The dynamics of Chinese missile proliferation

The missile nonproliferation regime has been criticized for its ineffectiveness in constraining states such as China from contributing to the proliferation of ballistic missile systems and related technologies to states in other regions. This regime is predicated on the assumption that the creation of social norms and acceptable patterns of behaviour will ultimately require China and others to conform to a universal perpective on the sources of and remedies for missile proliferation. The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that China's willingness to supply sensitive missile technology is a function of a weapons‐export policy that is incompatible with current initiatives in missile nonproliferation. Such a policy is the product of certain foreign policy considerations and domestic factors that serve as motivational elements within the internal political system.     

Arms production in the third tier: An analysis of opportunity and willingness

Major determinants of third world military industrialization operate at the domestic, regional, and global levels. I summarize these and then examine their relative importance by analyzing time‐series cross‐section data for twelve arms producers from 1968 to 1990. Overall, there is considerable support for the various factors identified in the literature. However, my findings do highlight the importance of opportunity, perhaps more than willingness, as an explanation for changing levels of third tier arms production. Resolution of the tensions that drive regional militarization and the eruption of military conflict should have some positive effects ‐on restraining the expansion of arms production capacity. But there also seems to be a certain inevitability to the process, a process that is limited primarily by states' resources, industrial capacities, and access to weapons‐production technologies.     

East Meets West in Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorist Finance: Policy Dialogue and Differentiation on Security, the Timber Trade and ‘Alternative’ Banking

This paper compares and contrasts South East Asian and European Union countries’ perceptions of the priorities for anti money laundering (AML) and anti terrorist finance (ATF) in relation to three industries: security goods and services; the timber trade; and ‘informal’ value transfer and banking services. It might be expected that all countries would equally support each of these aspects of AML/ATF policies, without differentiating between the industries generating the proceeds. As this paper will show, however, historical experiences, contemporary political relations and patterns of trade shape countries’ approaches, resulting in distinctive enthusiasms and reservations. In a nutshell, the EU points most strongly to products and services originating in Asia as posing AML/CTF risks, and locates primary responsibility for monitoring and control as falling within Asia - a projection of risk and responsibility that is reciprocated by Asian countries. Asian countries perceive a need for tighter control of dangerous products exported by the west, for example, small arms and light weapons, and of related money laundering circuits. Asian and European policy makers increasingly articulate concerns over illegal logging and related laundering, however European importers and their governments see responsibilities for this as falling primarily within Asia. Finally, the EU (like the US) perceives high levels of laundering risk in ‘informal’ value transfer/banking services, in which Asian-run businesses have a global competitive advantage. For the future, as the international balance of trade shifts, and as Asia increases its influence in international fora including those concerned with AML/CTF, so the region’s policy preferences may be expected to carry more weight.

War Games redux? Cyberthreats,US–Russian strategic stability,and new challenges for nuclear security and arms control

Some 30 years since the release of the Hollywood blockbuster War Games, the possibility that hackers might break into nuclear command and control facilities, compromise early warning or firing systems, or even cause the launch of a nuclear weapon has become disturbingly real. While this challenge will impact all nuclear-armed states, it appears particularly acute for the USA and Russia given their large, diverse, and highly alerted nuclear forces. The fact that east–west relations have deteriorated to a nadir perhaps not seen since the 1980s, strategic instability has increased – particularly in the wake of the Ukraine and now Syria crises – and that the nuclear arms reductions agenda appears to have reached a standstill makes this challenge particularly pressing. In this discouraging milieu, new cyberthreats are both exacerbating the already strained US–Russia strategic balance – particularly the perceived safety and security of nuclear forces – and at the same time creating new vulnerabilities and problems that might be exploited by a third party. Taken together, these dynamics add another major complication for current arms control agreements and possible future nuclear cuts, and also seem likely to increase the possibility of accidents, miscalculation, and potential unauthorised nuclear use, especially given the large number of nuclear weapons that remain on “hair-trigger” alert.     

印俄高度军备依赖关系生成机制探究

依赖关系可以出现从轻微依赖、中度依赖到高度依赖等不同程度的情景，是否存在供求关系、是否涉及关键资源、能否承担转换成本是判断国家间依赖程度高低的三个标准。印度和俄罗斯之间的军备合作达到了一种高度依赖的关系，这种关系并不是自然产生的，而是伴随着俄罗斯作为资源供应国采取的主动锁定策略生成并得到强化。通过“展示—供应—刺激—捆绑”这一系列主动锁定策略，俄罗斯逐步强化了印度对其军备供应的高度依赖，也使其国防发展模式和作战理念深深烙上了俄罗斯的印记。在军备依赖的强化过程中，印俄关系得到积极巩固和深入发展，但印度的战略灵活性也同时受到了损害，使印度处于机会主义风险中。当前印俄军备贸易过程中的摩擦、国际军备出口市场竞争的加剧、美印军事关系的发展等因素都不同程度地影响着印俄锁定依赖的稳定性。