不完全竞争中的价格信息

完全竞争市场中的人被假定拥有充分的信息和处理信息的能力 ,因此 ,价格被假定只需包含供求均衡与否的信息 ,市场出清只需价格与供求的相互作用就可以实现。现实的市场是不完全竞争的 ,信息变化的偶然性、主体知识的有限性、机会主义与道德风险导致了不完全信息 ,导致了价格信息的非真实性 ,使得价格和供求的相互作用不再能使市场出清。卖主的控价行为等 ,不能消除信息不完全 ,但可减少不完全竞争中的效率损失 ,有助于配合价格机制建设高效率的不完全竞争市场模型     

企业创新技术竞争保护方式的比较与选择

企业创新技术的竞争,实质上是如何运用法律手段或专有手段,保护企业创新技术不被竞争对手所掌握,使其处于市场竞争的优势地位.为了保证企业技术创新者的权益不受到侵犯,就必须理顺创新技术竞争秩序.理顺创新技术秩序,关键在于企业如何选择保护方式,这样才能真正地保护新技术,使之立于竞争的不败之地.     

村民自治推进中存在的问题与对策探讨

村民自治是中国农村基层民主的重要形式。当前在推进村民自治的进程中还存在乡镇政府干部制约村民自治的正常进展、村委会干部的权力难以受到有效制约和村民自治权利的保障与救济不完善等问题。因此,要完善村民自治,首先要从战略高度重视农村文化教育事业,使之成为村民自治的重中之重;其次要完善村民自治的监督机制,保障自治权不被异化,完善村委会选举制度,真正实行民主选举。     

提高中国出口产业竞争力与生产性服务的发展

生产性服务发展的严重滞后是制约我国出口产业整体竞争力提高的一个重要因素。生产性服务对推动产业技术进步、提高产品的技术和知识含量、增加产品附加价值、形成产品差异性以及推动生产国际化、降低国际贸易的交易费用等方面都发挥着重要作用。大力发展生产性服务 ,是“十五”期间增强我国出口产业国际竞争力的重要措施     

Like father,like son? Power and influence across two Gnassingbé presidencies in Togo

In personalized authoritarian systems, the death of a leader poses a serious challenge to regime survival. Togo, however, belongs to a small number of countries in which regime collapse has been avoided by the transfer of power to the deceased ruler’s son. But can the son simply pick up where the father left off? Combining a theoretically guided single case study with statistical network analysis, this article argues that hereditary succession involves both changes and continuities. While Gnassingbé Eyadema’s rule rested on repression, patronage, and a bizarre leadership cult, his son Faure Gnassingbé has partly adapted and reformulated these strategies. The quantitative part of the article is based on a novel data set that contains information on the biographical characteristics and interaction patterns of the deputies in the Togolese parliament. Using exponential random graph models (ERGMs), the article shows that people who have held important positions in the past or belong to the president’s ethnic group still play a significant role in the regime elite. The article not only presents detailed insights on a so far under-researched country, but also contributes to the wider literature by showing how mixed-method designs can further our understanding of authoritarian regimes.     

Electoral violence during party primaries in Kenya

ABSTRACT

Since the restoration of multi-party democracy in Kenya in 1991, elections have witnessed intra-party violence during the primaries for selecting parliamentary and civic seats candidates. This article addresses the question of why electoral violence occurs during party primaries in Kenya and argues that violence is an outcome of the organization of political parties, which has revolved around personalities identified with ethno-regional interests rather than institutionalism. The upshot has been the absence of party institutionalization to establish structures for recruitment of members and organization of primaries. Such organizational weaknesses have denied parties the capacity to match the intense competition for tickets of ethno-regional dominant parties that guarantees nominees to win seats in their strongholds. Intra-party violence has followed. The article submits that intra-party electoral violence in Kenya is a function of the politics of clientelism and ethnicity, both of which have severely hampered the institutionalization of political parties and their capacity to cope with the stiff competition for the tickets of ethno-regional dominant parties.     

Failure of authoritarian learning: explaining Burma/Myanmar’s electoral system

What explains why some authoritarian governments fail to take all the steps they can to preserve their positions of power during democratic transitions? This article examines this question using the example of the leading pro-military party in Myanmar, which lost badly to the National League for Democracy (NLD) in the transitioning elections of 2015. This article argues that a key to understanding how the military failed to perpetuate its power in the electoral sphere resides in its choice of electoral system. In 2010, the military junta chose an electoral system, first-past-the-post, that was distinctly ill-suited to preserve its power. We explore several hypotheses for why this occurred and ultimately conclude that the military and its allies did not understand electoral systems well enough to act strategically and that they overestimated their support relative to the NLD. This failure of authoritarian learning has important implications for understanding authoritarian politics, democratic transitions, and the challenges faced by authoritarian governments seeking to make such transitions.     

Unravelling clientelism in the Zambian electoral campaigns

Based on reports on selected parliamentary by-elections from 2009 to 2015 and two presidential elections in 2011 and 2015 in Zambia, this paper examines the political rhetoric to determine the presence and nature of clientelism in Zambian electoral campaigns. Zambia’s three leading newspapers, The Post, Times of Zambia and Zambia Daily Mail, were searched for reports of electoral campaigns. In total, 605 issues of each of the three newspapers spanning a period of 20 months were used. The paper concludes that a blend of vote buying and turnout buying were more evident in the campaign rhetoric in parliamentary by-elections than the presidential elections. Further, the ruling parties extended their clientelistic rhetoric to include perverse accountability.     

Myanmar’s way to democracy and the limits of the 2015 elections

The general election held on 8 November 2015 marked a significant turning point in Myanmar’s ongoing regime transition. Under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi, the National League for Democracy (NLD) overwhelmingly dominated the polls. Although the huge electoral mandate for the NLD suggests that further political liberalization in Myanmar is likely, the country is not yet undergoing a genuine democratization. Under the current constitutional framework, the military will remain a key actor within the government, thus a new power-sharing arrangement between the NLD and the military is inevitable. This article examines how Myanmar has transformed from a military regime into the military’s version of a ‘disciplined democracy’ and argues that the 2015 general election was not a precursor to a democratic government per se, but rather a re-affirmation of the military’s version of democracy, in which popularly elected civilian political parties are allowed to co-govern the country with the military.     

From the Wembley Conference to the ‘McDonnell Amendment’: Labour's Leadership Nomination Rules

A recent change to the Labour party's nomination rules for leadership elections was the eighth such major modification of this brief clause in the party's rule book since 1981. These changes have provided a barometer of factional conflict over this period and indicate the importance of gate‐keeping powers in leadership selection. This article recounts the history of these eight rule changes. It shows how the proportion of Labour MPs (and later MEPs) required to nominate candidates in leadership elections has oscillated markedly, as the left has tried to reduce it while centrists have sought to increase it. The most recent change in 2017, when the threshold was decreased to 10 per cent of Labour MPs and MEPs, was a victory for the left. The article argues that the changes to Labour's nomination rules, while lower‐key than the extension of voting rights from MPs to ordinary members, have been just as significant.