论我国商业银行监管模式的选择与借鉴

银行监管的模式是银行监管制度的核心和灵魂.综合考虑我国银行业风险的现状,国际监管与国内金融改革的总体趋势,以及我国金融开放的整体要求,我国金融监管的模式选择,应以提高金融效率控制资本充足率为核心目标,充分规避金融风险,推进金融市场化法制进程,建立与国际惯例接轨的银行监管体系.     

Regulatory novelty after financial crises: Evidence from international banking and securities standards, 1975–2016

Financial crises are often presented as triggers for important innovations in international regulation of financial markets, but existing evidence for this claim primarily derive from the analyses of individual initiatives, assessed against noncomparable benchmarks. In order to provide systematic evidence of financial crises' impact on international financial regulatory change, this paper develops a novel text-as-data approach to measure regulatory novelty. We use this approach to analyze the full population of international banking and securities standards between 1975 and 2016. Contrary to theoretical expectations, our empirical findings indicate rules designed by international banking and securities regulators following financial crises are on average as likely to build on existing international regulations as those designed before a crisis. We also find that international banking rules published after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis are an important exception.     

Adaptive governance for the Internet of Things: Coping with emerging security risks

The Internet of Things (IoT) is a disruptive innovation known for its socio-economic potential, but also for generating unprecedented vulnerabilities and threats. As a dynamic sociotechnical system, the IoT comprises well-known cybersecurity risks and endemic uncertainties that arise as IoT adoption increases and the system evolves. We highlight the impact of these challenges by analyzing how insecure IoT devices pose threats to both consumer protection and the Internet's infrastructure. While recent regulatory responses are starting to target IoT security risks, crucial deficiencies – especially related to the feedback necessary to keep pace with emerging risks and uncertainties – must be addressed. We propose a model of adaptive regulatory governance that integrates the benefits of centralized risk regulatory frameworks with the operational knowledge and mitigation mechanisms developed by epistemic communities that manage day-to-day Internet security. Rather than focusing on the choice of regulatory instruments, this model builds on the “planned adaptive regulation” literature to highlight the need to systematically plan for a knowledge-sharing interface in regulatory governance design for disruptive technologies, facilitating the feedback necessary to address evolving IoT security risks.     

Designing Regulation Across Organizations: Assessing the Functions and Dimensions of Governance

In recent years, regulation scholars and policymakers have increasingly turned their attention to the role of inter-governmental organizational design in effective governance. The existing literature on regulatory design has provided important insights into the advantages and disadvantages of alternative structural options. This article synthesizes and builds on that literature by describing a novel framework for characterizing, analyzing, and structuring authority across public institutions. Drawing on examples from a range of jurisdictions, it highlights the value of this framework in identifying the values tradeoffs that should drive policymakers' decisions to choose among competing structural alternatives. The framework is founded on two important points. First, inter-governmental allocations of authority can be structured along three different dimensions. Failing to appreciate the existence of, and differences among, these dimensions can prompt misassessments of the reasons for existing regulatory failures and selection of structural allocations that do not suit the problems intended to be addressed. Second, allocations of authority can, and in many cases should, vary for disparate governmental functions. Differential functional allocations of authority can minimize obstacles to needed structural reforms and tailor inter-governmental relations in ways that best promote chosen regulatory values, such as efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability, as well as how allocational choices may and perhaps should vary depending on the governmental function being performed. Finally, the article suggests how future regulation and governance scholarship can harness this emerging framework to help build a body of empirical evidence upon which policymakers can draw in future regulatory design endeavors.     

The local political economy of the regulatory state: Governing affordable housing in England

Regulatory governance involves the use of heterogeneous mechanisms to extract welfare gains from market-based processes. While often viewed as a depoliticization mechanism, here, we explore a distinctly political manifestation of regulatory governance. Our study focuses on the governance of affordable housing in England, specifically on local authorities' use of ‘Section 106′ (S106) powers to compel private developers to include affordable housing in new developments. We show that, following the financial crisis, the governance of affordable housing shifted from a partisan to a valence issue. As the crisis increased the issue salience of affordable housing, left-wing authorities' hitherto higher tendency to intervene was eroded in the midst of a broad-based increase in S106 deployment. In addition to extending insights into the political economy of regulatory state intervention, our findings shed valuable light on the undersupply of affordable housing in England.     

