A Resurgent Presidency? Portuguese Semi-Presidentialism and the 2016 Elections

This article analyses the Portuguese presidential elections of January 2016, setting these within the backdrop of recent semi-presidential practice in Portugal. The election took place in the context of an apparent hollowing of the presidency, a pattern that potentially reflects the bailout that marked most of the second term of the outgoing president, Cavaco Silva. This pattern also helps explain the second-order nature of this presidential election. Despite potentially being an ‘open’ election – in that the incumbent had reached term limits – the election was characterised by low citizen mobilisation, low partisan involvement and low competitiveness. The initial two months of the newly elected president, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, suggests he is seeking to invert this hollowing pattern by mobilising popular support behind the presidency.     

Thailand’s urbanized villagers and political polarization

Thailand currently suffers from high levels of political polarization; parties associated with former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra have won every election since 2001, based partly on strong support from voters registered in the populous North and Northeast regions. Many of these voters are migrant workers who spend much of their time working in Greater Bangkok, yet remain legal residents of their home provinces. This article argues that Thailand’s political polarization could be reduced if many of these “urbanized villagers” either took up formal residence in the capital city, or were encouraged to share in the creation of new small-scale urban communities in their places of birth.     

城市生活垃圾堆肥处理技术发展方向探讨

结合多年来在生活垃圾管理特别是堆肥厂的日常运行管理方面的经验,总结了目前我国生活垃圾堆肥处理技术应用现状和堆肥厂实际运行过程中存在的问题,并对今后堆肥技术的发展提出几点看法.综合评价垃圾堆肥技术、给予垃圾堆肥技术正确定位、选择合理堆肥工艺、充分发挥垃圾堆肥的优势、提高堆肥质量和开拓堆肥产品市场是今后垃圾堆肥技术发展的关键因素.     

Executive Particularism and Ministerial Selection in India

Why do political parties in parliamentary systems undertake actions, such as joining a coalition government, that will entail significant costs for their members in subsequent elections? Recent research points to the incentive structures faced by differentially positioned members of a parliamentary party: unlike backbenchers, MPs who hold a ministerial portfolio can use the prerequisites of executive office to shield themselves from the costs of governance. This article tests the theory of executive particularism by examining the electoral fortunes of government ministers in India. Sitting government ministers are found to outperform other candidates; however, tests of causality fail to demonstrate that holding a ministerial portfolio causes this electoral benefit. Instead, it appears that a candidate’s electoral performance enhances the likelihood of being granted a ministerial portfolio in the first place. This finding raises questions about the generalizability of claims that party elites can use ministerial office to shield themselves from the costs of governing.     

Change—and Scepticism—as a Constant: Anthony King on Parties and Party Systems

Tony King had a healthy disrespect for conventional wisdom but a deep appreciation for common sense. Drawing on an eclectic mix of sources, both qualitative and quantitative, he wore his learning lightly, the better to highlight and explain to academic and non‐academic audiences how shifts in society and public opinion drove change inside parties and in the party systems in which they operated. King asked great questions and provided answers that simultaneously captured complexity and the big picture. His provocative interpretations and analysis were always stimulating—and many of them proved highly prescient.     

Competing loyalties in electoral reform: An analysis of the U.S. electoral college

A central tenet in the electoral systems subfield is that parties, when in power and motivated by partisan interest, seek desired outcomes via the strategic adoption of electoral rules. Such a focus, however, omits a key point: electoral rules also distribute power among geographic units. If, within a party, the partisan and geographic interests of some members conflict, then the canonical relationship between partisanship and rule choice may be conditional. The U.S. electoral college provides an opportunity to test for such intra-party variation, because it advantages some states over others and thus makes salient geographic allegiances. Using an original dataset on one reform proposal—the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC)—I find evidence of competing loyalties. Although NPVIC advances furthest when Democrats control state lawmaking, a state's status as a swing—but not as an overrepresented—state weakens the relationship to the point where even Democrats are unlikely to aid NPVIC.     

Symposium on “The nationalization of electoral politics: Frontiers of research”

This editorial introduces the theme of the symposium which addresses the most recent advances in the field of the nationalization of electoral politics. After a decade of an increasing number of contribution in this field, the symposium takes stock of the diversity of applications of nationalization studies, the progress in data collection, and its innovative methods in designs including it as both a dependent and independent variable and analyzing it both for legislative and presidential elections. The editorial reviews the growth and diversification of the literature over time and illustrates in what directions it has evolved mapping out an increasingly rich and complex theory. It links the articles of the symposium to this evolution of the literature and discusses their innovative character.     

The autocratic mandate: elections,legitimacy and regime stability in Singapore

This paper explains how authoritarian regimes employ flawed elections to obtain both short-term legitimacy and long-term stability. In conjunction with the use of co-optation and repression, it argues that ruling parties hold de jure competitive elections to claim what is termed autonomous legitimation. This denotes the feigning of conformity to the established rules of the constitution and the shared beliefs of citizens. Regardless of overall turnout and support, ruling parties exploit the normative and symbolic value of elections in order to establish moral grounds for compliance within a dominant-subordinate relationship. In support of this argument, the case of Singapore's People's Action Party (PAP) is analysed in historical and contemporary terms. Since 1959, the PAP has used precisely timed elections to extract one or more mandate types from citizens and, by extension, claim legitimacy. In particular, it has sort a mandate based on its response to an event, execution of a policy and/or collection of a reward. In the long run, autocratic stability has been achieved through a process of reciprocal reinforcement, which has combined autonomous legitimation with targeted co-optation and low intensity coercion. The paper concludes by addressing the generalisability of this finding for other authoritarian regimes in Southeast Asia.     

What Makes Terrorism Salient? Terrorist Strategies,Political Competition,and Public Opinion

This article analyzes the determinants of terrorism saliency in public opinion. It is usually assumed that after a terrorist attack, terrorism becomes automatically salient. However, this assumption is only true in those countries where terrorist attacks are exceptional events. In democracies that have suffered domestic terrorism for decades, the evolution of terrorism saliency does not only depend on the frequency or intensity of terrorist attacks. In this article it is claimed that the tactics carried out by terrorist groups (the type of victim, especially) and the dynamics of political competition (especially the ideology of the incumbent) are also factors that explain the evolution of terrorism saliency. The article also analyzes how these two factors interact with citizens’ predispositions to explain variation in their reactions to terrorist threat. The empirical test relies on a novel database from monthly public opinion surveys in Spain from 1993 to 2012.     

The territoriality of personalization: New avenues for decentralized personalization in multi-level Western Europe

In light of the increasing scholarly attention to the concept of decentralized personalization, this paper argues that the territoriality (the level of government to which an MP belongs) of an MP would also lead to variations in that MP’s incentive to personalize their campaigns. Using data from the PARTIREP Comparative MP survey, this paper tests the role of the territoriality of an MP in their incentive to personalize their campaigns across nine multi-level countries in Western Europe. Although the level of personalization of campaigns does differ according to territoriality, the underlying explanatory variables do not behave uniformly across territoriality. This paper thus draws attention to the rarely explored role of territory, and the complications it may bring to the explanation of the personalization of politics.