A Better Press: A Response to John Lloyd's ‘Regulate Yourself’

Writing recently in The Political Quarterly, the journalist John Lloyd took issue with regulatory remedies for ‘bad journalism’ in the United Kingdom that were proposed by the Leveson inquiry of 2011–12 and endorsed by Parliament in 2013 in the form of a Royal Charter. State action will fail, he asserted, because only journalists can change journalism, and he urged British journalists to undertake this transformation. This response argues that Lloyd dismisses the Leveson process too lightly and takes too little account of the many victims of press abuses, who are entitled to better protection. A decent society had to do something about this, and the Leveson Charter process was a measured and constructive response that offers the best hope of higher press standards and of protection for ordinary citizens while safeguarding freedom of expression for journalists. Lloyd's proposal for action by journalists, by contrast, is impractical, not least because it ignores powerful forces preventing journalists from taking control.     

Command without control: The case of China's environmental target system

In the existing literature there is general agreement that the effectiveness and efficiency of command and control instruments versus market‐based instruments is highly context specific. A country's particular regulatory environment and state capacity, as well as the features of given environmental problems, play an important role in ascertaining what the “right” set of policy instruments for environmental management might be. This article examines how command and control instruments are used as an environmental enforcement mechanism in China's authoritarian state. Based on extensive fieldwork, this paper shows that the reliance on binding environmental targets as the main domestic policy instrument in China has generated numerous undesirable consequences. While China's target‐based approach to implementation has incentivized local officials to strictly enforce environmental mandates, there are numerous shortcomings in the system. In particular, target rigidity, cyclical behaviour, poor data quality, and the absence of an independent monitoring agency have generated adverse effects and contribute to a yawning gap between regulatory goals and outcomes. The paper concludes that binding environmental targets as the main command–control instrument in China can be more accurately described as “command without control” as the target‐setting central government does not exercise a high degree of control over implementation and monitoring processes. But command and control instruments can be suited for managing “first‐generation” environmental problems and addressing environmental issues that have easily identifiable pollution sources and which are easy to verify.     

The authoritarian logic of regulatory pluralism: Understanding China's new environmental actors

Over the last decade, Chinese citizens, judges, and prosecutors have started to take action against industrial pollution, pluralizing a regulatory landscape originally occupied by administrative agencies. Regulatory pluralism here has an authoritarian logic, occurring without the retreat of party‐state control. Under such logic, the party‐state both needs and fears new actors for their positive and negative roles in controlling risk and maintaining stability. Consequently, the regime's relation to regulatory pluralism is ambivalent, shifting between support and restriction. This prevents a development of a regulatory society that could bypass the regulatory state. Theoretically, this special edition argues for a subjective definition of regulation in a context of pluralism. Moreover, it finds that regulatory pluralism need not coincide with a decentring of regulation. Finally, it highlights how entry onto the regulatory landscape affects the non‐regulatory roles of new actors, creating unintended consequences for regulatory pluralism.     

Turning defiance into compliance with procedural justice: Understanding reactions to regulatory encounters through motivational posturing

This paper uses Braithwaite's motivational posturing framework to explain how individuals react to encounters with regulatory authorities. Of interest is whether procedural justice can reduce defiance and improve self‐reported compliance among individuals who are either resistant or dismissive of regulatory authority. Using longitudinal survey data collected from tax offenders (Study 1), and individuals who had a recent police‐citizen interaction (Study 2), it will be shown that procedural justice can promote compliance behavior. Procedural justice is also found to be effective for reducing resistant forms of defiance over time, but not dismissive defiance. Further, the results reveal that neither resistant defiance nor dismissive defiance moderate the effect of procedural justice on compliance, suggesting procedural justice works equally well for both low and high resisters and low and high disengagers. Finally, an unexpected result reveals that resistance, but not dismissive defiance, mediates the effect of procedural justice on self‐reported compliance behavior. The findings have implications for procedural justice research and for the regulation of defiance.     

