从行政成本看节约型政府的制度体系构建

构建节约型政府的最大障碍就是行政成本居高不下，造成这一问题的根本原因在于“制度缺失”，因此，要有效控制行政成本，建设节约型政府，必须多管齐下，综合治理，健全和完善严密有效的制度体系，从而最大程度地减少行政成本，推进政府机关的可持续发展。     

A Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity cost benefit analysis for use of nylon 4N6FLOQSwabs®

Forensic genetic laboratories are challenged with implementing innovation even if the benefits to operational performance are well demonstrated often because of internal budget constraints. A prospective cost–benefit analysis (CBA) could support justification for an increased budget by effectively demonstrating in a system-based approach the relatively small cost of increasing a laboratory budget can substantially reduce costs to society (both qualitatively and monetarily). A Monte Carlo simulation and sensitivity CBA was performed using a more expensive swab (i.e., nylon 4N6FLOQSwabs®) compared with a less costly cotton swab. Ranges of input values and tangible and intangible benefits were considered. The outcome is that the relatively small increased cost of using a nylon swab pales compared with the potential tangible and intangible benefits to the overall system. This approach provides a sounder basis for requesting additional funds to support implementation of technologies and better approximates realistic situations while accommodating uncertainty of input values.     

禁止儿童乞讨的法经济学分析

分析和解决社会问题有多种进路。法经济学仰仗其强大的解释力和不断自我升级的活力,为分析社会问题提供了一种新颖实用的视角。我们可以运用法经济学的分析范式研究禁止儿童乞讨的问题。儿童乞讨问题受到社会各界广泛关注。有人建议立法干预,甚至全面禁止儿童乞讨。通过法经济学的视角可以剖析儿童乞讨问题的社会根源,并就制度设计过程中需要界清的有关概念以及各种社会成本与收益进行分析,进而按照法经济学的评价体系对各种主张进行考察,从技术层面与国际比较的层面上对禁止儿童乞讨作出制度设计或改进方面的具体分析与建议。     

Patent litigation insurance and R&D incentives

A major policy concern regarding patenting activity is related to the actual enforceability of the patents granted by Patent Offices. The risk of facing elevated legal costs to defend patent rights can affect ex-ante incentives to invest in R&D. This paper analyses whether the availability of insurance policies that cover legal expenditures for patent litigation could increase the appropriability of the innovation. We model a situation in which an incumbent innovator is endowed with a valid patent and an entrant imitator can either directly enter the market or try to apply for a patent, hoping that an error will be made by the Patent Office. The incumbent can accommodate the entrant, file a suit to a civil court or offer a settlement agreement. We model the presence of heterogeneity in the risk that the patents will face an error by both patent examiners at Patent Offices and judges at civil court. We analyse the changes in expected profits for the innovator when given the possibility of buying an insurance policy which will cover legal costs in the event of trial. We compare the cases in which (i) coverage is voluntary and the insurer can discriminate perfectly between risky patents; (ii) coverage is voluntary and the insurer cannot discriminate between patents, and (iii) coverage is compulsory. The model highlights a set of peculiar strategic characteristics of insurance for legal expenditures which contribute to singling out the reasons underlying the underdevelopment of this market. We suggest that the crucial reason for such a failure is not adverse selection; consequently, we challenge the benefits of making coverage compulsory.     

论法学视野下的我国国家安全委员会

党的十八届三中全会决定设立国家安全委员会,标志着我党已着手在国家顶层设计层面上高度重视国家安全管理工作。在全面推进依法治国的今天,更加注重发挥法治在国家治理和社会管理中的重要作用,作为国家治理重要组成部分的国家安全事务也应当纳入依法治国的轨道。国家安全委员会作为国家安全事务的重要机构,必须在宪法和法律的范围内活动,推动依法治国战略的落实。     

降低县级政府行政成本

本文从行政管理学和经济学相结合的角度 ,运用统计调查、分析对比方法 ,分析了影响县级政府行政成本的相关因素 ,提出了降低县级政府行政成本的对策     

危机意识下的行政成本探究

本文从政府危机管理的角度出发,分析了危机意识的概念、意义,指出了三种不同的危机意识对行政成本的影响,政府在危机管理中降低行政成本的意义,最终指出合理、客观、实际的危机意识能够有效地降低行政成本。     

经济伦理视角下发展意蕴的再审视

重新认识发展的意蕴,必须将发展置于经济伦理学的检视之下,回答"发展是什么"、"发展为了什么"以及"如何对待发展的代价"等问题。传统的发展观缺乏经济伦理意蕴,忽视了人的主体性,其结果是发展的代价被普遍低估,而作为发展主体的人却被不同程度异化,社会为此付出了沉重代价。要正确理解发展的意蕴,必须赋予发展以新的经济伦理蕴含,把握发展中所内含的反发展倾向,正确认识和处理发展的代价。     

March divided,fight united? Trade union cohesion and government appeal for concertation

Why does the government appeal for concertation? Starting from the principal?agent framework and delegation theory, the article argues that the government is more willing to share decision-making power with trade unions when the policy preferences endorsed by the unions are closer to those of the cabinet. Furthermore, it maintains that government propensity to negotiate with trade unions increases as the heterogeneity of union policy preferences grows because the cabinet can exploit its agenda-setting power to divide the union front. The article tests these two hypotheses through a longitudinal analysis of the Italian case (1946–2014). In detail, it takes advantage of two original datasets built through content analysis that provide unique in-depth information on the policy preferences of parties and cabinets and measures the policy positions of the main Italian trade unions, thus allowing assessment of their reciprocal heterogeneity. The results confirm the expectations.