人民主权论与中国的违宪审查制度

本文从人民主权论出发 ,以违宪审查制度为焦点 ,揭示了在我国宪法基本原则下民主集中制与违宪审查制度的内在矛盾 ,并以此为基础 ,对我国违宪审查模式的选择和宪法监督机制的完善作了有益的探索。     

论对公共权力的监督

掌握公共权力者理应接受公众的监督.但是,人们实行起来在思想认识上还有障碍,并且在制度建设方面也很不完善.对于思想障碍要从中国的国情和历史根源上分析,提高认识,肃清封建主义残余的影响,树立现代公民意识;而监督机制则重在建设.要研究资产阶级多党制的利弊得失和苏联东欧政权变动的前车之鉴,结合中国国情完善我们的监督机制.     

群众公权观:创新社会管理的思想基础

本文以社会管理公仆路线和社群路线的分析为视角,提出社会管理的思想原则:贯彻群众路线克服官僚主义;以权为民所赋、责为民利谋的群众公权观的思想创新为基础,通过对社会管理预算与服务博弈矩阵的分析,阐释了党委在社会管理两对基本矛盾关系中,统领天理,协调人欲的地位和作用。     

行政执法权全面下移的组织法回应

虽然行政执法权全面下移工作已然铺开,但我国现有法律规范体系并未为其提供充足的规范基础,既有的行政组织结构及其相应规则也没有为镇街有效承接执法权做好充分准备。行政执法权全面下移依然承受着合法性与有效性的双重考问。以《行政处罚法》为框架的分析思路,并不能为消弭质疑提供有力支撑。行政执法权全面下移带来了镇街行政法身份、规模与组织形式、与区县人民政府职能部门的关系等方面的变化。这些变化意味着行政执法权全面下移属于执法权配置的结构性变迁,因而只能在组织法框架下探寻其解决之道。具体而言,应当通过《地方各级人民代表大会和地方各级人民政府组织法》的修改赋予镇街执法主体资格,在此基础上以行政法规、地方性法规等形式安排镇街机构设置与人员编制,理顺镇街执法与县(市、区)职能部门的关系,并为镇街执法提供必要的财政保障。     

海权争霸与俄苏的兴衰及其历史反思

从海权的角度分析俄苏的兴衰是一个尚未有人进行充分探讨的问题。在数百年的争夺中 ,海权的扩张固然构成了俄苏崛起的一个因素 ,但从长远的角度看 ,对海权的过度追求又构成了俄苏走向衰落的根源之一。具体说来 ,从俄苏海权扩张西进、南下和东进 3条线路中 ,西进战略较为成功 ,并促进了俄苏的崛起 ;南下和东进战略虽有所收获 ,但都遭遇挫折 ,尤其是南下的世界扩张战略直接导致了苏联的衰落。从本质上来说 ,地缘政治条件的制约、俄苏海权过渡扩张所导致的一系列矛盾构成了俄苏海权战略失败并导致国力衰微的根源之一。     

Centers of Gravity: Regional Powers,Democracy, and Trade

Classic studies on hegemonic stability and power transition suggest that concentration of capabilities favoring a single state can promote economic cooperation and discourage militarized conflict. However, tests of these arguments have been primarily limited to examining temporal variation in global capability distributions and corresponding levels of system-wide cooperation; few have examined the impact of capability concentration at the region level. In this article, we contend that concentration of regional military capabilities corresponds to lower trade costs for states throughout a region and to an incentive for weaker states to de-prioritize expenditure on the military, freeing resources that can be used to promote trade. As a result, this condition promotes higher levels of trade, particularly within the region. We also argue that democratic regional powers are better able to foster confidence in the sustainability of cooperation; thus, the trade-enhancing impact of concentrated regional capabilities is stronger when the predominant state is more democratic. We find evidence in support of our expectations in statistical models examining state trade between 1960 and 2007.     

论警民关系建设中公安机关软实力的培育

公安部“南京会议”后，各级公安机关在警民关系建设方面作了大量的探索和努力。和谐警民关系建设要结合当前工作实际，从制约警民关系建设的几个客观因素出发，立足于现阶段的基本国情，立足于公安本职工作，坚持与时俱进的发展理念。要从警民关系建设中公安机关努力的方向入手，增强队伍凝聚力、治安掌控力、执法公信力和形象传播力，力争通过自身转型和政策调整，进一步强化群众基础，在民心中建立起自己的软实力。     

我国检察权制约行政权的制度构建

在我国,检察权与行政权具有同等的宪法地位。检察权理应有效制约行政权,但现实中,受各种因素的影响,检察权制约行政权的实效远不尽如人意。我国检察权制约行政权有其理论基础、宪政基础、实践基础、文化基础,也顺应国际潮流。检察权要通过对行政权运行的程序控制和结果审查以及实行检察一体化、实现检察官的职业化、专业化和明确检察机关的具体行政监督职权来保障有效制约行政权的实现。     

秩序、正义、自由及其对警察权的制约——以《治安管理处罚法》为讨论起点

新的《治安管理处罚法》，与旧的《治安管理处罚条例》比较而言，在许多制度和理念上都有了不少进步，尤其在限制警察权力方面进步巨大，但是由于其在我国行政法中具有重要地位，因此对其具体制度和内容进行理论分析十分必要。本文在对《治安管理处罚法》背后蕴藏和体现的秩序、正义、自由三大立法价值评述的基础上，指出了本法目前仍存在的一些行为内容和具体制度设计上的不足和欠缺，希望通过完善其立法理念和制度设计，推动我国行政法理念的转变和人权保护层次的提高，并最终有助于我国法治国家的建立。     

Power Dynamics in an Experimental Game

We introduce a new experimental method for studying power. Drawing from multiple theoretical perspectives, we conceptualize power as relational and structural, as well as comprised of different forms through which basic human needs can be met. Thus, the method we introduce examines how, when faced with a particular need, people use multiple forms of power concurrently and within a “field of influence,” namely, the other players in a game. This enabled us to examine how one form of power is transformed into another and how power is transferred from one player to another through interaction, as well as to measure power as behavior, as the exercise of choice, as potential, and as outcomes. Two experiments using egalitarian start conditions and a survivable ecology demonstrated that participants used power to gain more power, creating inequality. Being the target of force made some players unable to “survive” in the local ecology. Theoretical and methodological issues in the study of power are discussed and the application of our game method to the study of power in other fields is considered.