简论全国人大及其常委会的表决制度

本文对表决原则、方式、法定人数、计算基准等我国现行的全国人大及其常委会的表决制度进行了分析 ,提出了一些学术上的个人见解。     

The measurement of electoral competition,with application to Indian states

We investigate the measurement of three distinct, but related dimensions of electoral competition in a majoritarian electoral system: contestability in the struggle for governing power; competition among candidates at the constituency level; and competition among existing parties at the level of the legislature. At each step, the analysis is made concrete by calculating our preferred indexes of these dimensions of competitiveness for 14 major Indian states from 1972 to 2009 (and from 1952 in some cases), while comparing them to others that have been widely used, though not always calculated for Indian states. We also use our preferred indexes to study the importance of the level of development for an understanding of how competition has evolved across the states. The paper concludes by posing questions about the measurement of competitiveness, in general and in the Indian case, that arise in the course of our investigation.     

The importance of personal vote intentions for the responsiveness of legislators: A field experiment

Individual legislators can be important agents of political representation. However, this is contingent upon their responsiveness to constituency requests. To study this topic, an increasing number of studies use field experiments in which the researcher sends a standardized email to legislators on behalf of a constituent. In this paper, we report the results of an original field experiment of this genre with the members of the German Bundestag. Supplementing previous research, we explore whether constituency requests in which voters mention a personal vote intention (rather than a partisan vote intention) increase legislators’ responsiveness, and how this treatment relates to electoral system's incentives. We find that legislators treated with a personal vote intention were more likely to respond (67 per cent) and respond faster than those treated with a partisan vote intention (59 per cent). However, we also show that the treatment effect is moderated by electoral system incentives: it is larger for nominally-elected legislators than for those elected via a party list. Our results suggest that electoral system's incentives matter for legislators’ responsiveness only when constituents explicitly signals an intention to cast a personal vote.     

The integration hypothesis: How the European Union shapes economic voting

Whereas economic perceptions influence the national vote in Western European countries, globalization, or international openness, conditions the influence of economic perceptions on that national vote. But how do attitudes toward the EU itself influence the economic vote? After establishing the presence of a national economic vote in Southern Europe (Spain, Italy, Greece and Portugal) we test the hypothesis that heightened perception of European Union economic responsibility reduces the magnitude of the national economic vote coefficient. These tests are carried out on current (2009) survey data, via logistic regression analysis of fully specified voting behavior models, estimated country-by-country and in a data pool. Clearly, the national economic vote diminishes, to the extent the EU is held responsible for the economy.     

The dynamics of issue competence and vote for parties in and out of power: An analysis of valence in Britain, 1979–1997

This article develops the reward‐punishment issue model of voting using a newly collated aggregate measure of issue competence in Britain between 1971 and 1997, revealing systematic differences between governing and opposition parties in the way citizens' evaluations of party competence are related to vote intention. Using monthly Gallup ‘best party to handle the most important problem’ and vote intention data, time series Granger‐causation tests give support to a classic issue reward‐punishment model for incumbents. However, for opposition parties this reward‐punishment model does not hold: macro‐issue competence evaluations are Granger‐caused by changes in vote choice or governing party competence. An explanation is offered based upon the differentiating role of policy performance and informational asymmetries, and the implications are considered for comparative studies of voting, public opinion and for political party competition.     

A deterrent to diversity: The conditional effect of electoral rules on the nomination of women candidates

Previous literature regarding the effects of electoral systems on candidate selection has implied a false dichotomy regarding proportional representation (PR) versus single member districts (SMD). This paper unpacks the category of proportional representation, and finds significant differences in the behavior of selectorates depending on their configuration of PR. Using both a natural experiment as well as an original data set comprised of 1095 party lists, I find that the type of proportional representation – i.e., whether or not the voters are allowed to pick a particular candidate from the party list – can have a significant effect on the number of women candidates selected to run for office. Further, I find that the strength of this effect depends on cultural gender norms; if a substantial segment of society believes that women are best in traditional roles, not as leaders, there is a significant, negative effect of the decisive intraparty preference vote on the nomination of women candidates.     

Voting at 16: Turnout and the quality of vote choice

Critics of giving citizens under 18 the right to vote argue that such teenagers lack the ability and motivation to participate effectively in elections. If this argument is true, lowering the voting age would have negative consequences for the quality of democracy. We test the argument using survey data from Austria, the only European country with a voting age of 16 in nation-wide elections. While the turnout levels of young people under 18 are relatively low, their failure to vote cannot be explained by a lower ability or motivation to participate. In addition, the quality of these citizens' choices is similar to that of older voters, so they do cast votes in ways that enable their interests to be represented equally well. These results are encouraging for supporters of a lower voting age.     

Voter preferences and party loyalty under cumulative voting: Political behaviour after electoral reform in Bremen and Hamburg

Many electoral systems constrain voters to one or two votes at election time. Reformers often see this as a failing because voters' preferences are both broader and more varied than the number of choices allowed. New electoral systems therefore often permit more preferences to be expressed. In this paper we examine what happens when cumulative voting is introduced in two German states. Even when we allow for tactical considerations, we find that the principle of unconstrained choice is not widely embraced by voters, although in practice, too, many seem to have preferences for more than just one party. This finding has implications for arguments relating to electoral reform as well as how to conceive of party affiliations in multi-party systems.     

The majority vote rule and runoff primaries in the United States

The major parties in the United States use primary elections to select party candidates for general elections. While most employ a simple plurality vote rule for this purpose, some states, primarily southern, employ a majority rule that requires a runoff between the top two vote recipients if no candidate receives a majority in the initial primary. Data on primaries for state Governor and U.S. Senator from 1980 to 2002 are used to examine contemporary concerns about runoffs. Included in the findings are (1) the problem that majority runoffs address – candidates being selected based on low levels of voter support is not a frequent outcome under the plurality rule; (2) the vast majority of selections is based on a majority of votes in a primary, regardless of whether a simple plurality or majority is required; and (3) runoff primaries are necessary in roughly one-third of the contested primaries held in the majority vote context, and in about one-third of them the primary leader loses the runoff.     

国际金融组织投票权分配制度探析

国际金融组织的投票权分配制度是一种基本投票权和加权投票权相结合的加权表决制度,它存在许多问题.应当赋予发展中国家更多的投票权;增加基本票在总投票权中的比重;采用集团投票制;各组织有独立的份额分配公式,选择合理的参数和权重,改进GDP的计算方法.