Sweden’s Burka Ban: Policy Proposals,Problematisations, and the Production of Swedishness

ABSTRACT

Between February 2002 and November 2018, Swedish politicians from the Centre, Christian Democrat, Moderate, Liberal and Sweden Democrat parties proposed policies to ban clothing variously referred to as the “burka,” “full-covering veil,” “face veil” and “niqab” (Arabic for face veil) at least 38 times, six at the national level and thirty-two at the municipal. Research suggests that circa 100 women in Sweden wear a “burka”; clearly these policy proposals have little to do with the burka’s prevalence. What, then, do these policy proposals attempt to govern? In this text we adopt feminist political scientist Carol Bacchi’s “what is the problem represented to be?” approach to analyse Swedish bills to regulate the burka. These policy proposals, we contend, have more to do with conceptualizing Swedishness than addressing an existing “problem” of women who wear burka.     

Bridging the gap: the effect of gender normativity on differences in empathy and emotional intelligence

Self-report measures of empathy and emotional intelligence have frequently revealed significant gender differences, with females typically scoring higher than males on these dimensions. In this study, we investigated whether, in line with a social identity approach, manipulating the gender normativity of empathy and emotional intelligence would ameliorate typically observed differences. Male and female participants (N = 330) were randomly assigned to read one of three narratives comprising fictitious neurological research evidence which claimed that males (Condition 1) or females (Condition 2) or neither males nor females (Condition 3) scored higher on measures of empathy and emotional intelligence. Results indicated that, in Conditions 2 and 3, females scored significantly higher than males on self-reported empathy. However, when information suggested that males were superior to females (Condition 1), no significant gender differences in self-reported empathy were observed. A similar pattern was found for emotional intelligence, however the predicted interaction effect failed to reach significance. The role of social context in determining gender differences in emotional functioning is discussed with particular reference to gender differences in motivation.     

Local government reforms: between multifunction and single-purpose organisations

The paper argues that, in ‘revisiting’ the referred-to article published back in 2004, the concept then guiding the analysis would need to be modified particularly on three scores. For one, in order to achieve a more adequate comparison the country selection should be expanded beyond the earlier sample (UK, France, Germany and Sweden) to also capture Southern and Central Eastern European countries. Second, the ‘developmental’ (‘over time’) analysis of the pertinent institutional changes should be further accentuated and complemented by proceeding ‘by (developmental)stages’ instead of ‘country by country’. Third, while still deeming the distinction between ‘multifunction’ and ‘single-purpose’ organisations fruitful to guide a ‘government versus governance’ analysis and interpretation, the distinction between ‘political rationality’ and ‘economic rationality’ should be added with the former (ideal-typically) identified with elected (local) government and the latter seen characteristic of many of the actors in the governance-typical actor networks.     

Islamic political parties and the nature of politics in Pakistan

The ‘war on terror’ has not only increased the operation and significance of Islamic parties but also intensified suspicion against them. The lack of comprehensive theoretical research about Islamic parties has further contributed to misunderstanding of their nature and politics. This article theorizes and classifies Islamic parties, especially of Pakistan, and explores their origin, development and nature. The conventional theories of party origin and traditional classifications of political parties are shown to have limited validity in the case of Islamic parties. Rather, the origin and development of Islamic parties is explored through the theoretical construct of historical crisis situation theory, consisting of four crisis situations. Moreover, a new typology of Islamic parties is developed and the Islamic parties are classified on the basis of six variables into three parties: clerical, conservative and Islamist. The exploration of the role of Islamic parties in Pakistan shows that party variables are not only essential to understand their proper nature but also critical to comprehend their politics. Though unanimously categorized as ‘Islamic’, their politics significantly differ and Pakistan provides a typical case to show the heterogeneous Islamic politics of Islamic parties.     

The trap of pop-charisma for the institutionalization of Indonesia's post-Suharto parties

This article investigates how the Indonesian party system has created parties that increasingly rely on charisma for support and votes. Initially associated with divinely bestowed qualities, the concept of charisma has evolved to emphasize popularity and recognizability instead. In Indonesia, this tendency has combined with direct elections to distract parties from their ideal functions of developing platforms and programmes. Instead, parties have sought to pick and choose candidates that are popular to front their campaign. This has contributed to the formation of dysfunctional parties that are opportunistic, corrupt, and rent-seeking. As Indonesian parties continue their struggle to prove themselves by relying on the ephemeral attraction of personal charisma, the resultant incapacity to develop solid organization will continue to be a crippling trap for them.     

