推进马克思主义政党建设思想的大众化

马克思主义政党建设思想大众化是推进马克思主义大众化、推进党的建设伟大工程的需要,是总结苏联共产党失败经验得出的结论。马克思主义政党建设思想大众化有其固有的内涵、对象、内容与方式。必须以改革创新的精神推进党的建设思想的大众化,要以普通党员和人民群众特别是农村党员和农民为重点,要与科学性和时代性相结合起来,要面向解决重大现实理论问题。     

新思考、新理念、新教育——中国延安干部学院党性教育拓展研究

根据＂发扬传统,发挥优势,发展特色＂的原则,采取＂寓党性教育于严格的组织生活之中、寓党性教育于马克思主义理论教学之中、寓党性教育于丰富的社会实践活动之中、寓党性教育于学员管理之中＂等针对性的措施,实现理论与实际、学习与运用、言论与行动相统一,是增强中国延安干部学院党性教育的重要措施。     

尊重党员主体地位和保障党员民主权利的理论基础及时代价值

马克思主义经典作家阐述了尊重党员主体地位与保障党员民主权利的一系列原则问题，为确立党员主体地位和保障党员民主权利奠定了基础。同时，我们党提出“尊重党员主体地位，保障党员民主权利”的重要论断具有鲜明的时代内涵和丰富的时代价值。     

困境与革命——对合同相对性的第三人解读

合同相对性原则是合同法的一块基石。但是在合同相对性的本质中，就已经孕育了革命的种子——第三人。20世纪以来，经济的复杂化和交易的日趋频繁。使得这粒种子茁壮成长，并突破了它的内核，因此，应当承认革命者的地位，重新界定合同相对性的内核，建立第三人制度，平衡第三人与合同当事人利益。     

The Quiet Revolution? The Labour Party and Welfare Conditionality

Labour's 2017 general election manifesto contained a pledge to ‘end the punitive sanctions regime’ in the British welfare state. Whilst the specific implications of this pledge were not elaborated, such a policy would nevertheless constitute a profound break with a welfare consensus spanning over twenty years. The depth of the suggested changes on welfare are also evident in the scale of reform proposed to disability benefits, as well as plans—confirmed in August 2018 by the Shadow Chancellor John McDonnell—to pilot universal basic income. Collectively, these policies would seemingly be deeply at odds with public opinion on the benefits system, which over the course of the last two decades has significantly hardened. Yet despite the seemingly radical and controversial nature of the policy, it received very little media or public attention during the election campaign. This article explores Labour's ‘quiet revolution’ on welfare, examining whether Labour's new welfare approach is indeed a bold attempt to reshape public opinion on welfare or, alternatively, a mostly pragmatic reaction to changing social attitudes. The argument presented is that whilst there are persuasive explanations that Labour is responding to a change in the public mood, there is also evidence of a more ambitious goal at stake: the aim of reshaping, not simply responding to, public opinion on the welfare state.     

Party convergence and vote switching: Explaining mainstream party decline across Europe

How can one explain the significant vote losses of mainstream parties across Europe in recent years? In this article, it is argued that mainstream party convergence is an important determinant of the recent political and electoral volatility in European party systems. More specifically, it is hypothesised that as mainstream parties converge on the left-right scale, voters will switch from supporting a mainstream party to a non-mainstream party in the next election as they look for an alternative that better represents their ideological views. To test these theoretical expectations, data is combined from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems and the Manifestos Project for nearly 15,000 vote choices of individual voters in 30 elections in 16 West and East European countries from 2001 until 2013. The findings have important implications for understanding the recent rise of non-mainstream parties, the changing nature of party systems and the increasing complexity of cabinet formation across Europe.     

Responding to the crisis: Eurosceptic parties of the left and right and their changing position towards the European Union

At the time of the election of the European Parliament (EP) in 2014, the European Union (EU) was heavily affected by a multifaceted crisis that had – and still has – far-reaching implications for the political system of its member countries, but also for the European level of governance. Against the background of the strong Eurosceptic vote in the 2014 EP elections, this study aims to investigate in which way Eurosceptic parties of the left and the right respond to the multiple crises of the EU. Using data from the Euromanifesto Project from 2004/2009 and 2014, changes in the party positions towards the EU are analysed in the shadow of the multiple crises and the reasons thereof are explored. The findings show a general anti-European shift among the two types of Eurosceptic parties. Nevertheless, the changes in the EU polity tone are not determined by issue-based repercussions of the multiple crises, but by the EU-related evaluation – the polity mood – of the national citizenry. For far-right Eurosceptic parties, the shift is moderated by the level of public support for EU integration in their national environment. Among far-left Eurosceptic parties, by contrast, it is moderated by the more specific public attitudes about the monetary union policy of the EU. Consequently, political parties when drafting their manifestos for EP elections are not so much guided by the objective severity of political problems or by the evaluations of these problems by the citizenry. What matters in the end is the link that citizens themselves are able to establish between the severity of political problems, on the one hand, and the responsibility of the EU for these problems on the other. This has important consequences for understanding of the nature and substance of political responsiveness within the EU system of multilevel governance.     

A problem with empirical studies of party policy shifts: Alternative measures of party shifts are uncorrelated

Many recent cross-national studies analyse the causes and electoral consequences of party policy shifts, using party position measures derived from election manifestos, expert surveys or voter surveys. However few studies validate their findings by analysing multiple measures of party policy shifts. In this article, data on European parties’ position shifts on both European integration and left-right ideology is analysed, showing that this is problematic because, while alternative measures of party policy positions correlate strongly in cross-sectional analyses, alternative measures of parties’ policy shifts are essentially uncorrelated in longitudinal analyses. Suggestions are offered on how to address this problem.     

Why do only some people who support parties actually join them? Evidence from Britain

What makes people join a political party is one of the most commonly studied questions in research on party members. Nearly all this research, however, is based on talking to people who have actually joined parties. This article simultaneously analyses surveys of members of political parties in Britain and surveys of non-member supporters of those same parties. This uniquely enables us to model the decision to join parties. The results suggest that most of the elements that constitute the influential ‘General Incentives Model’ are significant. But it also reveals that, while party supporters imagine that selective benefits, social norms and opposing rival parties’ policies are key factors in members’ decisions to join a party, those who actually do so are more likely to say they are motivated by attachments to their party’s values, policies and leaders, as well as by an altruistic desire to support democracy more generally.     

论股东对公司对外诉讼裁判提起第三人撤销之诉——兼评最高人民法院指导案例148号

最高人民法院指导案例148号的裁判要点指出,对于公司与相对人之间的生效裁判,股东无权提起第三人撤销之诉。股东是否为公司对外诉讼的第三人,取决于股东就公司对外法律关系是否有一定的实体法地位。公司对外行为可能有越权、不当关联交易、恶意串通等瑕疵。只有在公司行为构成恶意串通无效时,股东在实体上才有权攻击公司与相对人之间的法律关系,相应地在程序上成为公司诉讼的有独立请求权第三人。若效力瑕疵在实体上仅能由公司主张,则股东因欠缺实体法权限而非为有独立请求权第三人,亦不能基于"代位"而成为无独立请求权第三人。承认股东的原告资格符合第三人撤销之诉的制度机理,且与公司的法人独立人格不矛盾,因为在恶意串通时不存在法人独立人格所保护的法益。股东第三人撤销之诉的效果亦非公司内部救济所能代替。未来应修正该指导案例的裁判规则,承认特定情形下股东的第三人撤销之诉原告资格。