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61.
行政混合过错具有实践的现实需求性与理论的研究滞后性,其诞生乃是民事混合过错模式在行政行为实践中融合之结果。要认定行政混合过错应当具备主体、事实、过错和对象四大要件。行政混合过错的理论模式化及理论适用是其实现现实功效的前提。我国当前可以通过司法解释的形式实现对行政混合过错的高成效、低成本规制。 相似文献
62.
This article makes recommendations as to “Best Practices” for the training of mediators in court‐connected settings. The authors’ findings cover issues including the design of training programs, the importance of experiential learning through role‐plays, teaching methods for adult learners, class size and length, training ethical mediators, suggested trainer qualifications, and recommended regulatory practices for administrators. Data comes primarily from an assessment of mediation training and regulation in Florida, but the findings hold insights for court‐connected mediation programs throughout the United States. Additionally, the authors highlight the benefits of a collaborative assessment approach involving all stakeholder groups and facilitating smooth implementation of any needed changes. 相似文献
63.
Rebecca Kristen Wrock 《Contemporary Justice Review》2016,19(2):267-279
AbstractIn America, we like to say that we live in a democracy. Yet, it is difficult to believe that the majority would allow current practices to continue if citizens knew how the food animals they eat are treated – both during their short lives and during slaughter. The problem is that the citizens don’t know, and it is not a case of willful blindness. Take a moment to recall what you know about our meat industry. Can’t think of much? That is the goal of the meat industry: out of sight, out of mind. In several states, so called ‘Ag-Gag’ laws are designed to keep the truth from the public. In those states, it is a felony to obtain a job with the intent of being a whistle blower. The meat industry knows that if it were to be exposed, the public would demand better treatment of animals, a demand that would decrease profits for the meat industry. This paper will explain these ‘Ag-Gag’ laws in detail, explore their effect on our society, shed light on the practices that the meat industry tries – very successfully – to hide from voters and consumers, and examine the scary results that can occur when an industry is allowed to regulate itself. 相似文献
64.
Jodi L. Short 《Regulation & Governance》2021,15(3):653-685
There is broad consensus in the literature on regulatory enforcement and compliance that politics matters. However, there is little scholarly convergence on what politics is or rigorous theorization and empirical testing of how politics matters. Many enforcement and compliance studies omit political variables altogether. Among those that address political influences on regulatory outcomes, politics has been defined in myriad ways and, too often, left undefined. Even when political constructs are explicitly operationalized, the mechanisms by which they influence regulatory outcomes are thinly hypothesized or simply ignored. If politics is truly as important to enforcement and compliance outcomes as everyone in the field seems to agree, regulatory scholarship must make a more sustained and systematic effort to understand their relationship, because overlooking this connection risks missing what is actually driving regulatory outcomes. This article examines how the construct of “politics” has been conceptualized in regulatory theory and analyzes how it has been operationalized in empirical studies of regulatory enforcement and compliance outcomes. It brings together scholarship across disciplines that rarely speak but have much to say to one another on this subject in order to constitute a field around the politics of regulation. The goal is to sharpen theoretical and empirical understandings of when and how regulation works by better accounting for the role politics plays in its enforcement. 相似文献
65.
For many social scientists, government intervention is linked to low levels of social trust and corruption, while others associate it with high trust and low corruption. We aim to reconcile these contrasting views by distinguishing the opposing effects of trust on two alternative types of government intervention: regulation and redistribution. We argue that distrusting individuals demand more governmental regulation (H1) but less government redistribution (H2), and this could be one of the mechanisms explaining why countries with low levels of trust tend to both overregulate and under-redistribute. And the effects of trust on policy preferences are conditional on the quality of institutions. The higher the level of quality of government in a particular region, the more high-trusting individuals will like government redistribution and dislike government regulation that restricts the operations of free markets (H3). We test these hypotheses with data from the latest round of the European Quality of Government Index (EQI) survey, which covers 77,000 individuals from 185 regions of 21 EU member states. 相似文献
66.
Is experimentalist governance (XG) self-limiting or self-reinforcing by virtue of its relationship to strategic uncertainty as an essential scope condition? This article tackles this important but understudied question by elaborating a series of idealtypical pathways for the temporal evolution of XG in specific policy domains, ranging from reversion to hierarchical governance through endogenous reduction of strategic uncertainty at one extreme to institutionalization of experimentalism as a multipurpose governance architecture at the other. It then goes on to test the empirical validity of these contrasting theoretical expectations about the long-term relationship between XG and strategic uncertainty through a process-tracing analysis of electricity regulation in the European Union over a series of policy cycles since the 1990s. Building on and extending previous research in this domain, this article's findings strengthen empirical confidence in the theoretical expectation that XG is self-reinforcing, while diminishing confidence in the claim that it is self-limiting. 相似文献
67.
Genia Kostka 《Regulation & Governance》2016,10(1):58-74
In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify. 相似文献
68.
Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism. 相似文献
69.
Kristina Murphy 《Regulation & Governance》2016,10(1):93-109
This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance. 相似文献
70.
Xuehua Zhang 《Regulation & Governance》2016,10(1):29-43
This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment. 相似文献