遏制和预防公务员腐败的经济学分析

公务员腐败的一个重要原因是我国目前的制度安排尚有缺陷,导致腐败成为“高收益低风险”行为。从微观经济学理论出发,建立成本——收益模型和公务员腐败——廉洁选择的决策树模型。通过制度创新,使腐败成为被查处概率极高、政治风险极大和经济成本极巨的行为。同时,提高公务员廉洁收益。     

贪污罪的数额解析

贪污罪的数额对贪污罪的定罪与量刑具有重要意义。对贪污罪数额理解存在诸多争议,对贪污罪的司法实践具有较大影响。本文围绕贪污罪数额的界定、贪污罪数额的内涵、实践中贪污罪数额的认定标准展开探讨,作者提出了自己的观点。     

职务犯罪亚文化的功能探析

职务犯罪亚文化的功能不仅是解释个人加入职务犯罪亚文化群的原因,也是连接个人、群体、社会的纽带,还是连接职务犯罪亚文化形成理论和传播理论的桥梁.但是,我国现有犯罪学理论对它的研究却比较薄弱,不仅没有功能对象的区分,也少有功能性质的辨别.因此,有必要在分析功能概念的基础上对职务犯罪亚文化的功能依不同对象和性质进行分析.     

“初心使命”失守衍生的贪腐后果与成因——基于教育系统15个违纪违法案件的考察

初心使命作为党的思想建设范畴,具有重要的廉政价值,可以为构建廉政体系中的不想腐环节提供思想资源和技术支持。初心使命在实践运作中体现为岗位职责,初心使命失守是指党员干部在特定岗位上的职责意识淡化、弱化、异化。对教育系统15个违纪违法案例进行分析,发现“利益诱惑情境—初心使命失守—贪腐行为”是初心使命失守衍生的贪腐行为的内在逻辑链条,凸显了初心使命的廉政价值及作用机制。因此应根据利益诱惑情境的作用机制,构建激发初心使命特点优势与控制利益诱惑情境的双重防腐模式。从初心使命视角研究腐败行为的发生机理,弥补了当前初心使命与廉政关系研究的不足。     

腐败心理的内涵、构成及抑制策略

腐败心理是支配腐败行为人实施腐败行为的复杂心理现象的总称。腐败心理不仅是腐败行为发生的内在动因,其构成要素的组合状况和特点还决定了腐败行为的性质、类型和发生频次。因此,抑制腐败心理的生成,需要培育积极的心理动力结构要素、合理的心理认知结构要素和有效的心理自控结构要素,从源头上构筑起预防腐败行为发生的内在防线。     

The political and economic causes of satisfaction with democracy in Spain – a twofold panel study

This study tests the links between political and economic performance and satisfaction with democracy (SWD) in Spain. Contrary to the dominant theoretical paradigm that explains the aggregate evolution of and the individual-level differences in SWD mainly by means of economic factors, the article presents evidence that evaluations of the political process are equally relevant to account for both changes in individuals’ SWD over time and the evolution of SWD at the national level. Unlike most existing literature, this study supports its argument by combining analyses of a micro-level panel dataset (CIUPANEL) and of a pooled aggregate-level panel dataset based on the Spanish samples in the Eurobarometer and the Latinobarómetro between 1986 and 2014.     

Weak states and uneven pluralism: lessons from Mali and Kyrgyzstan

We argue that certain important democratic practices and elements of pluralism are lasting features of political systems in many poor countries. Because of state weakness, such arrangements work to the benefit of both elites and citizens. The broader citizenry and civil society enjoy significant political freedoms and greater access to foreign aid. Elites tolerate these limited civil liberties and regular elections because they produce few costly consequences due to state incapacity. We evaluate this theory of ‘uneven pluralism’ in poor countries using evidence from a paired comparison of Mali and Kyrgyzstan. These two countries have experienced significant political turbulence, but on balance have shown a persistent and robust commitment to a free press, transparent elections, and respect for freedom of association. Our theory suggests that uneven pluralism is likely to continue in countries like Mali and Kyrgyzstan, even as significant limits on judicial independence, persistent corruption, and lack of government transparency make democratic consolidation unlikely.     

Preventing Corruption Risk in Legislation: Evidence from Russia,Moldova, and Kazakhstan

ABSTRACT

Corruption risk assessment of draft laws and other normative acts is a relatively new instrument in the anti-corruption strategies implemented by developed nations, countries in transition, and the developing world. In connection with this, any practical experience accumulated in this area presents obvious interest. The analysis of such experience may allow to identify what works and what does not work in introducing the practices of anti-corruption screening of draft laws and other normative acts in various environments and settings, as well as contribute to dissemination of best practices in the countries of the region and elsewhere.

This article seeks to analyze and demonstrate the extent of practical implementation of corruption risk assessment of draft and enacted legislation in three post-communist countries, the problems encountered and solutions identified. Proceeding from this analysis, certain recommendations for practitioners in this field are formulated.     

Following the donor-designed path to Mozambique’s US$2.2 billion secret debt deal

Strenuous efforts by donors and lenders over four decades turned Mozambique from a socialist success story into a neoliberal capitalist one. The private sector dominates; a domestic elite dependent on foreign companies has been created. But a secret US$2.2 billion arms and fishing boat deal involving Swiss and Russian banks and Mozambican purchases from France, Germany, and Israel, with large profits on all sides, was a step too far down the donor’s capitalist road. The International Monetary Fund cut off its programme and western donors ended budget support.     

A failure of governmentality: why Transparency International underestimated corruption in Ben Ali’s Tunisia

This article critiques the Foucauldian approach to governance indicators. Transparency International’s (TI) Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) underestimated Tunisian corruption levels under President Ben Ali: his regime was highly corrupt but foreign investors were less affected. CPI methodology meant it reflected primarily the needs of foreign investors. The Foucauldian approach specifically excludes analysis of governance indicators’ methodologies. It thus fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of governance indicators as a technology of government, and it fails to show how the production of the CPI is embedded in a wider global political economy.