China's new generation trade agreements: Importing rules to lock in domestic reform?

Since the beginning of the 21st century we have witnessed a proliferation of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) in Asia Pacific. China has been at the forefront of this development. Initially, China's PTAs were very shallow and mainly aimed at building friendly relationships with developing countries. However, over time, China has started to negotiate deeper PTAs with developing and developed countries alike. This notable shift has thus far been understood to result from four broad motivations: China's desire to access key export markets; the facilitation of regional production networks; to address resource security concerns; and/or to further geostrategic interests and political influence. We propose that these motives are not sufficient to fully account for China's new generation trade agreements. We suggest that China is increasing its integration into the world economy to push for domestic marketization and reform by credibly committing to trade liberalization through PTAs. Deep and comprehensive PTAs oblige a country to follow a set of rules that leave little leeway to violate the terms. In order to successfully implement and enforce PTA commitments, China has also gradually strengthened its regulatory state by investing in regulatory capacity and capability in the field of trade policy. We test the plausibility of our argument through an in-depth analysis of the PTAs signed by China since 2000 and find evidence that China's PTAs are indeed in part driven by a desire to lock in domestic economic reform, which has gone hand in hand with a strengthening of its regulatory state.     

Agencies without borders: Explaining partner selection in the formation of transnational agreements between regulators

Transnational collaboration between regulatory agencies has proliferated rapidly within the last three decades. However, given that information regarding the motives, trustworthiness, and capabilities of potential partners is typically imperfect, decisions about with whom to collaborate are inevitably characterized by a degree of uncertainty. To better capture these dynamics, this article uses a network analytical perspective and hypothesizes that agencies are more likely to form agreements with agencies to whom they are already indirectly connected (transitivity), that are highly connected (preferential attachment), or with whom they share tie-characteristics (assortativity). To test these hypotheses, a stochastic actor-oriented model is used to analyze an original, self-coded data set in which bilateral information exchange agreements between national securities agencies (n = 143) are mapped out over a 18-year period. The results show that the formation of agreements between regulatory agencies is driven by (i) the number of shared partners (i.e. triadic closure); and (ii) similarity regarding agency characteristics (i.e. homophily).     

The political economy of Australian regulatory reform

The problem of regulatory accumulation has increasingly been recognised as a policy problem in its own right. Governments have then devised and implemented regulatory reform policies that directly seek to ameliorate the burdens of regulatory accumulation (e.g. red tape reduction targets). In this paper we examine regulatory reform approaches in Australia through the lens of policy innovation. Our contributions are twofold. We first examine the evolutionary discovery process of regulatory reform policies in Australia (at the federal, intergovernmental, and state levels). This demonstrates a process of policy innovation in regulatory mechanisms and measurements. We then analyse a new measurement of regulatory burden based on text analytics, RegData: Australia. RegData: Australia uses textual analysis to count ‘restrictiveness clauses' in regulation – such as ‘must’, ‘cannot’ and ‘shall’ – thereby developing a new database (RDAU1.0). We place this ‘restrictiveness clauses’ measurement within the context of regulatory policy innovation, and examine the potential for further innovation in regulatory reform mechanisms.     

市场与管制的迷思——兼论我国社会保障基金的运营及其监管

社会保障基金大案频发凸显了我国社会保障基金政府主导运营模式的弊端、严格限制投资立法的欠科学性和监管环节的薄弱。面对学界要求社会保障基金市场化的呼声,实现严格监管下的投资开禁、引导基金运营的市场化和专业化以及强化监管力量是解决当下社会保障基金困境的现实选择,但"一刀切"的全部市场化倾向并不足取,理性的做法应该是根据社会保障基金的不同类型和特性采取不同的管理和运营模式,即分别交由政府和市场运营。与此同时,鉴于不同的运营模式对监管模式的需求亦存有差异,故在不同的运营模式下,监管模式亦应有第三方监管和行政监管之别。     

垄断行业管制体制再改革的战略重点

垄断行业管制体制的再改革是中国深化市场体制和行政体制改革的重要议题。政府管制是市场经济体制下政府的重要基本职能,但政府管制作为一种自由裁量权很容易被滥用,从而出现管制失灵的问题。因此,有效的政府管制必须以有效约束政府行为为核心,实现法治,消除利益集团的阻碍和行政体制运行的内耗,从而建立有效的管制治理制度体系。