论质量调控训练管理方法在警察技术战术训练中的运用

实施以质量为核心的目标管理,是现代管理的主要特征。警察技术战术训练作为警察队伍生成战斗力的重要实践活动,尤其需要讲质量。运用质量调控训练管理方法,对提高警察技术战术训练质量具有积极的作用。各级公安院校和公安机关培训部门应强化质量意识,提高警察技术战术训练的标准、质量和效益,有效提高警察队伍的综合素质和整体战斗力。     

法治化进程中的军队政治工作

伴随不断建设中的发达社会主义市场法治经济 ,迈着军队正规化、法治化建设的步伐 ,形成于革命战争年代、植根于计划经济土壤的我军政治工作 ,正面临着如何适应和抉择的实践难题。其中的抉择之一 ,就是依法进行军队政治工作。     

信息不完全——对证券公开规制的一种经济分析

信息不完全是市场机制与生俱来的内在缺陷 ,它在证券这一特定“产品”的交易过程中得到更加充分地显现。公开规制作为国家干预证券市场的特定形式 ,恰是克服信息不完全的一种有效的制度选择。     

论行业组织的权力及其规制

行业组织是非营利性的社会组织,其权力的性质是具有公共管理职能的社会权。行业组织的权力是多方面的,对成员的影响也是巨大的,因此也必须对其权力进行规范,以保护其成员的合法权益。     

双层社会视阈下数据犯罪的法益规制思路

从网络到现实,双层社会迅速形成,相关犯罪亦从现实社会迁移至网络社会。如何应对伴生的新型犯罪形态,关键在于能否全面、清晰认知双层社会的链接点——数据。数据犯罪随双层社会固化而持续扩张,立法、司法均提出各自的应对思路,但规制现状并不乐观。以数据犯罪为核心,分析该犯罪形态在立法与司法领域的表征,并结合其技术与社会的双重价值属性,针对受损法益展开分析,最终实现对相关罪名适用的逻辑化探索。     

Protection and Regulations to Status Property of Rich Second Generation

The status property of rich second generation is based on protection of status relations and private property rights, private property lateral expanse to the family property, and vertical expanse to inheritance property, but the current legal right of property has also shaped the power of the rich second generation. Policies for rich second generation should be based on the property nature of private right and sociality, the efficiency of property possession, the intergenerational equity to inheritance, and the abuse of property rights. Rich second generation have limited legitimacy to the property. It is necessary to improve the system of equity and trust to serve their property, and use the estate tax to achieve balance of interests between individual and society, but also need to overcome the fairness of procedure to constraint abuse of power.     

The iteration deficit in responsive regulation: Are regulatory ambassadors an answer?

One reason that regulation is difficult is that repeated encounters between regulator and regulatee are rare. We suggest diplomacy as a model for reconfiguring regulatory institutions in response. Ambassadors for Regulatory Affairs who would be agents for all state regulatory agencies could be based in most large firms and small and medium enterprises that pose unusual regulatory risks. In rural towns, police would be trained as regulatory ambassadors. Just as a US Secretary of State can launch a “diplomatic surge” in Myanmar from 2009, so regulatory surges are possible in market sectors of high risk or high opportunity. We propose strategies of indirect reciprocity as a way in which reciprocity that is only episodic in these strategic ways can promote more general responsiveness. Indirect reciprocity is reciprocity that we do not personally experience, but learn from the experience of a culture. This means that so long as we sustain regulation as a relational as opposed to a purely technocratic process, indirect reciprocity might civilize regulatory compliance in an historical process informed by the theories of Elias and Putnam.     

Conceptualizing and theorizing EU regulatory networks

European regulatory networks (ERNs) play a central role in the formulation, deliberation, and implementation of EU policies and have, thus, become objects of investigation in a fast‐growing scholarly literature. We identify two shortcomings – one conceptual, one theoretical – in the literature on ERNs: First, we argue that the principal–agent approach, which is conventionally used to conceptualize ERNs, overlooks and even misrepresents central features of ERNs. By introducing and applying the “orchestration” framework to ERNs we demonstrate that it better captures the specific characteristics of ERNs. Secondly, explanations for the choice and design of ERNs have treated functional and power‐based accounts as mutually exclusive. We argue instead that explanatory leverage can be gained by combining these two accounts by specifying their respective domains of application. While functional accounts enable us to illuminate why and under what circumstances ERNs are created in the first place (rather than EU agencies or delegation to the Commission), political accounts help us to shed light on variation in the design of ERNs (i.e. why actors opt for rather close or loose network structures). We illustrate the explanatory value‐added of such an approach through two brief case studies on EU telecommunications and competition policies.     

Timing as a source of regulatory influence: A technical elite network analysis of global finance

Rules governing the international financial system are the subject of some of the most intense distributional battles waged in any area of global governance. Who wins and who loses such battles – and why? I develop a novel analytical framework – technical elite network (TEN) theory – which explains the widely varying levels of influence that stakeholders enjoy over global financial standards. TEN theory draws attention to how issue‐specific characteristics of international finance – in particular, its highly technical and complex nature – shape the distributional consequences of global regulatory processes. It posits that such characteristics influence distributional outcomes by (i) affecting who claims first‐mover position and, thus, sets the agenda in global financial rulemaking, and (ii) ensuring that proposals made by first movers are increasingly difficult to alter at later stages of rulemaking. I provide empirical evidence for the theory by examining two regulatory regimes that are central to the efficiency and stability of the global financial system: the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the International Accounting Standards Board.