Vote choices of left-authoritarians: Misperceived congruence and issue salience

Often lacking parties with a corresponding profile, citizens with economically left and culturally authoritarian, or nationalist, policy orientations face a trade-off between congruence on economic and on cultural issues. How such left-authoritarian voters resolve this trade-off depends on which issues are more salient to them, previous research argues. We extend this line of research by considering the role of (mis-)perceived party positions. Using a survey in the context of the 2017 German election, we show how perceived congruence and issue importance interactively shape the left-authoritarian vote. Our findings indicate that many left-authoritarians vote for a party simply because they misperceive it to hold a congruent left-authoritarian position. In this case, issue importance matters little. Yet when voters are aware that parties match their position on only one dimension, vote choices are shaped by whether they care most about the economy or immigration. We discuss several implications.     

Female representation and electoral clientelism: New insights from South African municipal electionss

Do citizens experience less electoral clientelism in polities with more elected female representatives? The current literature is remarkably silent on the role of gender and female political representation for electoral clientelism. Due to gender differences in issue priorities, targeted constituent groups, networks and resources, we argue that voters experience less clientelism in municipalities with a higher proportion of female politicians because either female politicians are likely to engage less in clientelism or women are less likely to be viable candidates in more clientelist settings. Through either mechanism, we expect all voters – and female voters in particular – to experience less exposure to clientelism in municipalities with higher female representation. We examine this idea using survey data from the 2016 municipal elections in South Africa – a country with high levels of female representation in politics but increasing problems of corruption and patronage in the political system. Our findings are consistent with the argument that municipalities with more elected female councilors have considerably lower rates of electoral clientelism and that this mostly affects whether female voters are targeted by clientelist distribution. These findings shed new light on how women's representation in elected political office shapes the incidence and use of clientelist distribution during elections.     

Income-based voting and polarization over redistribution under alternative electoral systems

Democracies that have proportional electoral systems spend substantively more on welfare policies than those that have majoritarian systems. Theoretical accounts of this empirical regularity are generally tested using macro-level data, leaving micro-level implications untested. In this paper, I take an alternative approach, leveraging the fact that the theories in question make predictions about the electoral coordination between parties and voters around broad-based redistribution under alternative institutional arrangements. To test the theories, I create a novel measure of income-based voting, which captures the sensitivity of vote choice to changes in income and forms the dependent variable in a second stage model. Overall, I find robust support for more proportionality leading to more income-based voting.     

多维度的选举权——基于霍菲尔德权利理论的一个分析

选举权包含多种法规范上的地位和关系，可看作一个有关选举的权利束。按照霍菲尔德的权利理论，可以从权力、自由、豁免和求四个维度来理解选举权。在权力维度上，选举权意味着对授权和代表关系的法律控制力，选民行使选举权的结果便是授权和代表关系的形成、变动和消灭。在自由维度上，选举权意味着个人有权自由地行使选举权力，不受国家、组织和他人的干涉。在豁免维度上，选举权意味着公民有不受约束的选举自由，国家没有不当干预选举自由的权力。求维度的选举权与其他维度的选举权紧密相连，它以选举权之权力、自由和豁免三素为主张对象，在一定意义上，其他维度的选举权只有与求维度的选举权结合起来，才能变得更有力、更具有可实现性。     

Electoral consequences of declining participation: A natural experiment in Austria

Participation rates have declined sharply across developed democracies. But the precise impact of this decline on party systems has proven difficult to study due to endogeneity concerns. This paper seeks to address this issue by leveraging a natural experiment in Austrian parliamentary elections. By examining instances in which compulsory voting was gradually repealed in a federal setting, I isolate the causal relationship between turnout decline and subsequent shifts in party vote share. The findings suggest that turnout decline is not associated with a significant redistribution of votes between parties. The clearest visible effect is a consolidation of the party system, with a mild shift in votes from minor to mainstream parties. Evaluating the findings, the paper argues that characteristics of proportional representation systems insulate parties against the consequences of declining electoral participation.     

US voter registration reform

Voter registration in the United States changed after the 2000 election with a requirement that states adopt statewide voter registries. However, these registries vary in design in practice, with some states having state managed “top–down” registries and other states having more decentralized “bottom–up” registries. I compare the effect of moving to a top–down registry with the adoption of Election Day registration – where voters can register to vote the day of the election – on voters saying that they are not registered because of election management problems or not voting because of a voter registration issue. EDR had a pronounced effect on reducing voter registration problems but the adoption of new voter registries had minimal effect on the same problems.     

Does ticket-splitting decrease the accuracy of recalled previous voting? Evidence from three German panel surveys

This paper addresses the role of ticket-splitting in decreasing the accuracy of recalled previous voting. It suggests that ticket-splitting makes recalling vote choice a more difficult task and thus increases recall error. Using data from three German panel surveys conducted from 1998 to 2008, the paper demonstrates that ticket-splitting increases recall error by a considerable margin, even after controlling for behavioral and attitudinal predictors. This finding suggests that recall accuracy is not a stable voter characteristic. It also lends credence to the notion that the increase in ticket-splitting in recent German elections decreased the accuracy of recalled previous voting. Finally, the evidence suggests that electoral systems affect the validity of survey answers concerning previous vote choice.     

Not always second order: Subnational elections,national-level vote intentions,and volatility spillovers in a multi-level electoral system

The widespread second-order view on subnational elections leaves little room for the idea that subnational election campaigns matter for national-level electoral preferences. I challenge this perspective and explore the context-conditional role of subnational election campaigns for national-level vote intentions in multi-level systems. Campaigns direct citizens’ attention to the political and economic “fundamentals” that determine their electoral preferences. Subnational election campaigns and the major campaign issues receive nation-wide media coverage. This induces all citizens in a country to evaluate parties at the national level even if they themselves are not eligible to vote in the upcoming subnational election. Thereby, subnational election campaigns may lead to a reduction in the uncertainty of voters’ national-level electoral preferences throughout the country, which is reflected by a decrease in the volatility of national-level vote intentions. I explore weekly vote intention data from Germany (1992–2007) within a conditional volatility model. Subnational elections reduce uncertainty in nation-wide federal-level vote intentions for major parties. However, patterns of incumbency and coalitional shifts moderate this volatility-reducing effect.     

The impact of at-large elections: vote dilution or choice dilution?

Multi-member, at-large legislative elections result in election outcomes different from outcomes in single-member district elections for two reasons: they cancel out the voting strength of geographically concentrated groups of voters (e.g., party groups, racial groups), and they make it difficult for a voter to vote for an individual candidate, rather than for one of the competing lists of candidates. An electoral setting in Long Island, New York, presents an opportunity to test which of these two aspects of at-large elections—vote dilution or choice dilution—accounts for the usual pattern of one party (or group) winning all the legislative seats at stake.     

On the efficiency of vote buying when voters have common interests

We examine the conditions under which vote buying may promote efficiency in an environment where voters have identical preferences with respect to the behavior of their elected representatives (who are subject to both moral hazard and adverse selection). Our results suggest that permission of vote buying may prove beneficial in the market for corporate control and in some types of local political elections.