Constraining political corruption: an empirical analysis of the impact of democracy

The present article addresses the relationship between democracy and political corruption. Extending past studies, this article introduces important refinements that respond to theoretical and methodological concerns. The theoretical framework proposed here is developed based on an electoral conception of democracy, which makes it possible to avoid the potential endogeneity problems associated with substantial definitions of democracy. I argue that despite the influence of other important aspects of democracy, elections and inter-party competition per se help to constrain political corruption. The article examines two analytical dimensions of democracy, the current level of democracy and its degree of consolidation over time. Unlike previous studies, a cross-national empirical analysis of a sample of more than 100 countries reveals that when tested together, the level of democracy and its degree of longitudinal variation are both significantly related to the control of corruption. The level of democracy affects corruption in a non-linear way. Hybrid regimes that are more autocratic than democratic show a lower level of corruption control than democracies, near-democracies, and closed dictatorships. The analysis also confirms that, despite having adopted different measures, more consolidated democracies are more powerful in constraining corruption.     

Measuring the quality of election administration

How do we distinguish between a ‘genuine’, ‘free and fair’, or ‘legitimate’ election and an election that is something less? In this article, we offer an answer to this vexing question: the Election Administration Systems Index (EASI). EASI is a practical, transparent, and sustainable tool for measuring the quality of elections in the developing world. The following pages describe the current limitations in measuring election quality, detail the EASI approach, and provide a comparative analysis of the results of its pilot implementation. EASI scores are drawn from a survey of experts on elections in the target country following a recent nationwide election. The analytical framework is comprised of three electoral dimensions: participation, competition, and integrity of the process. We also divide these dimensions temporally according to the electoral cycle: either pre-election, during the election, or post-election. The final product is a set of six primary scores displayed across dimension and time. By aggregating the survey data in this fashion, we provide for a nuanced assessment of an election by each dimension and across the cycle. As our pilot results demonstrate, EASI is a diagnostic tool for identifying electoral strengths and weaknesses and serves well for comparative assessments.     

What it takes to win when the game is rigged: the evolution of opposition electoral strategies in Moscow, 2012–2017

This paper examines how the political opposition innovated strategies to overcome obstacles presented by Russia’s uneven electoral playing field. Using evidence from two municipal elections in Moscow, I argue that members of the opposition have coordinated around local contests in response to political opportunities created by the Kremlin, including the anti-electoral fraud protests of the winter of 2011–2012 and the resurrection of gubernatorial elections in 2012. Following these openings, grassroots electoral initiatives recruited and trained opposition-minded individuals, first focusing on established activists and then on politicized individuals, to run for municipal council seats. The campaigns provided training using ad hoc educational seminars and later developed electronic tools that lowered barriers to political participation. As a result of these campaigns, electoral competition has boomed at the local level in Moscow even as regional and national contests have become less competitive. The campaigns demonstrate the continued vulnerability of authoritarian regimes that rely on elections for political legitimacy. Furthermore, the development of highly portable online tools for campaigning has potentially long-term democratizing consequences.     

Translating membership into power at the ballot box? Trade union candidates and worker voting patterns in Indonesia's national elections

This article analyses the effectiveness of trade unions' electoral engagement in the union-dense electoral localities of Bekasi and Tangerang in Indonesia's 2009 legislative elections. Our analysis reveals that legacies of authoritarianism, electoral rules, and union fragmentation pushed unions to pursue an ineffective electoral strategy of running union cadres on various party tickets. In Bekasi, local leaders within the Federation of Indonesian Metalworkers Unions (FSPMI) chose not to mobilize resources to support union candidates because the union's national leadership had failed to convince them of the soundness of its strategy. In Tangerang, local leaders embraced the National Workers Union's (SPN) national electoral strategy, but had inadequate membership data to conduct electoral mapping and did not provide candidates with financial and leadership support. Neither union, meanwhile, gave much consideration to the problem of translating membership to votes: survey data reveal that most members could not name union candidates, and many of those who could did not vote for them. The article argues that, despite its flaws, trade unions' strategy of engagement in the electoral arena constitutes an important step forward in the consolidation of Indonesia's democracy.     

