论声纹鉴定意见的表述形式

本文针对目前国内外讨论比较热烈的声纹鉴定意见表述问题进行了评述.首先介绍了实践中正在使用的听觉分析法、声谱比对分析法、声学分析法、听觉-声学分析法和说话人自动识别五种鉴定方法,指出了各种方法的优缺点;然后对现存的二元判决、可能性等级、似然比和英国立场声明四种鉴定意见表述形式进行了介绍和评析,通过分析发现,上述四种意见表述形式都存在一定的问题,实践中选择何种形式表述鉴定意见要综合考虑其科学性、逻辑性、现实性和可行性等多种价值选项;最后认为解决该问题的根本方法是各相关领域的专家应加强在鉴定方法上的合作性的基础研究.     

Australian opinion on international trade and the security link with the United States

In recent years, the Australian government has shifted the focus of its foreign economic and trade policies away from traditional practices and partners and onto Asia while simultaneously maintaining close diplomatic and defence ties with Washington. Using the results of the 1993 Australian Election Study survey, this note examines the place of public opinion in this continuing exercise. We find that although there is public support for increased trade with Asia, strong protectionist and pro‐alliance sentiments remain strong within the populace at large. These prevailing sentiments and their, albeit at this stage limited, interconnections could serve to complicate any push towards greater trade ties with its Asian neighbours.     

Focus Group Follies?

Abstract

Media coverage of the contemporary British Labour party routinely suggests party leaders, notably Tony Blair, have been overly reliant on using focus group as a means of obtaining voter feedback. The paper explores this popular understanding by considering how and when qualitative forms of opinion research began to play a significant role in developing campaign strategy. Following their incorporation into party planning during the mid-1980s, focus groups provided an increasingly influential (and at the time more discreet) source of data and support for the leadership's Policy Review later that decade. Following the 1992 election defeat selective findings from the party's qualitative research programme became integral to the public relations' initiatives of Labour's self-styled “modernisers,” particularly in their largely successful attempt to delegitimise and then marginalise the role of the party's once formidable affiliated union supporters in internal affairs. Crucially this contributed to a climate that enabled the key moderniser Tony Blair to emerge and win the leadership.     

以公关机制破解舆论对司法的负面影响

舆论对司法公正的影响已经成为当今社会共同关注的问题。在我国,部分公众对司法不信任、不依赖、不服从。公众通过发达的大众传媒冲击司法,甚至左右司法,致使司法公信力降低,司法信任危机加重。公关技术具有化解矛盾、增强互信的效能。把公关机制引入司法领域,建立舆情感知与分析制度,重塑司法品牌,可成为破解当前司法困境的有效途径。     

基于熵理论的网络舆情系统分析

网络舆情系统是通过自组织使各子系统协同作用从而使系统演化为具有一定有序程度的耗散结构.网络舆情系统熵变揭示了舆情的演变过程,构成舆情系统的四个因素（噪音）决定了熵值大小,也即系统的有序度.因此我们在舆情导控上不但要把握好处理的时间点,同时也要把握好处理的关键点.     

When governments ignore public opinion in foreign policy: Poland and the Iraq invasion

This article asks why the Government of Poland participated in the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 when a large majority of the Polish public was opposed to national involvement in Iraq. The aim is to further an understanding of the circumstances under which democratic governments ignore public opinion in their foreign policy decision-making. The article argues that a combination of three circumstances increased the willingness of the government to ignore the public. First, the Iraq issue had relatively low salience among the Polish voters, which decreased the domestic political risks of pursuing the policy. Second, the government's Iraq policy was supported by a considerable consensus among the political elite. Third, the political elites were unified in their perceptions that participating in the invasion would yield essential international gains for Poland.     