The Arabness of Middle East regionalism: the Arab Spring and competition for discursive hegemony between Egypt,Iran and Turkey

The Middle East is often considered to demonstrate a case of weak regionalism. This article suggests that the continued prevalence of Arab identity as the hegemonic component of regional consciousness contributes to this. The dominance of a discourse of ‘Arabness’ reduces the region's flexibility to adapt and develop regional institutions in several ways and particularly vis-a-vis the non-Arab communities and states that are found within the spatial boundaries of the Middle East. To explore the role played by Arab identity politics in regionalism with regard to the status of non-Arab states, this article presents a study of the competing hegemonic regional discourses employed by Turkey, Iran and Egypt during a two-year period following the 2011 uprising in Egypt. This analysis suggests that even during a time of crisis, non-Arab states face obstacles to their assertion of regional projects and that Arabness is a central factor in the narratives resisting alternative interpretations of the interests and definition of the Middle East as a region. The article concludes that Arabness forms the hegemonic discourse that shapes the international relations of the Middle East.     

Ethnic Identity Formation of Immigrant Children and Implications for Practice

The issue of immigration is especially controversial in the United States as immigrants today have not only increased in number but constitute a more heterogeneous population. Unlike the earlier waves of immigrants, which were predominantly of European origin, the post-1965 migration trend from Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean has tremendously altered the demographic characteristics of the U.S. population. In-depth exploration of various contextual factors affecting ethnic identity formation can offer insights that help social work practitioners and policy planners overcome the difficulty in working with immigrant populations and their descendants. This article reviews significant contextual aspects influencing immigrant children's ethnic identity formations and proposes practice recommendations that help facilitate the children's adaptation in the host society.     

From the provinces to the parliament: How the Ukrainian radical right mobilized in Galicia

This article traces the on-the-ground mobilization and recruitment strategies of Ukraine's radical right party, Svoboda (Freedom) in the years prior to its 2012 electoral breakthrough. Ethnographic fieldwork and in-depth interviews with Svoboda party leaders and activists in Galicia show how party leaders strategically created an organizational structure aimed at recruiting young people, making linkages with pre-existing nationalist groups, and shifting the ideological focus away from cultural and toward economic issues. Interviews with party activists reveal how personal networks were key in the recruitment and radicalization process, showing that radical right activists were radicalized, or “made,” through political participation. Consequently, Svoboda's organizational capacity allowed the party to take advantage of a political opportunity – Yanukovych's unpopularity and weakened national democratic parties – in the 2012 parliamentary elections.     

Russia says no: Power,status, and emotions in foreign policy

Since 2003, Russian foreign behavior has become much more assertive and volatile toward the West, often rejecting U.S. diplomatic initiatives and overreacting to perceived slights. This essay explains Russia's new assertiveness using social psychological hypotheses on the relationship between power, status, and emotions. Denial of respect to a state is humiliating. When a state loses status, the emotions experienced depend on the perceived cause of this loss. When a state perceives that others are responsible for its loss, it shows anger. The belief that others have unjustly used their power to deny the state its appropriate position arouses vengefulness. If a state believes that its loss of status is due to its own failure to live up to expectations, the elites will express shame. Since the end of the Cold War, Russia has displayed anger at the U.S. unwillingness to grant it the status to which it believes it is entitled, especially during the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, and most recently Russia's takeover of Crimea and the 2014 Ukrainian Crisis. We can also see elements of vengefulness in Russia's reaction to recognition of Kosovo, U.S. missile defense plans, the Magnitsky act, and the Snowden affair.     

Economic sanctions and the rhetorical responses of totalitarian regimes: Examining North Korean rhetorical strategies, 1949–2010

This study investigates the impact of economic statecraft on the North Korean Government. As a totalitarian regime, which is characterized by a controlled mass media, the North Korean Government tries to contain potential problems caused by sanctions by using three types of political rhetoric: appeasement, backlash, and surveillance. Using time-series data from 1949 to 2010 derived from a content analysis of the New Year's Day addresses by Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Il, and Kim Jong Un, the empirical results suggests that the North Korean Government does alter its rhetorical strategies in response to external economic sanctions. Negative sanctions cause the regime to use appeasement strategies (or calls for reforms and internal changes). It tends to use backlash rhetoric (or blaming the sanctioning powers) in response to, interestingly, positive sanctions. Surveillance rhetoric, or the call for internal vigilance against enemies, on the other hand, does not have any statistical connection with sanctions, rather driven by other factors, such as the Korean War, external instability, and so on.