative volume The Authoritarian Personality. The theory would also be reflected in a major shift in the agenda of Jewish civil rights organizations, which redefined their mission as promoting the democratic rights of all minorities rather than the particular interests of American Jews. This distinctive tendency vanished in the 1960s, however. One reason for the change was a fuller appreciation of the hostility that minorities could harbour towards other minorities. The realization also deepened of the singular vulnerability of black Americans under the pressure of racism, which demonstrated a tenacity as well as a proclivity for violence that had been largely absent from other forms of bigotry. Finally, a broader legitimation of difference itself emerged in the 1960s to bury the notion that minorities were fungible.     

Non-Familial Victimization Among Asian Pacific Islander Youth

Abstract

The few theoretical and empirical literature on victimization among the Asian and Pacific Islander (API) youth population have mainly focused on child maltreatment and sexual abuse within the home environment. Empirical evidence documenting non-familial victimization among API youth is virtually nonexistent. Analysis of official data collected by the Oakland Police Department in Oakland, California, between January and December 2000 showed that API youth were the least victimized racial group. However, there were significant differences in victimization by sex and age groups for API youth; specifically, girls were most likely to be victims of sexual violence, and males and older youth were most likely to be victimized for property offenses. Additionally, the pattern in the suspect-victim relationship suggested greater intra-ethnic group rather than inter-ethnic group victimization. Cultural factors affecting reporting and the implications of those factors, as well as limitations of the study and future directions are discussed.     

China–Taiwan diplomatic competition and the Pacific Islands

Abstract

China and Taiwan have become important actors in South Pacific affairs due to their diplomatic rivalry. Securing the diplomatic recognition of the Pacific Islands countries is expensive for China and Taiwan. There are limits to what the rivals are willing to spend, and they attempt to reduce costs. This dynamic shapes how Taiwan and China engage Pacific Islands politicians. It also motivates their high level official visits to the region, and how they engage South Pacific regional organizations. Despite criticisms that China–Taiwan rivalry corrupts and destabilizes the South Pacific, the issue of whether China and Taiwan's diplomatic rivalry has been beneficial or detrimental to the region remains contentious. China and Taiwan appear to have recently called a truce in their decades-old rivalry. This tacit agreement is still tentative, and the involvement of China and Taiwan in the region has yet to change significantly. However, Taiwan has reportedly begun to reduce funding, and is likely to reform its aid delivery in order to satisfy demands from the South Pacific region's dominant power, Australia, and to improve its image as a humanitarian aid donor. China is also likely to reduce funding while the truce holds. However, China considers its ties with South Pacific governments more important than responding to Australian pressure, and is unlikely to reform its South Pacific aid programmes as a result of the diplomatic truce.     

Governing International Migration through Partnership

Partnerships in international migration governance promise a cooperative approach between countries of origin, transit and destination. The literature has generally conceptualised migration partnerships as a policy instrument. This article suggests that understanding the broader transformations taking place in international migration governance under the rubric of partnership demands a novel analysis. Using a governmentality perspective, I interpret migration partnerships as an instance of neoliberal rule. Focusing on the convergence of international migration governance between the international realm and the European and North American region in particular, I demonstrate that the partnership approach frames international migration governance so as to enlist governments, migrants and particular experts in governing international migration, and invokes specific technologies of neoliberal governing which contribute to producing responsible, self-disciplined partners who can be trusted to govern themselves according to the norms established by the partnership discourse. The partnership approach is not a mere policy instrument; it goes beyond the European region and has become an essential element of the governance of international migration.