Electoral rules and manufacturing legislative supermajority: evidence from Singapore

Electoral authoritarian regimes usually preserve the dominance of the ruling party through electoral fraud, violence and intimidation. This paper focuses on the subtler forms of manipulation that undermine the electoral integrity and democratic outcomes. Specifically, we examine how an unusual electoral rule, involving multimember districts elected through plurality bloc voting for party slates, exaggerates the legislative seat shares of the People’s Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. This rule, used also by other electoral authoritarian regimes, facilitates the manipulation of district magnitude and gerrymandering, especially the ‘stacking’ form, to produce a large disproportionality which distorts the seats–votes linkage. It operates in an undemocratic fashion by precluding the opposition from gaining anything but token seats as long as the PAP remains the plurality-winning party. The importance of this electoral rule and its manipulation has been overlooked in current work that emphasises redistributive strategies or coercion to repress electoral competition.     

The Swiss Upper House: ‘Chambre de Réflexion’ or Conservative Renegades?

Theoretical analyses suggest that bicameral systems have policy consequences if the preferences of the two chambers differ. This paper offers an analysis of the ideological positions of the MPs in the two chambers of the Swiss parliament. Contrary to conventional wisdom the analyses relying on MP surveys and roll call analyses suggest that the MPs of the same party hardly differ with respect to their ideological positions. While the MP survey suggests that the Swiss upper house is more conservative given the underrepresentation of leftist parties in the latter chamber, similar differences fail to appear in the roll call analyses in a systematic way. Hence, the Swiss upper house is hardly a conservative bastion.     

English Question or Union Question? Neither has Easy Answers

While devolution has provided a stronger political voice for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland since the late 1990s, it is only in the past few years that English public opinion appears to have become exercised by the lack of similar arrangements for England. The renewed debates over the character of the Union after the Scottish independence referendum reveal a desire for ‘fair treatment’ of England within a Union conceived as a partnership of equals. At the same time, numerous proposals have been made for devolution of power within England, reflecting long‐held concerns about the territorial hegemony of London. Solutions to the former issue include English votes for English laws and an English Parliament. Solutions to the latter include city‐regions, strengthened local government, the first of these appears to be the government's preferred route, in the light of the recent ‘Greater Manchester Agreement’. However, none of these ‘solutions’ can count on being implemented.     

完善农村基层民主制度

中国农村基层民主至今已经走过了二十余个年头 ,在这一过程中农村基层民主的建设一方面取得了很大成绩 ,另一方面也暴露出了许多急待解决的问题。本文结合我国农村基层民主建设的实际 ,探讨中国农村基层民主建设过程中存在的问题及其相应的解决方法 ,旨在探索出一条适合我国农村基层民主发展的道路。     

Electoral contexts that impede voter coordination

An electorate can effectively coordinate on the viable parties in its district, or a relatively large proportion of its voters may “waste” their votes on parties that fail to obtain office. Avoiding wasted votes can be more or less difficult depending on several characteristics of the electoral context. Unfortunately, many of the features of electoral contexts hypothesized to cause vote wastage have been tested piecemeal on only a handful of (non-random) cases and/or with data inappropriately aggregated to the national, rather than the district, level. Based on results from 2007 districts in 183 lower chamber elections across 21 countries, we find evidence that new electoral rules, the entry of new parties, past electoral volatility, and high district magnitudes are all likely to make coordination a challenge, with entry by new parties having the largest, most consistent effect.     

Forgetting to make votes count: The role of previous democratic experience

This paper argues that wasted votes in founding elections decrease when countries have a previous democratic experience before the current democratic period. This historical-institutionalist argument is tested with national election results in 22 founding elections in third-wave European, Asian, Latin American and African democracies. The results demonstrate that having a democratic past clearly increases coordination and then reduces the percentage of wasted votes in the founding election, controlling for the electoral system.     

Determinants of disproportionality and wasted votes

The aim of this article is to explain differences in disproportionality. The dependent variable has two components. One is the index of disproportionality created by Michael Gallagher (1991). The other component consists of the amount of wasted votes, i.e. votes that are given to representatives of parties which fail to gain representation in parliament. Three independent variables are used: district magnitude, electoral thresholds, and the combined measurement of these variables, namely the effective threshold. The test reveals that while Gallagher's index of disproportionality is affected by district magnitude and the effective threshold, the amount of wasted votes remains, with the possible exception of a weak link to electoral thresholds, unaffected by changes in the independent variables. Explanations for the findings are introduced and discussed.     

Toe the line,break the whip: explaining floor dissent in parliamentary democracies

This article analyses the drivers of individual dissent in floor voting in parliamentary regimes. It focuses on the effect of ideological heterogeneity in legislative parties on individual MPs’ voting behaviour, as well as the different incentives caused by the differing consequences of defection and abstention. Combining individual-level survey and voting data from the Swedish Riksdag, neither of which is subject to selection bias, the study overcomes several limitations of previous research. It shows that MPs’ decisions to dissent are partly driven by ideological differences with their party, but also by the imperatives of maintaining a government majority in a parliamentary regime, along with the level of influence MPs exert on legislation. It also highlights the importance of distinguishing between abstaining from voting and defecting. Merely pooling the two oversimplifies the behaviour of MPs.     

Why Shareholders Shouldn't Vote: A Marxist‐progressive Critique of Shareholder Empowerment

This paper argues that liquidity, short‐termism and low involvement in corporate governance are fundamental ingredients of shareholders’ value maximisation strategies. Neither shareholders nor their representatives will voluntarily adopt restrictions which inhibit their ability to pursue these strategies, such as those presented by the Stewardship Codes. Utilising Marxist and progressive theory this paper evidences the tendency for all capital (including shares) to seek liquidity. It presents historical evidence which shows that political policy can either restrict this tendency, as it did in the progressive and post war period, or facilitate it, as it did in nineteenth century England and in the current neoliberal period. The shareholder empowerment initiatives examined in this paper are therefore best understood as strategies to justify shareholder claims in the current crisis and to thereby protect the neoliberal status quo.     

Buying Local Votes: The Effect of Individual Campaign Spending Under a Semi-Open PR System in the Belgian Local Elections

This article analyses the effect of campaign spending on the individual result of party candidates in the Belgian local elections. An analysis of data concerning the 2012 local elections in the Flemish region shows that candidates who spend more in absolute terms or outspend their rivals (at the list and the municipality level) obtain a better result, even though the size of the effect is small. Contrary to what was found for national elections, there are indications that spending affects the odds of obtaining a seat in the local council. The spending effect tends to be weaker for candidates holding an executive office in the municipality.