Does multiple office-holding generate an electoral bonus? Evidence from Belgian national and local elections

Traditionally, scholars have assumed that multiple office-holding (i.e. the combination of a local and national directly elected political mandate) leads to an enhanced electoral performance. Although the prospect of electoral benefits for such a mandate combination seems plausible, it remains unclear whether accumulating a national and local mandate does indeed provide an additional boost compared to holding either one prior to the election. Previous studies have only offered limited support for this assumption. For instance, they have focused exclusively on French national elections. This article, however, scrutinises whether dual mandate-holding pays off individually, for the candidate, as well as collectively, for the list as a whole in both Belgian national and local elections. The results here strongly suggest that cumul des mandats does not yield an additional electoral reward compared to single office-holders, contradicting both theoretical presumptions and normative beliefs.     

运用电子政务推进市县政府集中办公

在能源日益匮乏的今天,建设节约型机关、降低能源消耗、提高政府工作效率,已经成为政府部门亟待解决的问题。电子政务在政府办公自动化、公民服务电子化、行政决策电子化等方面有助于节约政府开支,推进节约型机关建设;而市县政府集中办公可以通过精简和优化机构和人员、缩减财政开支、提升公共服务质量等推进节约型机关建设。因此,发展电子政务和推进市县集中办公是地方政府改革和建设节约型机关的重要方向和途径。     

市政公用事业反垄断规制的对策

市政公用事业对于人民生活水平的提高和现代城市的建设,有着十分重要的作用。由于技术上和观念上的原因,人们普遍认为市政公用事业必然由政府来建立和经营,而这易于形成垄断。随着时间的推移,政府经营市政公用事业的弊端也愈来愈显现。因此,市政公用事业的反垄断规制势在必行。     

Effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout

We study the effects of municipal mergers on voter turnout in a difference-in-differences framework, using data from a wave of municipal mergers in Finland in 2009. Analysing two pre-merger elections and three post-merger elections, spanning a total of 17 years, we find that municipal mergers decrease voter turnout by 4 percentage points in the long run in the relatively small municipalities compared to similar small municipalities that did not merge. As the average turnout rate prior to merging in this group was around 69%, this is a substantial effect. We also find that virtually nothing happens to turnout in the municipalities that were relatively large within their merger. Furthermore, mergers are associated with a decrease in voters’ political efficacy and turnout decreases more in those municipalities that experience larger decreases in efficacy.     

How to Make Using Two-Way Mechanisms Routine: Testing a Preliminary Model

ABSTRACT

Consistent or continuous use of two-way engagement mechanisms is key to effective citizen participation. This article examines how to make the municipal manager’s use of two-way engagement mechanisms more consistent when they prepare local budgets. To test the model, self-administered mail surveys were compiled from two American states—New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The findings address the role of individual intentionality. The municipal manager’s attitudinal willingness, his perceived ease or difficulty, the trust she receives from elected officials, and the capacity to coordinate effectively are significantly related to his consistent use of two-way engagement mechanisms. However, district representatives and pressures channeled through media scrutiny are not able to compel a municipal manager to routine use of such mechanisms.     

Municipal Leadership of Climate Adaptation Negotiations: Effective Tools and Strategies in Houston and Fort Lauderdale

Negotiation analysis of climate change–related issues has largely focused on public dispute resolution mechanisms that are typically applied in the face of specific environmental crises, or on multiparty diplomacy relating to international climate agreements. Mayors and other municipal leaders, however, are increasingly taking steps to negotiate urban planning efforts with stakeholders to implement policies for managing the intensifying impact of climate change. In this article, we analyze negotiations in Houston, Texas, and Fort Lauderdale, Florida, to identify which methods municipal leaders employed to conduct negotiations to implement climate adaptation policies and also consider whether those methods were effective. The two cities present two differing city management structures: Houston has a strong mayor‐driven system, while Fort Lauderdale uses a city commission and city manager system. In this article, we examine the barriers that leaders must overcome and consider their options for negotiating lasting agreements.     

Fiscal institutions of Brazilian municipal borrowing

In an effort to understand subnational borrowing, this article explores how three Brazilian institutions—the 1988 Constitution which mandates revenue and expenditure assignments among the levels of the federation; the national Law of Fiscal Responsibility, which imposes expenditure and debt limitations on all levels and branches of government; and various borrowing arrangements—affect the municipal borrowing environment. These institutions are examined in light of de Mello's (2001) policy recommendations for strengthening efficiency and fiscal discipline in subnational borrowing. The institutions of Brazilian borrowing were found to have some of de Mello's recommendations, with the new Constitution and the Law of Fiscal Responsibility making progress towards increased fiscal responsibility, but the current borrowing arrangements serving to maintain a controlled system that is not conducive to responsible municipal borrowing. Several recommendations are made to improve the borrowing environment and foster fiscal discipline and efficiency Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

美国联邦侵权法于警察不法行为之应用

本文讨论了依据美国联邦1983条款对警察提起民事诉讼的框架.其中围绕着<1871年民权法案>的"以法律名义行使"、达到宪法水平和侵犯宪法权利及其他1983条款规定的责任的构成要素展开讨论,同时介绍了警察面对诉讼时可使用的抗辨事由.     

Jurisdiction size and local government effectiveness: Assessing the effects of municipal amalgamations on performance

The optimal jurisdiction size has been debated since Plato and Aristotle. A large literature has studied economic and democratic scale effects, but we have almost no knowledge of the effects of jurisdiction size on the effectiveness of local services. This is due to two methodological problems. First, selection bias and reverse causality often render change in jurisdiction size an endogenous variable. Second, there is a lack of empirical indicators of effectiveness, and most studies therefore focus on spending measures. Extant research thus studies economies of scale, leaving effectiveness of scale unexamined. We address both problems in a quasi-experimental study of public schools. Our findings from the school area indicate that jurisdiction size does not have systematic effects on effectiveness. Our analysis therefore supports recent studies of economic and democratic scale effects that indicate that the search for the optimal jurisdiction size is futile.