The political budget cycle across varying degrees of democracy

The political budget cycle (PBC) is a well-known theory claiming that leaders manipulate the economy in proximity to elections to improve their chances of re-election. While the existence of the phenomenon in democracies has been thoroughly discussed, little attention has been given to the theoretical justification and empirical evidence of its existence in autocracies. In this article, I present a hypothesis of the magnitude of the PBC in both autocracies and democracies, claiming that as the democracy level increases, the incentive of leaders to manipulate the economy rises, but their ability to do so is more limited. Therefore, I expect the magnitude of the PBC to be the lowest in states that are strongly autocratic (due to a lack of incentives) and in states that are strongly democratic (due to a lack of ability). The effect should be the strongest in weakly autocratic or weakly democratic states. The empirical analysis presented in the article supports the hypothesis of a non-linear correlation between the PBC and levels of democracy.     

Multi‐Level Elections in Switzerland

Why do election results at national and regional parliamentary elections in Switzerland differ so widely? And why are these differences more pronounced in some constituencies than in others? This study discusses competing theoretical views of the linkage between elections held at multiple federal levels, and empirically tests their predictions using official election statistics and contextual data from Swiss national and cantonal elections between 1999 and 2003. Despite the spatially and temporally limited scope of this analysis, one conclusion suggests itself: current theories of the linkage suffer from their neglect of features of the electoral systems which may vary between different types of elections. Taking these institutional variations into account, we find a strong systematic relationship between election outcomes at different levels. Moreover, the linkage of election outcomes is, to some extent, contingent upon the degree to which regions are integrated into the national political system: while national trends in party support tend to drive election outcomes in nationally well‐integrated cantons, election results ostensibly follow regional electoral developments in more peripheral cantons.     

Regulating political advertising in the EU and USA: a human rights perspective

Underlying the American model of political campaign communication are the US Constitutional guarantees of free speech, which secure the rights of citizens to support political candidates of their choosing and express that support in various forms, from bumper stickers to television advertising. Courts have at times struck down measures regulating political advertising, including limits on the amounts of such advertising and the amounts of funds which candidates, parties and individuals may spend on election‐related speeches and advertising as infringements of these rights. With few exceptions, in the USA, government may not limit the number of spots a candidate airs in an election. In Europe, international norms concerning free expression and fair elections appear in a number of legal instruments, including, most recently, the UK's Human Rights Act 1998 and the EU's Charter of Fundamental Rights. This paper compares the role and development of American First Amendment doctrines in limiting restrictions on political advertising in the USA with the development of comparable norms of free expression under the European Convention on Human Rights, European Union treaties and legislation and national laws of the member states and accession countries. In particular, this paper addresses the validity and enforceability of European legal limits on number, timing, placement, quantity and content of political advertisements under applicable human rights rules and similar regulations. The paper concludes that (1) a combination of European legal instruments, including the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Community Treaty, the European Community's ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directives and the Council of Europe's Convention on Transfrontier Television offer protections of a kind and type which broadly track the protections of the USA's First Amendment; that (2) it seems that governmental justifications for restricting these freedoms are more readily accepted in Europe than they might be in courts in the USA; and that (3) certain restrictions on political advertising identified in previous studies as existing throughout Europe will face increased judicial scrutiny and some of them are probably illegal under European Human Rights principles. Copyright © 2004 Henry Stewart Publications     

Being Certain Versus Being Right: Citizen Certainty and Accuracy of House Candidates' Ideological Orientations

Research on voting behavior has been reinvigorated by focusing on citizens' certainty of candidates' issue positions and ideological orientations. According to this perspective, citizens are inclined to support candidates whom they are confident possess attributes they deem important. Analysis of citizens' perceptual certainty and perceptual accuracy of 1994, 1996, and 1998 House candidates' ideological orientations reveals that many candidate characteristics (incumbency, fiscal resources) that enhance certainty fail to improve perceptual accuracy. The electoral consequence of this fact is that candidates endowed with these resources benefit from the importance of certainty to citizens without paying the electoral costs of clarifying their issue positions and ideological orientations. Similarly, several characteristics of citizens that lead to certainty reduction—gender and caring about the outcome of the election, for example—fail to improve perceptual accuracy. The implications of the empirical findings for the role of citizens' assessments of certainty in the voting decision for producing an informed electorate are considered here.     

