Working in the slaughterhouse: Tanganyika Packers Ltd., from colonialism to collapse, 1947–2014

Between 1947 and 1975, Tanganyika Packers Ltd (TPL) was Tanzania’s only export-oriented slaughterhouse and beef-canning factory, a branch of UK-based Liebig’s Extract of Meat Corporation (Lemco), which originated in 1860s Uruguay. Until shortly before TPL was nationalized in 1974, it was a profitable parastatal, employing some 1200 workers, anchoring a working-class community, and providing an outlet for indigenous Tanzanian cattle from open rangelands. While nationalization aimed to capture the full value of TPL profits and expand exports into the European Economic Community, it instead severed TPL from the world market when Lemco withdrew its marketing license. Worker layoffs followed, and TPL became primarily a domestic supplier of military rations, creating precarious working conditions, until the factory was shuttered in 1993. Although technically TPL still exists, this article contends that, far from being a victim of a post-cold war neo-liberal transition, as is usually asserted, TPL’s fate is properly located in the period between 1967 and 1974, when state socialism in Tanzania created pressures on the parastatal and its workers to contribute to nation building, particularly by supplying fresh beef to the local butcher trade. This was coupled with a political ecology of disease and corruption, at a time of drought, villagization, and agro-pastoral resistance to market pressures, which prevented TPL from acquiring sufficient numbers of cattle in Africa’s third largest cattle country to take advantage of international beef scarcities in the early 1970s. Global pressures, especially disease controls and the OPEC oil embargo, frustrated TPL beef exports as the world economy moved from beef scarcity to a sudden glut by 1974.     

The application of new public management doctrines in the developing world: An exploratory study of the autonomy and control of executive agencies in Tanzania

This article examines the agencification of public service in Tanzania. This is discussed with reference to the New Public Management (NPM)‐inspired reforms of which the creation of executive agencies is one of its core features. The article attempts to understand the extent to which executive agencies in Tanzania display characteristic features of an ideal‐agency model as propagated by the NPM reform doctrines. Key features of the ideal‐agency model have been described as structural disaggregation, autonomy and contractualisation. It questions views held by many NPM‐minded reformers, such as the EU and World Bank that this model is universally applicable and can be emulated in different parts of the world. The article's assumption is that the NPM‐agency model is based on a weak empirical foundation and its universal applicability is questionable. To illustrate our arguments we confront the NPM‐agency model with the empirical data drawn from the agencification of public services in Tanzania. Findings indicate that agencies in Tanzania display hybrid characteristics in terms of their autonomy and control. Our conclusion is that the universality of NPM‐agency model is illusive. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Green grabbing and the dynamics of local-level engagement with neoliberalization in Tanzania's wildlife management areas

This paper analyzes the politics and struggles ongoing within wildlife management areas (WMAs) in Tanzania to discuss the dynamics of neoliberalization of the wildlife sector. We discuss neoliberalization as a new political-economic context within which the ongoing politics of natural resource management are played out, and focus on green grabbing as an expression of these politics. We discuss how local-level actors are engaged in these processes, often in strategic ways, to negotiate their roles within WMAs and address green grabbing by the state. Secondly, we discuss an example of the politics of land control and local-level actors’ enactment of accumulation by dispossession within a WMA.     

Urban trust in Kenya and Tanzania: Cooperation in the provision of public goods

Literature connecting ethnic diversity with public goods provision has found public goods to be poorly and unevenly supplied in ethnically heterogeneous communities. Scrutinising this hypothesis, the study contrasts an ethnically homogenous community in Kenya with an ethnically heterogeneous one in Tanzania, documenting levels of trust and cooperation in public goods provision. Interviews and focus groups with market-sellers of Mwanza (Tanzania) and Kisumu (Kenya) reveal how the two professionally similar populations differ starkly in the way they participate in public goods, and in an opposite direction to that which would be predicted by the current literature on ethnicity. On the topic of the organisation of security and cleaning within markets in Mwanza, ethnically heterogeneous market-sellers' sense of solidarity facilitates a greater degree of seller-on-seller trust. In Kisumu, in contrast, with participants reflective of the dominant Luo ethnicity, the lack of state provision of public services has seen a feeble and individualistic response. The findings demonstrate how ethnic distribution matters less for public goods provision than commitments amongst citizens themselves and between citizens and local authorities.     

Party matters: the institutional origins of competitive hegemony in Tanzania

Electoral authoritarianism has emerged as a primary mode of authoritarian rule in the post-Cold War era. It is also a notably heterogeneous phenomenon, in terms of both its impact upon incumbents and the quality of contestation. This article investigates a specific type of electoral authoritarian outcome, a competitive hegemony. In competitive hegemonies regimes are able to dominate elections by large vote margins, but with comparatively much lower levels of electoral fraud and coercion. Using a case study of Tanzania and its ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), this article argues that distinct investments made under single-party rule into party institutionalization and the incorporation of subsistence-based peasants provided CCM with additional sources of elite cohesion, strong mobilization capacity, and therefore greater stability. The article shows how during multiparty elections elite defection has in fact been minimal, and voting patterns largely coincide with infrastructural investments made as part of Tanzania's socialist development programme, ujamaa. Moreover, while Tanzania's opposition parties have made important strides in recent years in terms of institutionalization, they are still precluded from competing effectively in large portions of the country where demand for new parties is low.     

