Public opinion and government policy in Britain: A case of congruence,amplification or dampening?

This article examines postwar government policy in Britain, as reflected in annual budget speeches. Like previous research, it aims to content‐analyse these speeches to derive estimates of actual, as opposed to intended, government policy stances. Unlike previous research, it also aims to capture and measure the gap between intentions (as represented in electoral manifestos) and actual policy. This gap cannot be assessed from the final output of the Wordscores content analysis programme (in either the original version or the Martin‐Vanberg variation), but it can be teased out of the raw output. This teasing‐out process reveals the gap to be very small: there is no evidence that British governments either moderate or amplify their left‐right stances when in office. This new measurement of government position is then used to cast further light on policy representation in Britain. The findings show that policy positions respond significantly to changes in public opinion as well as to electoral turnover, but do not exhibit or even approach the ideological congruence anticipated by the ‘median mandate’ interpretation of representative democracy.     

A Regional Party in a Centralized Country: The Case of One Osaka in Japan

Among the regional parties that have emerged in Japan against a background of prevalent voter disillusionment with national politics, by far the most prominent and successful example is One Osaka (Osaka Ishin no kai), which won both the 2011 gubernatorial and mayoral elections (‘double elections’) in Osaka against rivals backed by both major national parties before expanding into a national party. The present study attempts to place this party in a comparative context and analyses a voter survey to test the extent to which party support is attributable to political alienation, local factors, policy stances and favourable views of candidates. Results show that backing for One Osaka was based less on issue preferences or general disaffection with national politics, but instead motivated primarily by positive attitudes towards its candidates, particularly the party leader. The article also traces the party's expansion into national politics, compares its leadership with regional parties in other countries and discusses its future prospects.     

Racial attitudes and belief in redeemability: Most Whites believe justice-involved Black people can change

Public belief in redeemability reduces punitiveness and increases support for policy measures such as rehabilitation, expungement, and housing and employment opportunities. Although racial attitudes are known to influence a wide range of criminal justice policy opinions, their effects on beliefs about redeemability and condemnation have not been fully explored. Using data from a 2019 YouGov survey of a national sample of White U.S. adults (N = 766), the current study estimates the effects of three distinct racial attitudes—racial resentment, racial sympathy, and White nationalism—on three measures of belief in redeemability: 1) a race-neutral measure, 2) a measure of belief in redeemability of Black offenders, and 3) a measure of condemnation of Black offenders. The results indicate that belief in redeemability is high—for offenders in general and for Black offenders. These findings are supported by a second 2022 YouGov survey of White U.S. adults (N = 1,505). Racial sympathy and White nationalism have significant effects across all three outcomes, with the positive effect of White nationalism on condemnation of Black offenders being the largest across the three models. These findings suggest that although most Whites agree that formerly incarcerated people are redeemable, racial attitudes influence these beliefs, especially for Black offenders.     

Assessing the Influence of Political Parties on Public Opinion: The Challenge from Pretreatment Effects

Despite generations of research, political scientists have trouble pinpointing the influence of political parties on public opinion. Recently, scholars have made headway in exploring whether parties in fact shape policy preferences by relying on experimental designs. Yet, the evidence from this work is mixed. I argue that the typical experiment faces a design problem that likely minimizes the extent to which parties apparently matter. Because parties have policy reputations, experimental participants may already know from real-world exposure to political debate where the parties stand before they are told in the experiment—they are “pretreated.” This study investigates how real-world political context interferes with party cue stimulus in experiments. In two experiments I show that two types of “pretreatment” from outside the experiment—exposure-based and reputation-based—dramatically moderate the effects of party cues in experiments. Moreover, the politically aware participants—who are most likely to have been pretreated before entering the experiment—are the most sensitive to this interference from real-world context. Paradoxically, experimenters are most likely to find no effect of parties at the very time that their influence is strongest outside the experiment. These findings emphasize the importance of keeping real-world context in mind when designing and analyzing experiments on political communication effects and might help reconcile disparate results of previous party cue experiments.     

Expressing or fuelling discontent? The relationship between populist voting and political discontent

Many studies have found that political discontent and populist voting are positively related. Yet, an important shortcoming of these studies is that they interpret the correlation between these two phenomena as evidence that existing feelings of political discontent contribute to the support for populist parties. We argue that there is also a causal effect in the opposite direction: Populist parties fuel political discontent by exposing their supporters to a populist message in which they criticize the elite. Our study links individual level data on political discontent of voters to the populist message of the party they intend to vote for, employing various operationalizations of populism. Based on a 6-wave panel study from the Netherlands (2008–2013), we conclude that political discontent is both cause and consequence of the rise of populist parties. Our findings imply that the effect of political discontent on populist voting has been overestimated in many previous studies.     

Does voter polarisation induce party extremism? The moderating role of abstention

This article contributes to the literature on representation by examining how the ideological polarisation of the electorate affects parties’ programmatic positions in multiparty systems. The main argument is that parties face incentives to adopt more extreme positions when the electorate becomes more ideologically polarised and the share of non-moderate voters is higher. The reason is that by adopting moderate positions parties will prompt their non-moderate core constituents to sit out the election. This risk is conditioned by voters’ propensity to abstain. A higher (lower) propensity to abstain means that parties alienate a larger (smaller) share of their core constituents when adopting a moderate position. Parties therefore respond to greater voter polarisation by adopting more extreme positions, but the effect declines as voters’ propensity to abstain decreases. An empirical analysis of parties’ programmatic positions in 11 Western European countries between 1977 and 2016 strongly supports this expectation.     

Popular support for legislatures in Asia

Legislatures have long served as the fundamental organ of democratic rule. They bring together disparate views and competing preferences in one venue as an effort to introduce a equitable means of compromise to produce policies that affect those whom legislatures represent. They also check the authoritarian tendencies of other government actors, notably the executive, and create the conditions for institutionalised, rather than violent, debate. The legislatures of democratic Asia are no different. In this paper, I evaluate popular support for assemblies across the democracies of Asia, in terms of their legitimacy and use as a check on power. Traditional measures of support, including age, education, and liberal values, indicate growing support for legislatures. However, the significant effects of economic evaluations and the limited attachment to political parties suggest that the legislatures of Asia are still far from consolidating their role as assemblies that support democratic regimes in the region.     

大众媒介对职工影响的现状与问题

大众媒介对职工群体日常生活和思想具有重要的影响,特别是随着互联网的日益普及,网络新媒体成为职工舆情表达的重要平台.但当前大众媒介对职工的影响存在三大失衡:职工对新闻媒介的满意度与媒介对职工的影响力不相称、工人新闻的数量与庞大的工人队伍不平衡、工人对新闻的需求与新闻媒介的现状还有距离.为此,应加大对职工群体的报道,充分利...     

Why are the highly educated more sympathetic towards welfare recipients?

Stigmatising stereotypes about welfare recipients play a crucial role in building public support for welfare retrenchment. Existing literature finds that the highly educated are more sympathetic towards welfare recipients. This is surprising given the economic advantage associated with educational attainment. Furthermore, educational attainment has increased even as sympathy for welfare recipients has declined. I address these puzzles using three decades of British survey data and find that it is the socially liberal attitudes rather than the economic advantage associated with higher education that explains why this group is sympathetic towards welfare recipients. These findings reveal an educational cleavage in stereotypes about welfare recipients, which is based on non-economic concerns, and has implications for support for welfare retrenchment and policies such as increased conditionality. This cleavage is weaker in more highly educated regions, implying that there are diminishing returns from increasing educational attainment in terms of sympathetic attitudes towards welfare recipients.