独立学院学习困难学生的成因及对策

独立学院学习困难学生的教育工作关系到学校的和谐稳定和发展,也关系到家庭和学生个人的前途。独立学院学习困难学生基本有5种类型,文章从主观和客观两个方面分析了此类学生学习困难的主要原因,提出了从点和面的层面所要采取的措施和对策。     

区域知识产权自主创新能力与潜力研究——以河北省为例

区域知识产权自主创新是国家知识产权战略的重要组成部分,但目前我国区域知识产权创新还存在着数量少、质量低、创新效率不高等问题。本文以河北省为例,分析了问题的主要原因在于知识产权创新体系不完善,创新意识淡薄,创新激励机制不完善,高层次创新人才不足,创新经费投入强度较低,创新平台的规模、结构不合理等六个方面。提高我国区域知识产权自主创新能力需要营造良好的知识产权创新社会文化环境,建立健全知识产权工作体系,培养和吸引高层次人才,拓宽融资渠道,建设并优化创新平台。     

浅析独立学院学生社团的管理

高校学生社团是高校校园文化的重要载体，对广大学生知识、技能、能力的塑造和思想道德的培养起到越来越重要的作用。独立学院学生社团受其自身性质影响，不能简单照搬普通本科高校的社团管理方式，而需要特殊的引导和管理方式，才能确保其健康发展。分析和思考独立学院学生社团的管理方式，有利于探索独立学院社团组织和建设的有效途径。     

国际货运代理独立经营人身份相关问题探讨——兼谈对商务部1998年《〈国际货物运输代理业管理规定〉实施细则》的修改意见

以货运代理业务及多式联运业务发展的情况为基础,从独立经营人的内涵出发,对独立经营人、多式联运经营人与无船承运人之间的关系进行分析,认为上述主体之间既有区别又有联系,但不是完全等同的概念,不能完全替代。建议商务部在修订1998年《<国际货物运输代理业管理规定>实施细则》时,应摒弃"独立经营人"的概念及相关规定。     

Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil

Governments face a fundamental tradeoff between regulatory independence and control. Attempts of interference have the effect of reducing the system's level of commitment and credibility. On the other hand, an administration runs the risk that the autonomy delegated to regulators might be used to pursue outcomes that may harm their interests. This tradeoff is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new political elite with different preferences. This paper uses data from a 2016 survey on regulatory governance applied to Brazilian regulatory agencies. This data is compared to a similar survey performed in 2005. The new survey results turn out to be surprisingly similar to those of a decade earlier, suggesting strong resilience of regulatory agencies despite significant attempts at political interference by powerful presidents. The factors explaining the resilience of regulatory governance in Brazil lie in its broader institutional endowment, which moderates the effects of executive interference.     

Coordinating intermediaries: The prospects and limitations of professional associations in decentralized regulation

A key question in understanding regulation through independent intermediaries is the extent to which intermediary actions are either coordinated, thereby supporting consistency in regulatory application, or uncoordinated, leading to monitoring and enforcement disparities. This paper examines professional associations as one mechanism by which policy action may be coordinated in decentralized arrangements. Professional associations provide means and venues for members to interact, offer training and education that develops shared understanding of policy directives, are collective representation bodies for professional members, and may play an important role in establishing and enforcing collective standards for appropriate behavior. We examine these functions in the decentralized administration of United States organic food certification, focusing on two relevant professional associations – the Accredited Certifiers Association and the International Organic Inspectors Association. Drawing on multiple methods, including interviews and survey data, our findings indicate that professional organic certification associations provide valuable education and training, disseminate information, and facilitate knowledge sharing among administrative entities and with regulatory authorities. We conclude with a discussion of the prospects and limitations of professional associations for third‐party regulation, and how accounting for professional association functions can improve our understanding of regulatory intermediary coordination and conduct.     

Opaque transparency: How material affordances shape intermediary work

How do the material aspects of intermediary work affect regulators, targets, and beneficiaries? To shed light on this question, we studied an information intermediary in the form of a website and the organizations who founded it. Specifically, we analyzed FracFocus, a self‐regulatory initiative with strong industry ties, charged with disclosing data pertaining to the chemicals used in oil and gas wells completed using hydraulic fracturing technology (fracking) in the United States and Canada. We found that between 2010 and mid‐2017, the vast majority of legislation in states and provinces where fracking actively occurred was updated to mandate or encourage disclosure via FracFocus, meaning that it had a considerable effect on the trajectory of official regulation on fracking disclosure. We also found that FracFocus disclosed important data but did so in a manner that limited accessibility and reduced the comprehensibility of environmental and public health risks to beneficiaries. Our analysis suggests that the public's experience of such a device is one of opaque transparency, in which the line between official and non‐official regulation is blurred. We traced these outcomes to the material affordances created by FracFocus.     

市场型金融创新法律监管路径的反思与超越

市场型金融创新凸显了规范与现实之间的冲突。无论是选择性监管路径,还是规则扩张式监管路径,抑或是以监管沙箱为代表的实验式监管路径,都不能很好地解决该冲突。以上三种路径,都是在“术”的层面上展开。为了超越以上三种路径,我国应在“道”的层面上进行理念与制度完善,即我国需要完善金融法治基础,建构金融法治哲学,制定《金融法典》或《金融法总则》,创新金融法的更新机制,创建市场型金融创新合法性裁定制度,完善市场型金融创新的法律责任,以便进一步提升我国对市场型金融创新监管的法治化水平。     

The regulatory state in developing countries: Redistribution and regulatory failure in Brazil

Following the traditional doctrine of the “regulatory state”, regulatory agencies should be given very focused mandates and stay away from the politicized realm of distributive policies and decisions. An opposing perspective would state that if regulatory agencies can contribute to economic redistribution, positive results such as network expansion, economies of scale, and fiscal efficiency will ultimately lead to lower levels of regulatory failure. This article tests whether, in countries of high socio-economic inequality, such as Brazil, the active incorporation of distributive considerations by regulatory agencies leads to lower levels of failure. Through the analysis of the activities of seven Brazilian network regulatory agencies, the article develops theory-driven expectations and tests these expectations using crisp set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA). It concludes that not prioritizing redistribution is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for regulatory agencies' failure. In most types of failure, a lack of priority to redistribution leads to failure when combined with low regulatory capacity and low levels of competence.     

Discovering the Dark Side of Power: The Principal’s Moral Hazard in Political-Bureaucratic Relations

Principal agent (PA) is among the most prominent concepts for analyzing the relationship between politics and bureaucracy. Nonethelesss, the inherent bias of PA scholars to attribute moral hazard almost exclusively to the agent, usually referred to as “bureaucratic drift”, requires re-examination. Building on the spare literature in which moral hazard of the principal is considered, this paper provides empirical evidence for a neglected aspect of the PA concept. Three cases of German regulatory agencies responsible for drug control, financial services and rail safety are analyzed in critical situations which were largely perceived as bureaucratic failures. The analysis reveals that a good deal of these failures, ranging from negligence to suppressing crucial information, has to be attributed to the political principal. This is called the dark side of power because the intention is to shift blame or to dodge political responsibility. Turning conventional PA reasoning upside down, the conclusion is that the principal’s moral hazard should be considered more routinely as a potential explanation for political-bureaucratic interactions.