Rule of law and democracy in the Western Balkans: addressing the gap between policies and practice

ABSTRACT

Three decades since the beginning of democratization processes, the Western Balkan countries have built a democratic façade by holding elections, by promulgating legal acts guaranteeing freedom of expression, or by constitutionally declaring a strict system of checks and balances. In reality, however, political elites rely on informal structures, clientelism, and control of the media to undermine democracy. Given that formal democratic freedoms are effective only to the extent that political elites are bound by the effective rule of law, the core argument of this study is that the structural weaknesses of democratic institutions are purposefully exploited by domestic regimes, which are able to misuse these fragile institutions to their advantage.     

Influencing votes,winning elections: clientelist practices and private funding of electoral campaigns in Albania

ABSTRACT

The present article is part of a broader effort to understand and analyse the relationship between formal and informal norms and institutions in the Balkans. Free and fair elections are a central component of any functioning democracy and, in the case of Albania, an essential element of its EU accession process. Elections can also be affected by political clientelism, which puts their outcomes’ credibility into question. Political clientelism is a principal sector of informal relations and practices and informal and/or illegal funding of electoral campaigns are identified as its key mechanisms. This article addresses a number of issues related to clientelist practices and private funding of electoral campaigns, focusing on the general parliamentary elections of June 2017. The main research question investigates the ways in which private funding of electoral campaigns works in practice. Based on data gathered through ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, reports on the electoral process, and other secondary sources, we argue that informal clientelist practices permeating private funding of electoral campaigns enable political parties to further and strengthen clientelist relations and to influence the electoral result.     

Electoral Integrity and Turnout in a Context of Violence at the Sub-National Level in Mexico, 2015–2018

In this article, we analyse the effect of electoral integrity on electoral participation in violent contexts. Using data from Local Electoral Authorities on electoral results, Electoral Integrity rates, and the Peace Index, we develop an exploratory analysis for sub-national elections in Mexico, in the 2015–2018 period. We conclude that, when elections are characterised by a high level of integrity, the negative impact of violence on turnout lessens, or almost disappears. By doing this, we contribute to the existing literature about the effects of violence on turnout at the sub-national level and to the studies on electoral integrity.     

Paradoxes of electoral authoritarianism: the 2015 Ethiopian elections as hegemonic performance

The 2015 elections in Ethiopia had a predictable outcome, showing an entrenched system of one-party dominance that self-referentially enacts the political order created by the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991. EPRDF spokespersons continued to defend the party’s hegemony as inevitable, grounded in a logic of technocratic authority and with reference to ‘stability’ and ‘development’. This paper describes the electoral process not in the light of democracy theory but of hegemonic governance theory. Elections seem to have lost relevance in Ethiopia as a means of political expression and are only important as a performance of hegemonic governance and as ‘global impression management’ – showing state skills in securing a smooth electoral process as a major organisational feat in itself. Contradictions that the political process creates between the Ethiopian party-state and domestic constituencies, and between the attitudes/policies of certain donor countries, are downplayed or avoided, but problematic in the long run.     

Testing Duvergerʼs law: strategic voting in Mongolian elections, 1996–2004

Recent empirical research on voting in single-member districts, based on extensive data-sets of election results, has demonstrated the general (although not universal) validity of Duverger’s law (i.e. that the average outcome under plurality rule is generally consistent with two-party competition). This article tests Duverger’s law through analysis of a data-set covering Mongolian parliamentary elections in the period of 1996–2004. The results show consistent, but not linear, movement towards the Duvergerian equilibrium in Mongolia, with large part of the districts conforming to the Duvergerian norm of two-party competition. Duverger treated his law merely as an important tendency but insisted that social forces are the main determinants of the number of political parties. The main factor that limited Mongolian voters’ rationality, and created problems with their strategic ability to distinguish and abandon hopeless candidates, was weak institutionalization of the Mongolian party system. Finally, I prove that the emergence of bipolar party politics was not an immediate process and will continue over a series of elections, supporting the so-called “learning hypothesis.”