加强会计监督的法律思考

会计监督作为会计的基本职能之一,是依照国家法律和各项财经政策、规章制度对会计工作实行的监督,其利用正确的会计信息对经济活动进行全面、综合地协调、控制、监督、督促,以达到提高经济效益的目的。市场经济的有序运作离不开会计监督。目前,随着经济体制改革的深化,更需要强有力的会计监督。然而,由于种种原因,会计监督呈现出弱化态势,致使经济领域中不规范的经济行为与违法犯罪层出不穷,因此,强化会计监督就显得日益重要。     

The European Parliament as an actor in EU border policies: its role,relations with other EU institutions,and impact

This contribution focuses on the European Parliament (EP) as an actor in European Union (EU) border policies. It situates the Parliament in the dynamics of the Schengen project and discusses the distinct role it plays therein, as well as its impact thereon. The article argues that the EP managed to establish itself, years before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, as a credible actor in border policies able to bring the citizens’ perspective into EU border policies. With its keen interest in the Schengen area as an area in which citizens can move freely without being subject to border controls, and with its focus on fundamental rights, it played, and continues to do so, a role in ensuring that “Schengen works”. The article presents its powers and the interplay with the other EU institutions, mainly on the basis of a number of key examples.     

论社区矫正的管理制度

社区矫正的目的之一,是使被矫正人员增强社会适应性,成功地重新与社会结合,在社区矫正的适用方式上,是要教育、处遇、监督、管理等多种形式并举。要达到社区矫正目的,就必须有相应的制度加以规范和约束。这里所讲的管理制度,是社区矫正实施过程中所贯彻执行的主要制度。     

Covert action and congressional oversight: A deontology

Abstract

Covert action, i.e. covert operations whose main object is not the collection of intelligence, is a child of the Cold War. Almost haphazardly, it came to be conducted by the CIA, the nation's principal foreign intelligence service. Covert action, in its early years surrounded by secrecy, did not become legally subjected to congressional oversight until the Hughes‐Ryan Amendment, 14 years after the Bay of Pigs. In this legislation, and in the follow‐on Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980, covert action came under a separate oversight process than the collection of intelligence. In the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991, in which covert action for the first time was officially admitted by name as an activity of the U.S. Government, certain loopholes were addressed which had been revealed by Iran‐Contra (the issues of timely notification of Congress, involvement of third parties, and involvement of other U.S. Government agencies). Issues still remain, including the conduct of liaison with foreign intelligence services, which is outside of the covert action oversight process—although at times such liaisons are made as much for the purpose of establishing influence as for collecting intelligence.     

Parliamentary Questioning in 17 European Parliaments: Some Steps towards Comparison

All democratic parliaments have some procedures to allow representatives to put questions to ministers. However, there are no two parliaments with exactly the same procedures. Cross-national comparisons are hindered by the lack of agreed-upon scientific criteria to group similar procedures, which are too often classified on the basis of their names rather than on their substantive characteristics. To overcome this problem, this article devises a typology of parliamentary questions based on relevant procedural features in 17 European countries. A ranking of parliaments according to the criteria of the effectiveness of procedures is developed and a discussion of the relationship of this ranking to the coalitional characteristics of the parliaments is provided. Finally, the article develops some tentative arguments to explain what influences the development of more or less effective questioning procedures, testing the hypothesis that countries dominated by coalition governments tend to have more effective procedures. In contrast with the authors' expectations, with regard to the countries included in the present analysis, the frequent presence of coalition government is associated with weaker procedures.     

Legislative Oversight under the Nigerian Presidential System

Oversight function is a major component of the activities of modern legislatures irrespective of the form of government in practice. This study examines the extent to which the Nigerian legislature, characterised by infrequent appearances on the political scene and operating in an environment largely dominated by the executive arm, has performed its oversight role. The study, which is basically empirical, argues that the Nigerian legislature has been incapable of effectively performing its oversight role because, in addition to constraints like executive interference, crippling internal conflict, inexperience and high rate of members turnover hampering legislative efficiency, the legislature has compromised its role. However, occasional flashes of a measure of assertiveness by the legislature suggest that with effective mitigation of its internal problems its performance will improve as legislative culture deepens.     

An Examination of Oversight and Review in the Child Welfare System

Abstract

Child welfare agencies are accountable to the community not only because they spend public dollars, but also, most critically, because they are charged with protecting vulnerable children. Over the past three decades multiple oversight processes have been initiated as part of an effort to improve accountability in public child welfare. In agencies around the country an array of advocates and monitors regularly review the performance of individual caseworkers. While caseloads grow in number and complexity the ranks of the workforce have not kept pace. The result is too many people watching too few workers serve too many vulnerable children and families.

This paper examines the cumulative effect of five groups of “watchers” that oversee child welfare services. It suggests that every group of watchers should be able to demonstrate that their activities contribute directly to the achievement of system goals.     

Not yet a democracy: establishing civilian authority over the security sector in Brazil – lessons for other countries in transition

Brazil is considered one of the more successful examples of democratic transition and consolidation in the developing world; and one of the fastest developing and emerging countries. This article contends that Brazil is not yet a fully established democracy, because it lacks the proper civilian checks and balances ensuring full authority over the armed forces, police and secret services. There are five main reasons for this: first, the Constitution does not provide a generalised guide for the institution of civilian oversight. Second, a change of cultural perceptions vis-à-vis the security sector entities is needed. Third, piecemeal rather than holistic or comprehensive legal and institutional transformation has occurred, with little civilian oversight of the armed forces. Fourth, the large structures still held by each of the armed forces require re-articulation and fundamental transformation. Finally, there is no fully fledged civil society participation in security sector life through the media and academia. These problems weaken democracy in Brazil. The course of democratisation in Brazil and the role the security sector played in the transition are examined before discussion of some of the more recent legal and political developments in the security sector, as part of the democratic consolidation. The conclusion presents insights from Brazil’s experience and lessons for states facing similar transition challenges.     

Parliamentary oversight and corruption in the Caribbean: comparing Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada

Parliamentary oversight is a key determinant of corruption levels. This article presents research findings on parliamentary oversight in two Caribbean countries: Trinidad & Tobago and Grenada. Our results cast doubt on the results of previous research and also indicate that certain facets of ‘the Westminster’ system need to be relaxed, to reflect contextual reality in smaller island economies. Political will to adopt our recommended reforms is critical, but, as in other countries, inertia often dominates the political environment. Until citizens demand that their elected representatives establish various oversight and anti-corruption mechanisms and ensure these mechanisms are free of political influence, the institutions will be ‘window dressing’ and corrupt actions will go undeterred and unpunished.     

Community policing in indigenous societies – Venezuela: a country profile

In this paper we examine how local citizens and community organizations together have helped shape policing in their neighborhoods, providing new insights into how community policing operates in Venezuela. We also emphasize the unique attributes of policing practice and the current challenges of communal policing.