Subverting autocracy: emancipative mass values in competitive authoritarian regimes

Competitive elections in authoritarian regimes are inherently ambiguous: do they extend regime persistence or, vice versa, operate as subversive events? This article tests Inglehart and Welzel's “emancipatory theory of democracy”, which has not been tested for competitive elections in autocracies: when emancipative values grow strong, autocratic power appears increasingly illegitimate in people's eyes, which motivates subversive mass actions against authoritarian rule. For electoral outcomes this suggestion implies, first, that authoritarian incumbents are more likely to suffer electoral defeat when emancipative values have become more widespread. Second, post-electoral protest against fraudulent elections is more likely when emancipative values have become more widespread. To test these hypotheses, we analyse 152 elections among 33 electoral authoritarian regimes over 21 years from 1990–2011. We find that emancipative values are indeed strongly conducive to incumbent defeat while their effect on post-electoral protest is conditional: it only occurs in elections won by the incumbent. These findings intertwine two separately developed literatures: one on authoritarian regime subversion and the other on emancipatory cultural change.     

Intellectual Property Counterfeiting and Piracy – Response of Small Commonwealth Jurisdictions∗

This article provides an analysis of some recent developments relating to Constitutional law in Jamaica, including the legal issues arising from tied elections and the dual nationality of parliamentarians. It also discusses a case relating to the failure to incorporate the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime (the Palermo Convention). In this case, though the Palermo Convention contemplates investigations by agents of one country on the territory of another for certain crimes, one state party found it was unable to carry out such investigations on the territory of another. Although the latter country, a CARICOM member state, was also a party to the Convention, it had not enacted the required implementing legislation     

Does electoral fraud spread? The expansion of electoral manipulation in Russia

In this paper, we argue that the occurrence of electoral manipulation in Russia has been driven, in part, by diffusion across neighboring raions through emulation, incentives, and networks. Presumably, in Putin’s Russia all local authorities have some incentives to deliver a high number of votes to United Russia, the “party of power”. However, the perceived pressure to deliver ever higher levels of support for Putin’s party arguably increases considerably if one’s raion is located in a region marked by extraordinarily high turnout and high vote share for United Russia. Conversely, the absence of perceived competition to curry executive favor through delivering votes and networks of uncorrupted local authorities, as well as local opposition organizations working to combat electoral fraud, may help explain the absence of fraud among raions located in regions marked by clean elections. Our quantitative analyses suggest that a “neighborhood effect” – the existence of manipulated raions within a region – strongly influences the likelihood that raions are manipulated. Moreover, although results are more mixed, spatial autocorrelation analysis suggests that turnout levels in raions are influenced by the turnout in proximate raions.     

国家综合配套改革试验区的实践探索与发展趋势

近几年,为适应改革开放新形势的需要,国家推动了综合配套改革试验区建设,赋予其落实科学发展观、体制创新、探索新发展模式、提升区域竞争力以及建设和谐社会的历史使命。从目前已经推行综合配套改革的几个试点城市来看,改革方案的内容及举措均体现出鲜明的时代和区域特色,尤其是与以往经济特区模式相比具有较大的差异。在当前区域竞争日益激烈的情况下,能否利用自己的特色和优势,推进体制创新,掌握改革主动权,将决定一个城市或地区在未来竞争格局中的位置。获准设立国家综合配套改革试验区,对于一个城市或地区来说,无疑相当于获得一次体制创新、再创业和腾飞的机会。这也正是各地在申报建立国家综合配套改革试验区上竞争激烈的原因所在。     

《国际贸易实务》课程实践教学改革初探--以职业技能竞赛为推手

目前,我国对外贸易形势日益严峻,企业对优秀外贸人才的需求也更加迫切。对于高职院校国际贸易实务专业而言,核心课程《国际贸易实务》实践教学改革的效果将直接影响到人才的培养质量。职业技能竞赛,以提高学生的职业岗位实际操作能力水平为目标,对该课程的实践教学改革有着积极的促进作用。     

Not all election winners are equal: Satisfaction with democracy and the nature of the vote

It is well known that individuals who voted for the winning party in an election tend to be more satisfied with democracy than those who did not. However, many winners deviate from their first choice when voting. It is argued in this article that the mechanisms that engender satisfaction operate less forcefully among such winners, thereby lessening the impact of victory on satisfaction. Results show that the gap in satisfaction over electoral losers among these ‘non‐optimal winners’ is, in fact, much smaller than that of ‘optimal winners’, who voted in line with their expressed preferences. A win matters more for those who have a bigger stake in victory. The article further explores how the effect of optimal victory on satisfaction varies across electoral systems.