论国际舆论对国际法的影响——兼析对解决东海南海岛屿争端的启示

国际舆论作为国际社会一股重要的力量,不仅有其区别于一般舆论的特性,而且通过与人类核心价值观念、国际法渊源和国际争端解决的联系,对国际法产生了全面而深刻的影响。国际舆论与国际法相互影响,并对国际争端的解决产生巨大作用。随着东海南海岛屿争端的加剧,诉诸国际法成为解决争议的最好办法。但单纯依靠法律方法解决争端仍然具有一定的局限性,而在国际法框架内充分调动国际舆论的积极因素,不失为解决此类岛屿争端的明智选择。在中菲南海仲裁案中,中方应重视对于国际舆论主导权的争夺。     

Colloquy: Political Communication Scholarship in France

Undoubtedly, framing political issues is an effective means of influencing the distribution of opinion. But while most studies have shown the effectiveness of alternative issue frames on opinion, they largely ignore the role of the messenger. Our research examines whether message content or messengers are more important in influencing opinion. Four experimental conditions and a control were embedded in a statewide survey, allowing an explicit comparison between the impact of frames comprising message content alone and the same frames attributed to public figures identified with physician-assisted suicide. Results show that an attributed source is no more effective than content alone in influencing opinion on physician-assisted suicide and that the messenger might in fact reduce the intended influence of the message. We conclude with a discussion of our findings within the larger literature on political persuasion and attitude change.     

Introduction: Great Underappreciated Works Deserving of Renewed Attention

Although news is a social construction that narrates events in the world by assimilating them to existing cultural categories, there are many cultural categories from which to choose. How do journalists determine whether an event calls for a melodramatic frame or an ironic frame or some other narrative convention? Reviewing two recent studies—of news coverage of 9/11 and news coverage in the early 1990s of an accidental killing of a Japanese exchange student in New Orleans—this article argues that the character of “the events themselves” helps limit what narrative frames journalists select.     

Soviet propaganda and the neutron bomb decision

Abstract

In July 1977, newly elected President Jimmy Carter suddenly found himself confronted with a difficult neutron bomb decision. With a narrow victory in Congress, pro neutron‐bomb forces had successfully presented the President with the authority to proceed with production. Unfortunately, as the months passed, Carter failed to move swiftly with production of the neutron warheads which many NATO alliance members saw as a much needed deterrent to the Warsaw PACT'S massive armor superiority.

Confronted with mounting international and domestic opposition to the neutron weapon, Jimmy Carter, in the fall of 1977, insisted that the NATO allies officially support American production of the warheads before the United States would produce it. Spurred on by Carter's indecision and by certain NATO members’ reluctance to officially support the weapon, the Soviet Union shifted its propaganda machine into high gear in a massive effort to sway international opinion against the weapon.

During the first few months of 1978, Western Europe saw a flood of protests against this so‐called “inhumane” weapon. Domestic communist and left‐wing socialist opposition to the neutron bomb precipitated a precarious right‐left split within many Western European socialist parties. Nowhere was this split more graphically illustrated than within the ruling West German Social Democratic Party (SPD). Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and his moderate technocrats basically favored the neutron bomb, but feared crippling left‐wing SPD opposition and possible defections if West Germany complied with American demands to break with over 30 years of U.S.‐West German nuclear precedent and agree officially to American production of a nuclear weapon, the neutron bomb.

Only after much American cajoling did the allies move toward official NATO support for production. Carter had failed to understand the disastrous political implications which left‐wing opposition had created within the NATO countries and refused to let Schmidt and other leaders off the hook. And then in an amazing move, after Schmidt and the NATO allies had risked political ruin to reach an agreement to support the neutron bomb, President Carter pulled the rug from under them on April 7,1978, when he indefinitely delayed a decision on the weapon.

With this decision, Carter had set a dangerous precedent by yielding to Soviet pressure and had missed an opportunity to win the favor of skeptical NATO allies and critics who asserted he was too weak and indecisive. But above all, Carter had unnecessarily alienated and angered NATO leaders like Schmidt who risked possible political ruin by supporting the neutron bomb.