Mandating – a likely scrutiny instrument for regional parliaments in EU affairs?

ABSTRACT

Scrutinising governments lies at the heart of parliamentary activities in EU affairs. This applies to national as well as to regional parliaments, most of which possess a toolbox of scrutiny instruments, including the power to mandate, allowing for the strongest form of scrutiny vis-à-vis governments. The article investigates the existence of mandating tools in the 70 regional parliaments equipped with legislative competences in Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, whose role in EU affairs has been strengthened by stipulations in the Lisbon Treaty. It is argued that mandating tools are, first, not widely used; second, they are more commonly applied in cases where national parliaments act as ‘policy shapers’ – enabling policy transfer – and if meso-level factors involving territorial politics create further incentives. In sum, the regional parliaments in six member states are still trying to find a place in the maturing EU multi-level parliamentary system.     

Conclusion: regional parliaments – a distinct role in the EU?

ABSTRACT

Regional parliaments can shape EU policy-making via a range of domestic and European channels. In the context of a renewed interest in the subnational level, this article aims to address three core questions: have regional parliaments really been empowered by the early warning system provisions? Which factors explain differences in strength and mobilisation? Finally, what kind of a role do regional parliaments play in EU policy-making today, now that they have had several years to react to the trend towards multilevel parliamentarism? The authors argue that regional parliaments do indeed have the potential to contribute a distinct perspective to EU policy-making, even if their current level of activity is still low. Their distinctive territorial focus sets them apart from national parliaments. Their level of activity still varies greatly between parliaments depending on a number of factors.     

Legislatures and civil‒military relations in the United States and the United Kingdom

Abstract

Legislatures in separation of powers systems like the US are often portrayed as having far greater capabilities and willingness to change defence policy than are parliaments in Westminster systems. This paper uses principal?agent models and hypotheses on legislative will to review the role of defence committees in the US Congress and Britain’s parliament during each country’s most recent, significant change in civil?military relations. Congressional committees drafted the 1986 Goldwater?Nichols Act over the objections of the president, fundamentally changing US civil?military relations. We would expect the British House of Commons to be at the opposite end of the spectrum, unable and unwilling to act without the prime minister’s blessing. At first glance, this is indeed what happened during Britain’s 2011 Defence Reform effort. Parliament took no concrete, independent action. A closer examination, however, suggests that parliamentary committees helped set the agenda for the 2011 reforms. These results point to the need to carefully assess both legislative capabilities and will when examining the role of legislatures in foreign policy, as well as the indirect means by which parliaments affect security policy.     

Inter-parliamentary European Union–Latin American Caribbean (EU-LAC) relations and the increasing political convergence among Latin American regional parliaments (2006–15)

Europe and Latin America present a long-standing tradition of parliamentary diplomacy and particularly in the development of regional parliaments. Since the 1970s, inter-parliamentary relations between the two regions have been institutionalized, first by the regular dialogue of the European Parliament with the Latin American Parliament (Parlatino) and more recently, in 2006, with the creation of the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (EuroLat). Apart from representatives of Parlatino, EuroLat includes in the European Union-Latin American Caribbean (EU-LAC) parliamentary dialogue members of other regional assemblies created in recent decades, such as the Andean Parliament, the Central American Parliament and the Mercosur Parliament. However, recent EuroLat meetings have made evident a polarization of positions on regional politics between European and Latin American sides, especially regarding the political and human rights situation in Venezuela. In this sense, the present paper analyzes the impact of EU-LAC relations on the political convergence of Latin American parliaments concerning regional political issues. The aim is to discuss how institutionalized relations with the European Parliament, through EuroLat, increased convergence among Latin American parliamentarians. This argument is exemplified by the joint defensive position on the Venezuelan political situation adopted by Latin American parliamentarians vis-à-vis the European Parliament's condemnatory position.     

Fixed‐Term Parliaments and the Challenges for Governments and the Civil Service: A Comparative Perspective

The Fixed‐term Parliaments Act significantly reduces the powers of the Prime Minister to manage the risk of government termination and to time elections to his or her party's advantage. In this paper we ask how the Act is likely to change the way in which governments terminate, their durability and opportunities for planning in government and departments. In answering these questions we draw on quantitative comparative evidence from other European countries that operate with fixed‐term parliaments. Our analysis suggests that fixing the parliamentary term can be expected to convert some opportunistically called elections into regular elections and to stabilise governments toward the end of the parliamentary term. But the Act is also likely to have unanticipated consequences in increasing governments’ vulnerability to failure before they reach the final sessions of Parliament. We explore these unanticipated consequences and outline their implications for governing style and Civil Service planning.     

Voter–Representative Congruence in Europe: A Loss of Institutional Influence?

What is the level of voter–elite congruence in Europe and how is it affected by institutions? This article presents a different conceptualisation and new data to comparative research on congruence between voters and their representatives in 15 European countries. The originality of this work is mainly in its use of the most appropriate cross-national data for the conceptualisation of congruence as a ‘many-to-many’ relationship, using for the first time a survey of representatives to replace expert and public opinion on legislators’ attitudes. The study’s results show that congruence in European countries is relatively high in terms of left–right positions and, surprisingly, even higher regarding the question of EU integration. However, while we find enough evidence to link ideological congruence to mostly electoral institutions, it seems the same factors have no relation to the European unification dimension of congruence. This indicates the different nature of congruence in both the ideological and EU integration dimensions. Additionally, the present study found congruence to be higher for the group of voters rather than non-voters, and also higher for voters interested in politics as well as voters with a university degree.