PUNITIVE SENTIMENT

Scholarship has long noted the importance of understanding the changes that occur over time in aggregate public support for punitive criminal justice policies. Yet, the lack of a reliable and valid measure of this concept limits our understanding of this aspect of the criminal justice system. This research develops a measure of public support for punitive policies from 1951 to 2006 using 242 administrations of 24 unique survey indicators. It argues that punitive sentiment is politically constructed via frames focusing on the permissiveness of the criminal justice system. Punitive sentiment is estimated with an error‐correction model showing both the short‐ and long‐term relationships between punitive sentiment and presidential framing of crime, public dissatisfaction with social welfare policies, and perceptions of racial integration. The results highlight the complex dynamics responsible for the change over time in punitive sentiment as well as the possibilities of obtaining public support for alternative solutions to crime.     

Public Opinion and Military Intervention: Afghanistan,Iraq and Libya

Britain has participated in several military interventions of varying duration, extent and political controversy in recent years. This article analyses public opinion towards the most recent intervention in Libya in 2011, looking at three different aspects of the topic. First, it examines differences in cross‐national attitudes towards military action in Libya amongst NATO countries. Secondly, it then looks in detail at which social groups were more or less likely to approve of British involvement, comparing this with group attitudes towards Britain's role in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thirdly, it assesses how public opinion shifted during the course of the action in Libya, looking at three key indicators of the popular mood: whether Britain was right or wrong to take military action; how well the war is going; and assessments of David Cameron's handling of the conflict. Broader reflections are then made about public opinion towards British involvement in future military action.     

The Dynamics of Stereotyping: Is a New Image of the Terrorist Evolving in American Popular Culture?

This article considers popular ways of representing terror activists, and the metamorphoses that approaches to representation in the American media have undergone. A part of the article deals with terrorism in the media over time, common stereotypes, and how they affect the representation of Arabs and Muslims. The article then discusses Sleeper Cell (2005), a mini-series which focuses on a Jihad terror group. The article addresses questions including: How are Arabs and non-Arab Muslims portrayed in the series? Can a real change be observed over time in the method of portraying them? Twentieth-century historical considerations precede the pointed topical discussion.     

The first initiatives

The Greek election of May 2012 failed to produce a government, resulting in repeat elections six weeks later. This shock outcome was a symptom of a broader delegitimation of the national political system. Over the past decade Eurobarometer data show a much more extensive loss of confidence in political institutions in Greece than in the European Union as a whole. In a first phase, rising political discontent was managed within the traditional political framework through alternation in power between the two major parties. In contrast, the second phase, following the outbreak of the Greek sovereign debt crisis, led to the dramatic fragmentation of the party system and changed the mode of government formation. This process is not reversible and entails serious democratic dangers.     

Why did Thailand's middle class turn against a democratically elected government? The information-gap hypothesis

In 2006, Bangkok's middle-class residents overwhelmingly supported the military coup that displaced the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. Survey research shows that opponents of Thaksin had a stronger commitment to liberal democracy and possibly to royalist values while rural voters supported Thaksin because he fulfilled their social demands. Opposition to Thaksin was not motivated by economic interests, but rather, there is some evidence that urban middle- and upper-class voters disliked Thaksin because they heard negative reporting about him, which were less available in the countryside. These findings are compatible with a new theory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes have the means that would enable and encourage them to pay sufficient attention to politics to discover that what they viewed as ‘good government’ was violated by the ruling party, which could have led to demands for more democracy historically. More recently, however, in Thailand and perhaps other instances in Southeast Asia and Latin America, those with the money and leisure to follow politics closely have heard reports about the ‘bad government’ of populist, democratically elected leaders, and thus have turned against them.     

论公安机关应对网络流行语的舆情引导策略

网络流行语往往与社会重大公共事件相伴相生,折射出深刻的社会背景,一定程度地反映了我国社会转型期人们的心理状况,对网络舆论的走向起着推波助澜的作用。网络流行语具有触发性、速成性、反讽性、易煽动性和短暂性等特征,具有正负两方面的社会效应。公安机关作为代表国家行使公安职权和履行公安职责的国家机关,应积极关注网络流行语的动态,把握网络流行语的形成特点及产生发展规律,切实转变工作方式,畅通公众沟通渠道,坚持公平、公正、公开原则,正确引导网络舆论。     

Representation,agendas and institutions

Dynamic agenda representation can be understood through the transmission of the priorities of the public onto the policy priorities of government. The pattern of representation in policy agendas is mediated through institutions due to friction (i.e., organisational and cognitive costs imposed on change) in decision making and variation in the scarcity of policy makers' attention. This article builds on extant studies of the correspondence between public priorities and the policy activities of government, undertaking time‐series analyses using data for the United States and the United Kingdom, from 1951 to 2003, relating to executive speeches, laws and budgets in combination with data on public opinion about the ‘most important problem’. The results show that the responsiveness of policy agendas to public priorities is greater when institutions are subject to less friction (i.e., executive speeches subject to few formal rules and involving a limited number of actors) and declines as friction against policy change increases (i.e., laws and budgets subject to a greater number of veto points and political interests/coalitions).     

媒体与司法之间的良性互动

舆论监督对司法独立的影响分为两步：一是新闻媒体通过报道或是对案件的评价让公众了解案件的前因后果;二是公众依据所收到的报道对这类事件产生看法和意见。在这两个阶段中,媒体不仅扮演着媒介的角色,也扮演着＂引导者＂的角色。在媒体的＂引导＂下,公众的情绪就构成社会舆论,它会直接影响执法者对案件的审判,从而影响司法独立。     

警务微博的功能演进与发展战略

作为中国政务微博中的支柱性力量,警务微博主要发挥着警务信息公开、舆论引导、警务办公平台三种功能。虽然警务微博兴起时间不长,但从诞生至今,警务微博走过了试验起步、整合发展和创新服务三个阶段,其功能也逐渐深化拓展。根据活跃度、传播力和引导力的不同,警务微博应选择恰当的结构战略和功能战略。警务微博的发展对于公安机关在新时期密切联系群众及创新社会管理,具有积极意义。     

死刑存废、公众舆论与公众参与——以日本的裁判员制度为视点

国外的实践表明,限制、废除死刑是国家的宏观政治决策,所以公众舆论成为左右死刑决策的重要影响因素,是自然而然的事情。我国决策机构在限制、废除死刑问题上踌躇不前,主要原因也是社会公众对死刑及其适用的强烈支持。从死刑司法与公众舆论之间的互动与交替关系出发,我们应该积极利用公众舆论与死刑司法之间的相互作用机制,形成支持废除死刑的公众舆论,为今后的死刑改革奠定有利的公众舆论基础。从日本裁判员制度实施4年以来的死刑适用现状与舆论调查结果来看,通过扩大死刑司法的公众参与,让社会成员切身感受给出死刑判决所经受的压力,是改变死刑公众舆论的有效途径,完善人民陪审员制度、建立死刑信息公开制度、规范死刑案件公众参与同样是引导公众舆论的有效途径。