Judicial enforcement deputies: Causes and effects of Chinese judges enforcing environmental administrative decisions

This paper explores how and why Chinese courts became involved in regulating pollution by aiding administrative agencies in executing sanction decisions and collecting pollution levies. It also studies the effects of their regulatory involvement, both in terms of deterrence inferred from available information, as well as the compliance behavior of regulated actors defined as payment of regulatory penalties. It finds that judicial involvement in regulatory enforcement proved to be short‐lived and depended on a particular context at a particular period of time when a regulatory need coincided with administrative and financial judicial needs and particular judges. The paper also finds that court involvement enhanced deterrence in terms of certainty of punishment and to some extent the severity of punishment; however that deterrent effect was undermined by the close relationship between the courts and the regulated entities as fines and levies were almost always negotiated. In effect, deterrence increased the number of compliers paying levies without increasing the depth of compliance in terms of their full payment.     

Regulatory dynamism of environmental mobilization in urban China

In China, urban middle class mobilization against potential pollution risk has become increasingly common. This article examines this phenomenon through a detailed case study of a 2009 anti‐waste incinerator campaign in the Panyu District of Guangzhou, which culminated in a sizeable public protest and government U‐turn. This episode revealed tension between the narrow, state‐centered regulatory model fixated on end‐of‐pipe pollution control, and a much broader decentered approach advocated – and practiced – by project opponents, which incorporated public consultation and much greater emphasis on upstream waste reduction and sorting. In the process, the Panyu campaign progressed beyond a case of “regulation by escalation,” whereby beneficial regulations are belatedly enforced following populist pressure. Instead, it transformed into an open dialogue between a plurality of actors, including citizens, journalists, experts, and officials, about what regulation should constitute and who should determine acceptable levels of risk. By focusing on the processes through which regulatory issues emerged and changed during the Panyu campaign, this article highlights the regulatory dynamism of environmental mobilization in a context of regulatory uncertainty, and campaigns against “locally unwanted land uses” more broadly.     

浅论构建能源竞争性市场的法律路径

中国能源市场面临的首要问题就是需要构建能源竞争性市场,以期为未来实现能源发展的最终目标铺平道路。竞争意味着存在合格的产业组织和多元的产权主体,因此,国有企业需要改革升级,民营企业应当被大力引进能源市场。在政治和经济的博弈中,能源法律制度为这个竞争性市场提供了一把保护伞。     

Ignorance is bliss: self-regulation and Ag-Gag laws in the American meat industry

Abstract

In America, we like to say that we live in a democracy. Yet, it is difficult to believe that the majority would allow current practices to continue if citizens knew how the food animals they eat are treated – both during their short lives and during slaughter. The problem is that the citizens don’t know, and it is not a case of willful blindness. Take a moment to recall what you know about our meat industry. Can’t think of much? That is the goal of the meat industry: out of sight, out of mind. In several states, so called ‘Ag-Gag’ laws are designed to keep the truth from the public. In those states, it is a felony to obtain a job with the intent of being a whistle blower. The meat industry knows that if it were to be exposed, the public would demand better treatment of animals, a demand that would decrease profits for the meat industry. This paper will explain these ‘Ag-Gag’ laws in detail, explore their effect on our society, shed light on the practices that the meat industry tries – very successfully – to hide from voters and consumers, and examine the scary results that can occur when an industry is allowed to regulate itself.     

困境和出路:政府权力清单对行政权行使的规制——以行政法治的形成为视角

政府权力清单提出的目的是规制行政权的行使,其本质上仍然是以规范性文件的形式作为行政权的控制工具。然而政府权力清单的构建,无法协调处理好其所涉及的行政法关系及相应范畴。规制行政权行使的出路在于:对行政权行使进行"软法"上的规制,设立行政法院对行政机关是否违反"软法"进行审查;将政府权力清单定义为具有政府信息公开性、对各项公共权力进行统计的明细单,仅仅是一个"清单"。     

中国城乡结合部土地规制改进的探讨

目前,在土地转性和用途更改集中的城乡结合部,呈现出土地利用的粗放式、低效率、违法违规等问题,表明现有的土地规制政策有其内在缺陷,不能有效地遏制耕地资源的减少。因此,应当从明晰土地产权,完善土地征用的法律制度、程序、管理体制,加强市场机制作用等方面进行城乡结合部土地规制的改进。