Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

What Drives For-Profit and Nonprofit Organizations’ Entry into Voucher Markets?

This study investigates a social service voucher program in Korea to examine why local governments rely on external actors, such as for-profit and nonprofit organizations, in provisioning social services and what encourages such market entry in view of the transaction cost theory. The social service voucher program, first introduced in 2007, offers a unique dataset of 1,101 local markets to examine how local governments are willing to stay in control of provisioning the nationwide program while promoting private actor entry. This study finds that local governments with lower fiscal capacities or in markets in which multiple existing organizations operate are more motivated to foster for-profit entry, whereas only existing nonprofit organizations in the market that provide the same services predict nonprofit entry. The implication is that the facilitation of for-profit entry is associated with local governments’ need to manage transaction costs, although this may not be true for nonprofit entry.     

论设立中公司交易的责任

设立中公司交易就是在设立公司过程中的交易行为,是设立中公司的行为。设立中公司交易主要有设立中公司合同和发起人协议。设立中公司在法律地位上属于一种合伙企业,第三人可向承担顺位连带责任的设立中公司与发起人行使双重优先权。英美法系、大陆法系国家的立法对此问题给予了充分关注。我国对于设立中公司交易责任承担的法律规定却很不完善,建议借鉴先进国家立法经验,完善我国的相关立法。     

违约救济的多种模式以及我国的选择

在违约救济领域存在着多种模式,理论上较为完善的有大陆模式、英美模式以及国际模式三种。我国在借鉴的过程中,不仅要分析这些模式本身的利弊,还要考虑自身的条件和需求。鉴于大陆模式更有助于培养诚信意识、建立交易秩序并且对法官的依赖较少,所以应当成为我们主要的制度渊源。     

美国控制股东信义义务:本原厘定与移植回应

控制股东信义义务"移植论"存在方法论误用的缺陷,过度关注概念和规则的译介,而未深究其制度功能所关联的特定社会背景。信义义务根植于普通法特殊的历史土壤,以信托为"母体"并经归纳推理不断扩张泛化,"控制股东信义义务"是这种泛化现象的缩影,早期"受益人利益最大化"内涵已被"公平交易义务"取代。内涵演变的动因是对公司本质认知的进化以及因之发生的个人法向团体法逻辑的持续递进。我国控制股东滥权现象的主要成因并非规范资源不足,转轨时期"政企不分"的现实和公司法体系二元区隔的倾向亦不容忽视。美国关于交易公平性判断的程序性规则有助于克服法律行为评价系统的局限性,具有"复原"商业决策背景的功能,契合复杂的市场环境需求,是最具借鉴价值的部分。     

企业国际化过程中的法律问题研究

本文从企业国际化过程中的“国家”面向。追问了企业在进入某国市场时该国法律对企业国际化选择可能具有的作用：从合约的角度分析了如何运用交易成本及准备成本对企业国际化的约束、上头成本对企业国际化的保护及其限度问题。     

刑罚与赔偿互易之博弈论衡

刑罚与赔偿互易是指民事责任与刑事责任的相互转化,其本质是国家、被害人与罪犯的博弈：犯罪人在满足被害人求偿愿望的同时,获得从宽处罚的机会,国家也因此节约了行刑资源。要使得这种博弈实现利益最大化,应当明确这场博弈中的利害关系主体,并明确这些主体的利益需求,将其设计成类似于合同订立的＂要约与承诺＂模式。     

Economic Competitiveness and Social Policy in Open Economies

While many studies have shown that greater trade openness affects the overall size of social spending, this study emphasizes that it also affects types of social policies that a government prioritizes. When faced with deepening trade competition, governments tend to use different policy measures to address the opportunities and challenges stemming from their economic competitiveness in the international market. Policy makers in countries with high relative labor costs are likely to privilege social insurances and income transfer. This is because as high labor costs make their workers more vulnerable in the trade competition, governments seek to protect skilled labor in order to maintain their economic advantage in advanced industries. In contrast, when relative labor costs are low, human capital investment programs are likely to be emphasized to enhance productivity and the quality of labor to capitalize the cost competitiveness of a country’s workers. The findings from empirical analyzes of 26 OECD economies from 1991 to 2012 support these arguments.     

科斯定理在侵权法制定中的应用

科斯定理认为 ,交易成本的高低对权利规则的制定起着决定性作用。如果交易成本较低 ,权利的原始配置就不会影响太大 ,因为当事人会自行重置 ;但在交易成本较高的情况下 ,一般会保持权利的原始配置状态。科斯定理不仅是经济学原理 ,在侵权法领域也大有作为。     

破产视角下的抵销

为更好地反映抵销制度的正当性基础,应细化抵销的类型,区分“独立的抵销”与“同一交易内的抵销”,并在破产法上作不同的处置.对照“同一交易内的抵销”制度,有助于我们更准确地认识债权债务折算及解除返还的制度,更深刻地理解民法上“牵连关系”、同时履行抗辩、留置权(尤其是商事留置权)等概念或制度,并更好地安排抵销在诉讼法上的处置.从立法论的角度,“同一交易内的抵销”制度可作为未来我国修订企业破产法的参考.在判断可否进行破产抵销时,一方面应继续贯彻破产撤销制度尤其是偏颇清偿制度的基本理念,另一方面应充分考虑抵销制度中的公平考量,承认实际利益主体与名义权利人可能分离的现实,更注重利益的关联,限制转让债权与受让债权的抵销,但同时又不过分拘泥于债权之间形式上的相互性.另外,应重视抵销的担保功能,保护包括后顺序债权人在内的破产债权人于破产程序之外本应享有的权利.在抵销与其他担保权竞争的情况下,原则上应承认抵销的优先性.