Redesigning health information systems in developing countries: the need for local flexibility and distributed control

Despite widespread aims to strengthen the Health Information System (HIS) as a tool for decentralised health care, there is a strong tendency in most developing countries that the HIS continues to reflect the central level's needs and requirements. The traditional design approach with little or no end user involvement results in a centralised HIS with an extensive, somewhat inappropriate, but also inflexible set of standards. Consequently, the HIS is not very useful for the wished‐for decentralisation of health services, and there is an urgent need to redesign the existing HIS in order to make it locally relevant and appropriately decentralised. Based on a comparative case analysis of the HIS in Tanzania and Ethiopia, we offer practical recommendations on the way to achieve this redesign. A central design goal should be to achieve a balance between centralised control and local autonomy. Some degree of control over a decentralised HIS, including budgets and the use of resources, should be delegated to the district administration. In order to achieve the aim of a locally relevant, well‐working HIS, it is necessary that appropriate authority, capacity and decentralised allocation of resources for HIS will be developed at the district and sub‐district levels. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutions and governance: public staff management in Tanzania

The importance of institutions is one of the distinctive features of the new governance model. This article is an empirical study of how the institutional framework affects the way public servants are managed in Tanzania. In the ‘Ujamaa’ period, staffing institutions were placed under the control of the ruling party so that they would serve national development objectives, but the effect was to contaminate the efficiency and integrity of government. The legal framework conferred excessive powers on the President, and centralised staffing authority in agencies which were largely rubber‐stamping bodies, and it allowed duplication of functions between central and line agencies. Recent reforms have not altered this situation. In a climate of corruption and favouritism, there was little confidence in the integrity of civil service staffing. There was a need to strengthen its independence, to devolve and to align the institution governing it with current political and development objectives while controlling corruption at lower levels. Our findings may have an application to the institutions of government as a whole. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Negotiating the technological capacity in Chinese engagements: Is the Tanzanian government in the driving seat?

Is the Tanzanian government in charge of development cooperation programmes with China? The literature has portrayed the Tanzanian and other state actors in Africa as passive and weakly coordinated players over the five decades of intensified cooperation with China. This paper will attempt to challenge this narrative by drawing on lessons from the negotiation efforts of individual and institutional actors in Tanzania, as they sought to improve the country's industrial and technological capacity, among other interests. Our findings revealed a gap between the capacity to attract Chinese investments and development assistance, and extraction of knowledge and technology from such engagements. President John Pombe Magufuli's anti-corruption measures signal a paradigm shift against the rent-seeking tendencies, elitism and limited utilisation of local content under the Chinese partnership projects. Nevertheless, the combination of a declining share of official Chinese engagements with the increased involvement of private actors necessitates further policy innovations in order to boost inter-firm technological spillovers.     

Tools of single party hegemony in Tanzania: evidence from surveys and survey experiments

Political systems dominated by a single party are common in the developing world, including in countries that hold regular elections. Yet we lack knowledge about the strategies by which these regimes maintain political dominance. This article presents evidence from Tanzania, a paradigmatic dominant party regime, to demonstrate how party institutions are used instrumentally to ensure the regime's sustained control. First, I show that the ruling party maintains a large infrastructure of neighbourhood representatives, and that in the presence of these agents, citizens self-censor about their political views. Second, I provide estimates of the frequency with which politicians give goods to voters around elections, demonstrating that such gifts are more common in Tanzania than previous surveys suggest. Third, I use a survey experiment to test respondents’ reaction to information about corruption. Few voters change their preferences upon receipt of this information. Taken together, this article provides a detailed picture of ruling party activities at the micro-level in Tanzania. Citizens conceal opposition sympathies from ten cell leaders, either because they fear punishment or seek benefits. These party agents can monitor citizens’ political views, facilitating clientelist exchange. Finally, citizens’ relative insensitivity to clientelism helps explain why politicians are not punished for these strategies.     

Analysing agricultural investment from the realities of small-scale food providers: grounding the debates

Abstract

Over the past decade, agricultural investment has been presented as a catchall solution to a converging set of global crises, often with poor rural communities as the proclaimed beneficiaries. Yet the promises of such investment, such as poverty alleviation and improved food access, are routinely at odds with realities on the ground. This article offers frameworks for analysis of agricultural investment that are grounded in the realities of small-scale food providers, drawing from two studies. The first study employs a right to food framework to identify the main channels through which food for consumption is procured by small-scale food providers and the factors impacting these channels. It draws on empirical data from within the Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT), an investment model promised to lift rural communities out of poverty, which reflects a regional trend. Based on the shortcomings of the large-scale investments examined, the second study employs a food sovereignty framework to explore alternative forms of investment envisioned and/or already being put into practice by small-scale food providers in the SAGCOT area and elsewhere in Tanzania. While two different frameworks formed the basis of two different studies, both the studies and their frameworks are interrelated. The final section of this article makes the case for why both the right to food and food sovereignty are essential lenses for understanding agricultural investment vis-à-vis small-scale food providers and the ways in which they can serve as complementary tools for effective analysis.