Strategic Behaviour in Parliament

Most research on roll call votes considers each voting decision by members of parliament (MPs) as an independent observation. Only recently have scholars (for example, Clinton, 2012, American Journal of Political Science, 56, 355–372; Clinton & Meirowitz, 2004, American Journal of Political Science, 48, 675–689) started to assess how knowledge about the sequence of votes may help us to understand the legislative process in more detail. Many of these analyses are, however, predicated on quite important assumptions regarding the forward-looking capacities of MPs. In this paper, this more recent literature is drawn on and brought to bear on an analysis of two bills adopted in the Swiss parliament. Having detailed information available on MPs’ preferences over various options voted upon, it is possible to test whether MPs behave strategically, and to what degree they are capable of anticipating the way forward through the agenda tree. Evidence is found that MPs behave strategically, but their foresight is not as perfect as one would expect from theoretical models.     

Setting the Post War Australian Policy Agenda – Causes and Content

What are the origins of policy agendas and what determines agenda setting? The one robust theory in the literature associates different agendas with different moments in the evolution of the broader party system namely mass, catch‐all and most recently cartel patterns. This article explores Australian evidence for this thesis. It also argues the cartel moment has recently mutated. Agenda setting is now circumscribed by a mismatch between the needs of policy making and the political incentive structure. The media have become primary tissue connecting political elites to their publics. But this traps the system in short term, primarily populist stances. Systemic capacities to mediate agenda setting have thus been corrupted.     

When Do Low Roll Rates Indicate Party Influence? Evidence from Counterfactual Roll Rates

A simulation-based counterfactual is one way to solve the observational equivalence challenge that seemingly “partisan” majority-party roll rates can be observed in the absence of any actual party influence. We simulate no-partisan-agenda-control counterfactual roll rates and apply them across sessions of the US House of Representatives and 86 state legislative chambers to evaluate the extent to which observed roll rates provide evidence for party influence on the legislative agenda. After assessing and controlling for the baseline risk of majority-party rolls, there is significant evidence of party influence on roll rates in some state legislatures, particularly those with rules that grant parties more agenda power, and in the post-Reed’s-rules House of Representatives. Institutional rules interact with the (simulated) risk of a majority roll to shape observed roll rates across chambers and across time.     

‘Soft’ forms of direct democracy: Explaining the occurrence of referendum motions and advisory referendums in Finnish local government

This study investigates ‘soft’ forms of direct democracy and identifies factors that explain their occurrence. Soft direct democracy refers to non‐binding referendum motions and advisory referendums, which the literature on direct democracy has largely ignored. Strategic motives have dominated previous explanations of the occurrence of initiatives and referendums, but are less useful in exploring non‐binding procedures of direct democracy. The article distinguishes four types of factors – socio‐structural, party system, political support and learning – and tests hypotheses on their effects with sub‐national data from Finland. The data enable us to compare two different types of instruments – non‐binding referendum motions and advisory referendums – while controlling for many unobserved factors. The findings show that erosion of political support, participatory traditions and policy diffusion explain the occurrence of bottom‐up referendum motions, while the last two together with small population and party system factors predict the occurrence of advisory government‐initiated referendums.     

论舆论市场中的公共新闻——兼论公共新闻对我国新闻改革的借鉴意义

公共新闻(或称公民新闻)在美国的兴起,引起国内学者的关注.公共新闻活动与以往最大的不同之处是同城媒介联合行动,共同设置话题,直接介入公共事务,试图解决公众关注的公共问题.公共新闻活动是对此前所有新闻学、传播学、舆论学和社会学理论的巨大冲击.它的实践和理论对于我国新闻媒介的改革具有现实借鉴意义.本文从公共新闻与舆论市场、与媒介议程设置、与我国媒介改革诸方面对公共新闻实践和理论的影响和可借鉴之处作了理论上的探讨,并从国家民族利益角度提出了应对策略.     

论公共政策议程建立过程中媒体的影响

由于媒体具有覆盖面广、信息容量大和传播迅速的特点,一个社会问题一旦经过媒体的放大很快就能形成强大的社会舆论,因而就能对政府政策议程的建立产生很大的影响。但是,媒体对于公共政策议程建立的影响力也受到自身存在的某些问题的制约。在公共政策议程建立过程中要协调和处理好媒体与政府、公众三者之间关系。     

Government alternation and legislative agenda setting

Recent studies of the legislative process have put forward a number of plausible hypotheses regarding the distribution of agenda‐setting power. These hypotheses have guided scholars in identifying those conflicts and actors that are crucial to explaining legislative change and the wording of legislation. However, this has not yet led to a better understanding of the choice of specific agenda‐setting rules. Why does the cabinet in some parliamentary democracies enjoy an undisputed role, while in others the parliament continues to play the role of co‐protagonist? This article attempts to answer this question by looking at some well‐known features of party systems. It is argued that in pivotal party systems, with limited government alternation, it is much more difficult to strengthen the government vis‐à‐vis the parliament. One factor prevents the procedural and institutional predominance of the cabinet under these circumstances: the lack of opportunities for, and expectations of, large and controversial policy change.